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Abstract
This dissertation examines questions of local agency and inclusion. It develops a
conceptual understanding of whether, and if so how, local customary justice mechanisms
could serve as guarantees of non-recurrence. It looks at how grassroots practices of
“justice” could be utilized at the community level to deter the commission of future abuses
and prevent the repetition of violent conflict, especially where the state has been
completely absent. It specifically explores Acholi indigenous and customary practices of
peacemaking and justice in Northern Uganda to understand how local practices could
secure a lasting peace and cement communities’ commitment to peaceful coexistence.
While the prevailing literature tends to conceptualize measures of non-recurrence
as being the purview of a formal state and governmental apparatus, this conceptualization
is based on a narrow idea that state actors are the dominant perpetrators of violence in
armed conflicts. However, recent structural shifts in armed conflict demonstrate that nonstate armed actors equally commit severe atrocities, resulting in varying degrees of state
control, ranging from perennial weakness to complete absence. Therefore, I argue that to
effectively terminate violence and prevent the future reoccurrence of violent conflict,
measures of non-recurrence must be viewed as a holistic approach that engages a series of
actors at different levels, especially non-state armed actors and traditional institutions of
conflict management at the local level.
Through the lens of social constructivism, I advance three explanations about how
locally-based customary justice could help prevent the recurrence of violent conflict. First,
I argue that the various customary justice instruments of how victims and perpetrators make
amends at the community level could provide ex-combatants the best route to safely
i

reintegrate into civilian life, which could, in turn, promote peaceful coexistence and reduce
the likelihood of ex-combatants’ return to join armed groups. Second, customary justice
and other traditional conflict management instruments such as local peace deals could also
terminate localized violence, thereby serving as the springboard for broader peace
processes to emerge at the national level. Third, the communal orientation of customary
justice could serve as social control and accountability mechanism, which could perform a
social deterrent function to prevent ex-fighters from returning to combat life.

Keywords
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Summary for Lay Audience

In societies emerging from armed conflict, several measures are often undertaken to secure
long-term peace, including truth-seeking, criminal prosecution of people accused of
wrongdoing, repairing the harms of victims, and actions to prevent the future reversion of
armed conflict. These measures, often designed and implemented by international and
national level actors, fail to secure long-term peace, and most societies tend to revert to
armed conflict. These national-level measures tend to fail because they do not adequately
pay attention to the conflict’s local contexts, including existing local and traditional conflict
management systems. This study explores how existing local traditional and customary
responses to armed conflict could stop ongoing hostilities, prevent future reversion to that
conflict, and secure long-term peace. I advance three arguments about how traditional and
customary transitional justice measures could potentially stop armed conflict and prevent
a future reversion to violence.
First, I argue that customary transitional justice mechanisms are more suitable to
help reintegrated ex-fighters when they return from fighting in the bush. Customary justice
is more suitable because they tend to focus on the social dimensions of reintegration of the
ex-fighters to reconnect with their families and the general community to get their civilian
life back. Second, because recent armed conflict involves several non-state armed groups
who often fight against each other at the local level, it might be helpful to pay attention to
securing a local level peace agreement among local non-state armed groups. The idea here
is that once various local armed groups agree to stop fighting, there could be a “trickle-up”
effect, which could provide avenues for larger peace negotiations to emerge at the national
level, which could secure long-term peace. Finally, I argue that customary justice
iii

mechanisms often focus on the social dimension, and communities take a collective
responsibility to correct their members’ wrongs. As a result of this communal nature of
customary justice, the entire community serves as a social accountability mechanism that
puts “checks” on their potential wrongdoers in their community. This social accountability
mechanism could be a powerful tool to prevent people from joining armed groups or
participating in armed conflict.
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Chapter 1
1

Introduction

This thesis develops a conceptual understanding of whether, and if so how, local customary
justice mechanisms could serve as guarantees of non-recurrence within the scholarly field
of transitional justice. The arguments in this study draw from two related bodies of
literature—peacebuilding and transitional justice. Before I proceed, it is imperative to
illustrate the connection between the two bodies of literature. Historically, peacebuilding
and transitional justice have developed mainly in parallel to each other.1 However, in
reality, peacebuilding and transitional justice are bound up together because both bodies of
literature tend to engage with similar issues and often have shared goals—that is, how to
deal with the legacies of armed conflict.2 The United Nations (UN) defined peacebuilding
as “action[s] to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify
peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”3 Transitional justice, therefore, is part of
the broader peacebuilding agenda, one of the elements of peacebuilding that could
strengthen and solidify peace.4
Transitional justice, broadly, “is the full range of processes and mechanisms
associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past

Dustin N. Sharp, “Beyond the Post-Conflict Checklist: Linking Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice
through the Lens of Critique,” Chicago Journal of International Law 14, no. 1 (2013): 165.
2
Catherine Baker and Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik, “Mapping the Nexus of Transitional Justice and
Peacebuilding,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 10, no. 3 (July 2, 2016): 281,
https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2016.1199483; Sharp, “Beyond the Post-Conflict Checklist,” 186.
3
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping”
(UN Security Council, 1992), para. 21, available from
file:///C:/Users/ibayo/Downloads/%5EST_%5EDPI_1247-EN.pdf.
4
A more detailed illustration of the link between peacebuilding and transitional justice is explored in
chapter 3.
1
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abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.”5 The
transitional justice field has several mechanisms that contribute in different ways to
promote long-term peace. One of such mechanisms is guarantees of non-repetition, which
is part of a comprehensive strategy to redress the aftermath of armed conflict, along with
truth-seeking, individual criminal justice, and repairing the harms of victims.
Measures of non-recurrence are interventions taken to prevent the future
reoccurrence of armed conflict or prevent future rights violations.6 In the post-conflict
context, the mainstream transitional justice literature tends to conceive measures of nonrecurrence narrowly, as state-centric, driven mainly through national and international
level actors.7 The measures commonly used as guarantees of non-recurrence include
reforming state institutions, vetting the security forces and the judiciary, training security
forces in human rights, and subjecting governmental apparatus to international scrutiny.8
The core critique of these international and state-centric measures is that they tend to follow
a pattern often determined by the dominant liberal peacebuilding and transitional justice
framework.9 Among other things, the liberal peace framework is premised on the idea that
democratic governance, the rule of law, strong and accountable state institutions are vital
to promoting sustainable peace in societies emerging from armed violence. Although these

United Nations, “Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional
Justice” (United Nations General Assembly, March 2010), 2; available from
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf.
6
Pablo de Greiff, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and
Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, Human Rights Council Thirtieth Session, A/HRC/30/42 (New York:
United Nations General Assembly, 2015), para. 16, available from
file:///C:/Users/ibayo/Downloads/A_HRC_30_42-EN.pdf.
7
Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, “Guarantees of Non-Recurrence: An Approximation,” Human Rights Quarterly
39, no. 2 (2017): 416–48, https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2017.0024.
8
de Greiff, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and
Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, 2015, para. 23.
9
Chapter 3 discusses liberal peace in detail.
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state-centric measures are essential, they often fail to secure those kinds of guarantees to
prevent societies from reverting to armed violence.10
The state-centric model often fails because they tend not to capture the multiple
configurations that exist below the level of the state, since African states, in particular,
were simply divided up by the European powers without any consideration of who lived
there, thereby producing a variegated nation.11 In the Ugandan context, several scholars
have observed that the bundling of different ethnic groups together within the borders of a
single political state by the colonial imperialists created acrimonious relationships, which
partly contributed to the conflict.12 Therefore, most national and international-level
mechanisms of responding to armed conflict often fail to resonate with realities of the
specific local contexts, and they often lack a connection among post-conflict societies who
often have their “own understandings of identity, sovereignty, institutions, rights, law and
needs according to their… socio-historical and cultural traditions.”13
The limitations and relative failure of liberal state-centric forms of transitional
justice to prevent the reoccurrence of violence have prompted scholars and practitioners to
consider the utility of other forms of mechanisms that could prevent the reversion of armed
conflict and advance the conditions of peace. This has led scholars and practitioners to turn

Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Measures of Non-Repetition in Transitional Justice: The Missing Link?” in From
Transitional Justice to Transformative Justice, ed. Paul Gready and Simon Robins (Cambridge UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2019), 105–30.
11
Fredrick Kisekka-Ntale, “Roots of the Conflict in Northern Uganda,” The Journal of Social, Political and
Economic Studies 32, no. 4 (2007): 423.
12
Kisekka-Ntale, “Roots of the Conflict in Northern Uganda,” 423–25; see also Ogenga Otunnu, Crisis of
Legitimacy and Political Violence in Uganda, 1979 to 2016, African Histories and Modernities (London,
UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Samwiri Rubaraza Karugire, A Political History of Uganda (Nairobi:
Heinemann Educational Books, 1980).
13
Oliver P Richmond, “Failed Statebuilding versus Peace Formation,” Cooperation and Conflict 48, no. 3
(September 1, 2013): 379, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836713482816.
10
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their attention to, and call for, the use of customary and grassroots practices of responding
to armed violence.
This project contributes directly to that literature to advance an understanding of
how locally based, traditional, and customary justice could serve as measures that ensure
the non-repetition of armed conflict and cement communities’ commitment to peaceful
coexistence. I argue that the mainstream transitional justice literature, which tends to frame
guarantees of non-recurrence within the state-centric liberal peace framework, is narrow,
restrictive, and does not account for the complexity of contemporary armed conflicts and
civil wars. In contemporary armed conflicts, armed actors and other agents of violence
often include non-state armed groups, which play crucial roles concerning how societies
confront past abuses and ensure long-lasting peace and stability.14 These complexities in
armed violence present new challenges, including the blurring of victims and perpetrators,
leading to difficulties in attributing responsibility.15 In addition, in most communitarian
African societies, the understanding of conflict and peace is constitutive of their social
relationships and the normative orders of society.16 The neoliberal framework of conflict
and peace does not often go far enough to consider these constructions of the social reality
of people affected by conflict, which partly explains why they often fail. These new
realities of armed conflict meant that measures to prevent the reversion of armed conflict
must look beyond the focus on democratic governance and statebuilding. Instead, measures

Annyssa Bellal, “Non-State Armed Groups in Transitional Justice Processes: Adapting to New Realities
of Conflict,” in Justice Mosaics: How Context Shapes Transitional Justice in Fractured Societies, ed.
Roger Duthie and Paul Seils (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2017), 1.
15
Pablo de Greiff, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and
Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, Human Rights Council Twenty-First Session, A/HRC/21/46 (New York:
United Nations General Assembly, 2012), para. 53; available from
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HRC-2146_en.pdf.
16
The issue of the social construction of conflict and peace is discussed in detail in chapter 5
14
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of non-recurrence must be thought of as a holistic approach that engages a series of actors
at different levels, especially traditional authorities, non-state armed actors, and other
agents of violence at the local level.

1.1 Research Question
This thesis answers one fundamental question: How do customary responses to armed
conflict achieve measures of non-repetition—that is, stopping armed conflict, preventing a
future reversion to that conflict, and cement communities’ commitment to peaceful
coexistence? While customary justice and other traditional conflict management systems
have long been viewed to play crucial roles in promoting reconciliation and restore social
relations, they have not been thought of within the context of measures of non-repetition.
This question arises in part from my work in grassroots peacebuilding. Before
returning to the academy, I spent many years working with several peacebuilding
organizations in West Africa, particularly in Ghana. Although most of the projects I worked
on have been at the subnational and grassroots levels, the interventions are not based on
local approaches. Instead, the interventions tend to be skewed toward neoliberal
instrumental approaches to peacebuilding. For example, most of our interventions are
based on the Western principles of mediation, dialogue, peace education, and developing
the capacities of local-level decentralized government agencies to promote democratic
governance, the rule of law, and accountability. Even when I engage local elders and
traditional authorities in mediation and dialogue, I often follow the western-inspired
technocratic blueprint of mediation “best practices.” The result of using these technocratic
blueprints is superficial peace outcomes that are not sustainable because those approaches
fall short and tend to overlook local contextual repertoires of knowledge of conflict
5

resolution and customary justice practices. Also, I observed that transitional justice and
peacebuilding often occur in relative silos, although they often aim to accomplish similar
goals. That is to say, peacebuilding and transitional justice interventions tend to occur in
isolation, and there are not many synergetic effects that are necessary for sustainable
peacebuilding. Based on these observations and the lessons I learned from my practical
peacebuilding experience, I developed an interest in exploring ways practitioners can
increase the quality of post-conflict reconstruction approaches to prevent conflict
reoccurrence. Over the years, I have focused my academic inquiry on exploring how local
contextual knowledge and customary practices of conflict and dispute resolution might add
value to peacebuilding and transitional justice synergistically.
This research question is important because it constructs a revised notion of
measures of non-recurrence beyond its very restrictive and state-centric usage to include
the local as a site for better-enforced measures of non-recurrence. This new framing could
provide scholars and practitioners a broader set of tools regarding how measures of nonrecurrence could better be implemented, which accounts for the new realities of armed
conflict in terms of the role of local agents and non-state armed actors.

1.2 Original Contribution to Current State of Knowledge
In response to the challenges of the state-centered peacebuilding and transitional justice
approaches, researchers have made considerable efforts to examine how different aspects
of transitional justice mechanisms could be localized to better respond to the specific
context in which they are applied. While the literature on how to localize truth-seeking and

6

reparation abounds, this is not the case with guarantees of non-repetition.17 The state of
research on guarantees of non-repetition invites closer attention and a different level of
analysis that goes beyond state-centric approaches. This study makes three interrelated
original contributions to the state of knowledge about the utility of customary justice to
guarantees of non-repetition.
First, there are many studies on the utility of customary justice to some aspects of
transitional justice, such as acknowledgment, truth-seeking, social repair, and
reconciliation. However, to date, there has not been adequate academic attention to
customary justice’s future-looking and conflict-prevention potential. Yet, most customary
justice practices and traditional conflict resolution approaches aim to maintain community
harmony and preserve future relationships, especially in communitarian African
societies. 18 As a result, I argue that the future-looking orientation of customary justice
makes them inherently conflict prevention and non-repetition mechanisms. This
interpretation of the utility of customary justice makes a novel contribution to the academic
literature because it presents an account of how customary approaches of social repair and
reconciliation could work as guarantees of non-repetition. I moved away from statecentered practices, such as the reform of abusive state security apparatus, and using a local,

17

Pablo de Greiff, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and
Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, Human Rights Council Thirtieth Session, A/HRC/30/42 (New York:
United Nations General Assembly, 2015), 9, file:///C:/Users/ibayo/Downloads/A_HRC_30_42-EN.pdf;
Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, “Guarantees of Non-Recurrence: An Approximation,” Human Rights Quarterly
39, no. 2 (2017): 416, https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2017.0024; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Measures of NonRepetition in Transitional Justice: The Missing Link?,” in From Transitional Justice to Transformative
Justice, ed. Paul Gready and Simon Robins (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 105–30.
18
Guy Oliver Faure, “Traditional Conflict Management in Africa and China,” in Traditional Cures for
Modern Conflicts: African Conflict “Medicine,” ed. William I. Zartman (Boulder, Col: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2000), 159; Joe A. D Alie, “Reconciliation and Traditional Justice: Tradition-Based Practices of
the Kpaa Mende in Sierra Leone,” in Traditional Justice and Reconciliation After Violent Conflict:
Learning from African Experiences, ed. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter (Stockholm: International Idea, 2008),
40.
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situated lens to examine how culturally specific justice practices could help rebuild
individual and community harmony and prevent the reoccurrence of armed violence. This
new interpretation of the utility of customary justice generates new ideas, and directions of
measures of non-repetition, which stands to change the way conflict is resolved around the
world.
Second, the concept of guarantees of non-repetition itself is still developing and a
relatively new domain in the post-conflict peacebuilding and transitional justice literature.
The literature on guarantees of non-repetition in this arena is scant, and no thorough sketch
of the concept exists, even though it has been theorized in other venues. As guarantees of
non-repetition continue to gain more academic and practical attention, there is a need to
understand better their meaning, scope, and how it could be implemented. In this respect,
this thesis fills a gap. This thesis makes an original contribution by providing a foundational
knowledge of the concept by systematic synthesis of the background, historical
development, and concrete examples of how it could be applied. I traced the origins of
guarantees of non-recurrence from its origins in international state relations to its uptake
as one of the mechanisms in the toolbox of dealing with intra-state armed conflicts and
civil wars. In doing so, I synthesize the literature and weaves different streams of research
together to push the boundaries of measures of non-repetition beyond its usual field of
transitional justice and examined its historical development within the broader peace
studies literature. By examining measures of non-repetition within the broader
peacebuilding literature, I critically examined how the concept is closely related to the
cessation of ongoing armed conflict in negotiated peace settlements. The systematic
analysis of the origins of the concept of guarantees of non-repetition is vital to developing

8

a greater understanding of the potential of imagining the local as a site where guarantees
of non-repetition could emerge beyond the conventional state-led practices.
Third, the thesis also elucidates the tension between customary justice and formal
state-centered approaches and showed how the two could interact and co-exist. The tension
and relationship between customary justice and other state-led transitional justice
approaches have been one of the fundamental problems scholars and practitioners have
grappled with. This study gets at this tension by highlighting how the repertoire of local
transitional justice could work alongside other national-level broader transitional justice
mechanisms for a more fulsome and transformative change for long-term peace.
While this thesis seeks to understand how measures of non-recurrence could be
developed through the use of customary transitional justice mechanisms, it is imperative to
note the challenges this raises. One fundamental problem that stands out is the risk of
romanticizing or essentializing the local. As illustrated in detail in chapters 4 and 7, I do
not take the local for granted. The local involves a range of actors and practices, with
varying degrees of competing power relations, which must be recognized.
The local is not perfect, and customary justice and traditional approaches are not a
cure-all when it comes to conflict prevention and addressing the legacies of years of civil
wars and armed conflict. In chapter 4, I discussed some of the weaknesses of customary
justice and other traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. For example, customary
justice may not be consistent with universal human rights norms; they may have a limited
range of applicability; traditional authorities may abuse customary justice for their own
benefit; and millennials may not also understand or be willing to participate in customary
processes.
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Nevertheless, customary justice and traditional approaches could offer important
insights for conflict prevention and redressing the legacies of armed violence. There are
many non-state actors, traditional institutions, and customary approaches to preventing
armed conflict that could provide durable solutions to post-conflict societies grappling with
how to prevent conflict and deal with the legacies of years of civil war. This study,
therefore, proceeds while being mindful of these weaknesses and challenges of customary
justice and traditional approaches to conflict resolution. I draw upon local traditional
institutions and customary justice to understand how it could work as a location for possible
measures of non-recurrence specifically and to increase the quality and efficacy of
transitional justice interventions more broadly.

1.3 Key Concepts
The key concepts that undergird this work are discussed in detail in the literature review
chapter. However, I briefly highlight the four fundamental concepts that are relevant to this
study. The key concepts that undergird this study include transitional justice, the local turn,
customary justice, and measures of non-recurrence. Although transitional justice began to
gain attention in the wake of the Nuremberg Trials after World War II, its current
application took shape from post-authoritarian contexts.19 Over the past few decades,
transitional justice has increasingly become one of the crucial mechanisms used to address
the legacies of armed conflicts towards achieving long-term peace. In general, transitional

Ruti G. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003): 70; see also
Ruti G. Teitel, “Nuremberg and Its Legacy, Fifty Years Late,” in War Crimes: The Legacy of Nuremberg,
ed. Belinda Cooper, 1st ed. (New York: TV Books, 1999), 44; Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped
Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31 (2009): 321–67,
https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.0.0069; Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Human Rights and Democratization in
Latin America: Uruguay and Chile, Human Rights and Democratization in Latin America (Oxford
University Press, 1997).
19
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justice consists of both judicial and non-judicial processes. The most widely use
mechanisms include criminal prosecutions, reparations, amnesty, and truth-telling. In some
contexts, various forms of memorials are also often used. These may include establishing
national remembrance days; renaming streets and other public spaces; building museums;
and honoring mass burial sites.
In this thesis, transitional justice applies in the context of post-conflict and ongoing
conflict situations. This suggests that transitional justice instruments could be applicable
in situations where open warfare has ended and where violence only slows down, but the
conflict per se has not ended. Various armed groups might retreat in such a scenario but
have not laid down their arms or demobilized. The application of transitional justice in
situations where there could be ongoing violence differs from others’ ideas that transitional
justice applies when violence has ended, and there is a break and institutional change from
one regime to another.20
Viewing transitional justice this way is significant because, as I have illustrated in
detail in chapter 3, the notion of measures of non-repetition draws part of its literature from
peace studies—particularly peace agreements. Thus, “the duty to prevent recurrence is
hence closely linked to the obligation of cessation of an ongoing violation.”21 The
obligation of cessation or termination is often discussed in the mainstream peace studies
literature under peace agreements, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR).

Anja Mihr, “An Introduction to Transitional Justice,” in An Introduction to Transitional Justice, ed.
Olivera Simić (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 19; see also Joanna R. Quinn, “Whither the
‘Transition’ of Transitional Justice?” Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rights Law 8, no. 1 (2015): 67;
Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 334–37.
21
de Greiff, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and
Guarantees of Non-Recurrence (2015), para. 18.
20
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Until recently, peace agreements, DDR, and transitional justice initiatives have
operated along parallel tracks—with transitional justice focusing on justice and
accountability, and peace agreements and DDR focusing on stability and security. 22 As
such, this study draws from both peace studies and transitional justice literature, in which
transitional justice is taken to mean not only its justice-oriented aims but also include
peacebuilding objectives, including efforts to terminate ongoing hostilities.
The other important concepts that underpin this dissertation are the local turn and
customary justice. The rise of the local turn in peacebuilding and transitional justice
resulted from recognizing the challenges and relative failures of the liberal peace paradigm.
The liberal paradigm here is taken to mean the prescription of liberal democratic principles
in post-conflict societies, such as promoting democratic governance, the rule of law, and
statebuilding, which sometimes do not resonate with the specific local context in which
they are applied.23 Customary justice is used to mean those transitional justice instruments
that are grounded in the cultures of conflict-affected societies and have “their roots in the
local indigenous societal structures of pre-colonial and pre-contact societies,” rather than
being the product of external importation.24 Some of the customary practices considered

Anna Cutter Patel, “Transitional Justice and DDR,” in Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction:
Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War, ed. Robert Muggah, Routledge Global Security Studies
(London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 248; Lars Waldorf, “Just Peace? Integrating DDR and Transitional
Justice,” in Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and Ex-Combatants, ed.
Chandra Lekha Sriram, Jemima García-Godos, Olga Martin-Ortega, and Johanna Herman (London:
Routledge, 2012), 62; see also Lars Waldorf, “Introduction: Linking DDR and Transitional Justice,” in
Disarming the Past: Transitional Justice and Ex-Combatants, eds. Ana Cutter Patel, Pablo de Greiff, and
Lars Waldorf, Advancing Transitional Justice Series 4 (Social Science Research Council, 2009), 14–35.
23
Richmond, “Failed Statebuilding versus Peace Formation,” 379; see also Beate Jahn, “The Tragedy of
Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization, Intervention, Statebuilding (Part I),” Journal of Intervention and
Statebuilding 1, no. 1 (March 1, 2007): 87–106, https://doi.org/10.1080/17502970601075931.
24
Volker Boege, “Potential and Limits of Traditional Approaches in Peacebuilding” (Berghof Research
Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2011), 436; available from https://berghoffoundation.org/files/publications/boege_handbookII.pdf; William I. Zartman, “Introduction: African
Traditional Conflict ‘Medicine,’” in Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict “Medicine,”
ed. William I. Zartman (Boulder, Col: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 7.
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here have likely been adjusted and changed over time to fit the current contexts in which
they are applied.25
The fourth key concept explored in this study is measures of non-recurrence. In its
conventional interpretation, measures of non-recurrence are the range of steps states take
to terminate ongoing violations and human rights abuses and take measures to prevent or
avoid a reoccurrence of similar violations in the future.26 In this interpretation, the primary
responsibility is on the state to guarantee the security of its citizens and ensure violations
are prevented in the future. The focus of measures of non-recurrence in this dissertation is
much broader. Rather than focusing on the state and its institutions, I broaden measures of
non-recurrence to include customary justice mechanisms and other traditional instruments
of conflict resolution and peacebuilding at the local level that could terminate ongoing
armed conflict and prevent a future reversion to that conflict.

1.4 Clarifying Terminologies and Labels
A substantial amount of research has been done on transitional justice and peacebuilding
practices at the sub-state level. The terminologies used to describe these sub-state
transitional justice and peacebuilding practices have generated debates among scholars.27
Some have chosen the terms local-based, bottom-up, and indigenous.28 Some of these

Zartman, “Introduction: African Traditional Conflict ‘Medicine,’” 7.
de Greiff, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and
Guarantees of Non-Recurrence (2015), paras. 16–18.
27
See, for instance, Luc Huyse, “Introduction: Tradition-Based Approaches in Peacemaking, Transitional
Justice and Reconciliation Policies,” in Traditional Justice and Reconciliation After Violent Conflict:
Learning from African Experiences, ed. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter (Stockholm Sweden: International
Idea, 2008), 7–8; William I. Zartman, “Introduction: African Traditional Conflict ‘Medicine,’” in
Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict “Medicine,” ed. William I. Zartman (Boulder,
Col: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 7.
28
See generally Rosalind Shaw, Lars Waldorf, and Pierre Hazan, eds., Localizing Transitional Justice:
Interventions and Priorities after Mass Violence, 1 edition (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,
25
26
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terms, such as “traditional” tend to invoke a meaning of some static and anachronistic relics
of the past.29 Locally based or bottom-up could be understood as interventions that are
facilitated by local and grassroots actors, regardless of whether the said interventions
follow a liberal framework. For these reasons, this dissertation retains Quinn’s use of the
term “customary” as the key label to suggest that these practices are commonly used and
change over time, which may or may not necessarily be traditional.30 But the question of
customary practices that may or may not be based on tradition is not entirely
straightforward. This is a relevant question, especially in Africa, where colonialism and
other external factors have had a fundamental impact on social practices. Others question
whether, in Africa and places where there has been a fundamental colonial influence,
customary practices could claim to be authentically based on tradition? Due to colonialism
and other external influences, some ‘original’ traditional institutions and practices have
decayed while new ones have emerged. 31 Due to these effects on traditional institutions,
some scholars conclude that “strictly speaking, they [traditional institutions and practices]
are no longer traditional.”32
2010); Roger Mac Ginty, “Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace,” Cooperation and Conflict
43, no. 2 (June 1, 2008): 139–63, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836708089080; Simon Robins, “Transitional
Justice as an Elite Discourse,” Critical Asian Studies 44, no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 3–30,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2012.644885; Simon Robins, “An Empirical Approach to Post-Conflict
Legitimacy: Victims’ Needs and the Everyday,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 7, no. 1 (March
1, 2013): 45–64, https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2012.655618.
29
Boege, “Potential and Limits of Traditional Approaches in Peacebuilding,” 437.
30
Joanna R. Quinn, “Tradition⁈ Traditional Cultural Institutions on Customary Practices in Uganda,”
Africa Spectrum 49, no. 3 (2014): 31., Joanna R. Quinn, “Tradition⁈ Traditional Cultural Institutions on
Customary Practices in Uganda,”
31
James Ojera Latigo, “Northern Uganda: Tradition-Based Practices in the Acholi Region,” in Traditional
Justice and Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences, ed. Luc Huyse and
Mark Salter (Stockholm Sweden: International Idea, 2008), 107.
32
Luc Huyse, “Introduction: Tradition-Based Approaches in Peacemaking, Transitional Justice and
Reconciliation Policies,” in Traditional Justice and Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: Learning from
African Experiences, ed. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter (Stockholm Sweden: International Idea, 2008), 8;
Adam Kochanski, “The ‘Local Turn’ in Transitional Justice: Curb the Enthusiasm,” International Studies
Review 22, no. 1 (March 1, 2020): 28, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viy081; Quinn, “Tradition⁈ Traditional
Cultural Institutions on Customary Practices in Uganda,” 34.
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Nevertheless, scholars such as Osaghae have argued that ‘distorted’ traditional
cultural institutions and customary practices could still claim to be traditional.33 He views
tradition as simply the legacy of the past, in the working of society, including
transformations—decay and emergence—the past might have gone through.34 He asserted
that traditions may be resistant to change, but the imperviousness does not suggest
‘permanency.’35 Therefore, traditions, just as customs, are constructed and ‘invented,’
which is a normal process of social change.36 It “involves the preservation of some
traditions and transformations or discarding of others.”37
Drawing on these arguments, this project proceeds to use the label customary
practices to refer to a wide variety of practices that tap into the rituals and symbols of
traditional cultural institutions, including those that might have witnessed transformations.
These practices are established by common usage and convention, and “they do need to fit
the situations that confront them in the present day and be of real utility for their users.”38
I consider my conceptualization to include customary practices that perform various roles,
including retributive and restorative functions.39 Customary justice systems are not
necessarily benign. In some cases, local authorities apply some form of retributive justice
in the form of sanctions and punishment to uphold social order.

Eghosa E. Osaghae, “Applying Traditional Methods to Modern Conflicts: Possibilities and Limits,” in
Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict “Medicine,” ed. William I. Zartman (Boulder,
U.S.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 204. See also E. J. Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger, The Invention of
Tradition, Canto Classics (Cambridge: University Press, 2012).
34
Osaghae, “Applying Traditional Methods to Modern Conflicts: Possibilities and Limits,” 204.
35
Osaghae, “Applying Traditional Methods to Modern Conflicts: Possibilities and Limits,”204.
36
Hobsbawm and Ranger, The Invention of Tradition.
37
Osaghae, “Applying Traditional Methods to Modern Conflicts: Possibilities and Limits,” 204.
38
Quinn, “Tradition⁈ Traditional Cultural Institutions on Customary Practices in Uganda,” 31.
39
Quinn, Quinn, “Tradition⁈ Traditional Cultural Institutions on Customary Practices in Uganda,”34.
33

15

1.5 Theoretical Framework
This study is framed around social constructivist theoretical assumptions. Adler observed
that constructivists acknowledge that the “material world shapes and is shaped by human
action and interaction.”40 In other words, social reality is influenced by an individual’s
normative interpretations of the material world. Wendt identified two basic tenets of
constructivism. First, “structures of human association are determined primarily by shared
ideas rather than material forces… [second] the identities and interests of purposive actors
are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”41 This means that
constructivism values ideas and the human capacity for reflections, intersubjective
knowledge, experiences, and collective understanding. This intersubjective knowledge and
collective understanding, in turn, impact the manner individuals and social actors
cognitively frame the world they know and experience.42
The study uses a constructivist framework to critically examine the utility of
customary practices that could be utilized as measures of non-repetition. As a lens through
which to understand the theoretical question, it often cites the socio-political structure and
the dynamic functioning of the Acholi in northern Uganda and how their collective identity
and shared history influence how they respond to conflict and armed violence.
Constructivism offers a valuable and relevant lens through which the study explores the
historical context and how local communities construct their world view, thereby giving
legitimacy to customs, norms, and culture. The worldview of local communities is vital in

Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” European Journal of
International Relations 3, no. 3 (September 1, 1997): 322, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066197003003003.
41
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), 1.
42
Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground,” 322.
40
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understanding their unique perceptions and intersubjective understanding of justice and
appropriate redress. For example, in the Acholi cultural context, and in other communal
communities in Africa, what is meaningful and considered an appropriate response to
remedy a wrongful act when an individual commits violence against their own community
might make “no sense” in a different socio-cultural context. Therefore, the willingness of
victims and the community to live together with alleged perpetrators and ex-combatants
depends on how local communities construct their social reality.
Parsons identified two variations of constructivism— modern constructivism and
postmodern/post-structural interpretive constructivism.43 The fundamental difference
between postmodernists and modernists strands of constructivism lies in the extent to
which the subjectivity of social constructs affects the world view of social actors and
academic observers. 44 On the one hand, postmodern constructivists understand the social
world as a clash of multiple “interpretive agendas than anything that can relate to remotely
‘true’ claims about a ‘real’ world.”45 On the other hand, modern constructivists contend
that, although the social world is constructed, researchers can still analyze the different
competing narratives and manage to make some acceptable or relatively objective claims
about “how the socially constructed world ‘really’ works.”46 As such, a modern
constructivists researcher tends to pay more attention to their own interpretive bias, which
helps to analyze different viewpoints to arrive at pragmatic claims and conclusions.

Craig Parsons, “Constructivism and Interpretive Theory,” in Theory and Methods in Political Science,
ed. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, 3rd ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 89.
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This study is more aligned with the modernist constructivist strand. The modernist
constructivism strand helps to consider the various perspectives, voices, and narratives
about the history of the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency in northern Uganda, the
narratives about the Acholi ethnic identity, the Acholi cosmology, and their customary
practices. I can then examine and sift through the various interpretations and competing
narratives to make pragmatic and tentative claims about whether and how customary
justice could help terminate armed conflict to prevent the future reversion to that conflict.

1.6 Dissertation Outline
Chapter 2 discusses the main research question and outlines the methodology for this study.
I highlight the challenges presented by the global Covid-19 pandemic, which resulted in
me pivoting my original research from empirical study to a theory-building exercise. As a
result of my inability to undertake fieldwork, the research uses available published sources
as the primary means of obtaining information to frame the main theoretical arguments
presented in the study.
In chapter 3, I review the existing scholarly literature to provide the analytical
context for the study. The chapter starts with a broad overview of post-conflict
reconstruction and peacebuilding. This is followed by a discussion of transitional justice
as a subfield of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. I lay out an account of the
theoretical debates about some of the major instruments of transitional justice, including
criminal prosecution, truth-seeking, and reparation. The chapter also traces the origin,
normative foundations, and characteristics of measures of non-recurrence. In discussing
measures of non-recurrence, I delve into the debates regarding the tensions between the
liberal peacebuilding paradigm and local encounters in post-conflict reconstruction and
18

transitional justice. I highlight the limitations regarding the mainstream framing of
measures of non-recurrence as a state-centric practice and illustrate the importance of
resituating measures of non-recurrence at the community level.
Chapter 4 explores the history and main scholarly debates about the rise of the local
turn in peacebuilding and transitional justice. It discusses the emerging critical literature
that argues for shifting from a top-down liberal peacebuilding paradigm to a deeper
engagement with local context and actors. I highlight two strands of the local turn debate.
The first school of thought acknowledges the need for increased local ownership and
empowerment and is sensitive to the cultural context of peacebuilding and transitional
justice interventions. Although the first strand of the local turn argues for increased
involvement of local and grassroots actors in peacebuilding and transitional justice, they
believe that liberal methodologies and norms, such as democratic governance and
statebuilding, are still the best routes to address the legacies of armed violence.47 The
second strand represents a fundamental shift away from the liberal paradigm, which is
based on a post-structuralist and postcolonial theoretical framework.48 These scholars
“understand locally-driven peacebuilding as a form of resistance against the dominant
discourse and practice of the international peacebuilding project.”49

See generally Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, 1 edition (Cambridge,
U.K. ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Roland Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,”
Review of International Studies 36, no. 2 (2010): 337–65.
48
Thania Paffenholz, “Unpacking the Local Turn in Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment towards an
Agenda for Future Research,” Third World Quarterly 36, no. 5 (2015): 857,
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1029908.
49
Paffenholz, “Unpacking the Local Turn in Peacebuilding, ,” 859; Oliver P. Richmond, “Resistance and
the Post-Liberal Peace,” Millennium, May 10, 2010, https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829810365017; Homi K.
Bhabha, The Location of Culture, first edition (London ; New York: Psychology Press, 1994); David
Chandler, “Peacebuilding and the Politics of Non-Linearity: Rethinking ‘Hidden’ Agency and
‘Resistance,’” Peacebuilding 1, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 17–32,
https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2013.756256; David Chandler, Peacebuilding: The Twenty Years’ Crisis,
1997-2017, 1st ed. (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); John Paul Lederach, Building Peace:
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In chapter 5, I examine the ways customary justice could contribute to terminate
armed conflict and prevent conflict reoccurrence in the future. Here, I analyze the various
elements and functions of customary practices of dispute settlement and conflict resolution
procedures as they are related to the concept of non-recurrence. In particular, I explore the
Acholi customary practices and social organization, dispute and conflict management
practices, and how local communities express their agency to act and rebuild society when
the state is unable to do so, especially when state institutions are weakened by conflict. I
advance three arguments about how customary justice could lead to the non-recurrence of
armed conflict. First, I argue that the various customary justice instruments of how victims
and perpetrators make amends at the community level could provide ex-combatants the
best route to reintegrate into civilian life, which could, in turn, promote peaceful
coexistence and reduce the likelihood of ex-combatants’ recidivism. Second, customary
justice and other traditional conflict management instruments such as local peace deals
could also terminate localized violence, thereby opening the space for broader peace
processes to emerge at the national level. Third, the communal orientation of customary
justice serves as social control and accountability mechanism, which performs a social
deterrent function to prevent ex-fighters from returning to combat life.
In chapter 6, I delve into the history of the civil war in Northern Uganda. I discuss
Uganda’s socio-political landscape leading to, during, and after independence, which is
vital in giving accounts about the identity, authority, and legitimacy of peacebuilding and
transitional justice actors in Uganda. In particular, I undertake an overview of the effects
of colonialism on the formation of the Acholi ethnic identity. I highlight how colonialism

Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press,
1998).
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and other historical factors have exacerbated ethnic tensions and divisions, which laid a
weak foundation for post-independent Uganda. I highlight examples from the Acholi
repertoire of customary practices to show how the various forms of local conflict resolution
could terminate armed conflict and prevent societies from returning to armed violence.
The final substantive discussion in this study is chapter 7. Here, I take a step back
to reflect on the inescapable role of the central state and international actors in transitional
justice and post-conflict reconstruction. The fundamental argument in this chapter is that
the post-conflict environment is often complex, leading to contested power dynamics and
competing imperatives. Therefore, each mechanism often plays a necessary but only partial
role, whether at the international, national, or local level. Drawing from legal pluralism, I
argue that to effectively terminate conflict and prevent its reoccurrence in the future,
transitional justice efforts must be comprehensive, multi-sectoral, holistic, and
interdependent involving international, national, and local actors.
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Chapter 2

2

Methodology

The purpose of this study is to develop a conceptual understanding of whether, and if so
how, local customary justice mechanisms could serve as guarantees of non-recurrence
within the scholarly field of transitional justice. The study was initially conceived to be an
empirical study. However, my research work suffered a significant setback due to the
global Covid-19 pandemic, when it became apparent that I would not be able to go to the
field to collect the primary data to make up the major contribution of my study.1 During
this time, Western university suspended all international outbound student travel to
research sites. At the time of writing, university sanctioned international travel outside of
Canada for all students will not be allowed until at least April 2022.2 Given the limited
internet availability and difficulty reaching potential research subjects in northern Uganda,
it was determined that even virtual interviews would be impossible. For that reason, I
decided to pivot my research to focus on building a conceptual framework that attempts to
enhance our understanding of how measures of non-recurrence could fit with customary
justice practices. As such, this dissertation attempts to identify the common features of
customary justice and traditional conflict management practices among the Acholi and in
other African contexts to explain and develop theoretical arguments about how customary
justice and traditional conflict management could be used as instruments of measures of
non-recurrence. Therefore, this dissertation seeks to provide an initial exploration that lays

1

Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences
(Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2005), 5.
2
Western University, “COVID-19 Information for the Campus Community,” accessed October 13, 2021,
available from https://www.uwo.ca/coronavirus/.
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the foundation and identify promising pathways through which policymakers and
researchers could “contribute to more nuanced theories” regarding how to prevent the
reoccurrence of armed conflict through customary justice mechanisms. 3

2.1 Geographic Focus and Justification
This study relied heavily on information from the Acholi-sub region in northern Uganda.
Besides the Acholi, I also drew upon examples from other communities in Africa with
similar usage and practices of customary justice and traditional conflict resolution
mechanisms. Some of these include the indigenous methods of conflict resolution among
the Pokot, Turkana, Samburu, and Marakwet communities of northern Kenya.4 Although I
have drawn from “snippets” of a range of other examples to build my theoretical
arguments, I paid greater attention to the Acholi because it could provide better illustrative
lens through which I can better explain the theoretical arguments in this study.

2.1.1

The Acholi as an Illustrative Lens

Many African societies have developed complex social systems to deal with disputes,
administer justice, and address the legacies of armed violence. To mention a few examples,
the institution of bashingantahe has been responsible for the peaceful resolution of disputes
among the Tutsi and Hutus in Burundi since the seventeenth century. 5 In Gorongosa, in

3

Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences
(Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2005), 8.
4
Adan Mohamud, Isabella Masinde, and Ruto Pkalya, “Indigenous Democracy: Traditional Conflict
Resolution Mechanisms - Pokot, Turkana, Samburu and Marakwet” (Intermediate Technology
Development Group - Eastern Africa, January 2004), 6, file:///C:/Users/ibayo/Downloads/4d927e25-5e004626-a7a3-12b32e33baf9.pdf.
5
Tracy Dexter and Philippe Ntahombaye, “The Role of Informal Justice Systems in Fostering the Rule of
Law in Post-Conflict Situations: The Case of Burundi” (Geneva: The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue,
2005), 10–11; available from
https://media.africaportal.org/documents/The_Role_of_Informal_Justice_Systems_in_Fostering_the_Rule_
of_Law_in_Post-Conf_zrYcJz4.pdf.
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central Mozambique, community members have used the magamba spirits to heal, attain
justice, and reconcile in the aftermath of the civil war.6 In Rwanda, although the recent use
of the gacaca courts in the wake of the genocide has been criticized for being perverted by
the government, they have nonetheless been a key traditional instrument of conflict and
dispute resolution in precolonial times.7
In the sphere of customary justice and traditional conflict management mechanisms
in Africa, the Acholi ethnocultural group in northern Uganda has strategic importance for
my research because the Acholi have a wide array of customary practices and, more
importantly, they have preserved and extensively utilized many of their customary
practices to deal with the almost twenty years of armed conflict. Although the effects of
the conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda
are still deeply felt today, the north has experienced relative peace and has managed to
avoid a large-scale armed conflict over the past couple of years. Therefore, given the
subject matter that I am interested in, I have much to learn from the Acholi example
regarding how customary justice might terminate violence and prevent the future
reoccurrence of armed conflict.
Although this thesis is conceptual in nature, and attempts to build a theory that
explains the potential utility for measures of non-repetition, it is helpful to have in mind a
case in which the theory that is being constructed might be used—a sort of picture in the
mind’s eye of how one concept or another might look in a concrete context. In this

Luc Huyse, “Conclusions and Recommendations,” in Traditional Justice and Reconciliation After Violent
Conflict: Learning from African Experiences, ed. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter (Stockholm Sweden:
International Idea, 2008), 189–91.
7
Huyse, “Conclusions and Recommendations,” 187; see also Bert Ingelaere, “The Gacaca Courts in
Rwanda,” in Traditional Justice and Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: Learning from African
Experiences, ed. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter (Stockholm Sweden: International Idea, 2008), 1–22.
6
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instance, the Acholis’ use of customary practices through the LRA conflict provides a
useful illustrative case; much is written about the use and utility of customary practices,
and even more has been written about the Acholi responses to the conflict itself. It is the
Acholi context that I have had in mind while developing the theoretical arguments—
although it is important to note that this thesis is not a case study, and that the theoretical
construction could have been played out against any number of case backdrops.

2.2 On Validity
Validity may carry different connotations in qualitative and quantitative research.8 On the
one hand, quantitative and positivist methodological researchers might be interested in
internal and external validity, which establishes cause-effect relationships and the degree
of generalizability.9 On the other hand, qualitative researchers might be interested in
contextual or qualitative validity, particularly those using a constructivist lens. 10 Creswell
and Miller defined qualitative validity as the extent to which research findings and
inferences are accurate from the researcher's standpoint, the participant, or "readers for
whom the account is written.”11
There are several methods qualitative researchers can employ to demonstrate the
validity of their research. Some of these methods include triangulation, member checking,
peer reviews, and external audits.12 The decision to choose a method often depends on the

8

John W. Creswell and J. David Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods
Approaches, 5th ed. (Los Angeles; London: SAGE Publications, 2018), 274.
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nature of the qualitative research. In the context of this study, I employ triangulation as the
most appropriate method to enhance the credibility and accuracy of my research.
“Triangulation is a validity procedure where researchers search for convergence among
multiple and different sources of information to form themes or categories in a study.”13 In
this research, I drew on multiple and different sources of information, as I described in the
following section.

2.3 Sources of Information
This study drew information mainly from secondary sources through desk research,
although I also analyzed original documents such as the Agreement on the Cessation of
Hostilities between Uganda’s government, and the Lord’s Resistance Army signed in Juba
on August 26, 2006; the 1966 and 1995 Constitutions of Uganda; and the Uganda National
Transitional Justice Policy. Secondary sources seek to discuss, interpret, analyze, and
evaluate data and documents that have been published or reported by scholars, research
centers, civil society organizations, and government agencies.
The search for secondary sources of information was bound within the following
parameters and key thematic areas. A strong focus on peacebuilding and transitional justice
that deals with the broader issues of customary justice in Uganda, but I also drew from
other examples in other parts of Africa; the liberal peace and its challenges; the insurgency
of the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda; the social and political governance
structure of Uganda before and after independence; and literature on Yoweri Kaguta
Museveni and the National Resistance Army/Movement. I paid attention to works written
around the Lord’s Resistance Army insurgency in 1984 and the Acholi responses to the
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conflict up to the present. However, I occasionally draw upon earlier works published
before 1984 if they bear relevance to addressing my research question. Peer-reviewed
articles, books, reports from civil society, reports from international intergovernmental
organizations such as the United Nations, and documents from the government of Uganda
were reviewed. I assessed the sources by critically analyzing and examining the main
ideas, relationships, and abstracted information that can explain what is known while
highlighting potential areas where new knowledge may be needed.

2.4 Limitations of the Methodological Approach
I was unable to collect primary data from my study location, so I have used others’ data
and findings to help me formulate a theoretical argument that draws on real-world
experiences. Reliance on others’ work raises two fundamental challenges. The first is that
I have to rely on the researchers’ questions and do not have knowledge about the research
design and how the overall research was conducted.14 As such, I have no control over
managing potential problems such as the type of questions asked and participants’
misunderstanding of specific questions. The second related challenge is about the data
analysis, interpretation, and reporting. Here, too, researchers may not provide a great depth
of information, and many choose to include or exclude some depth or detail information
from their publications. Similarly, researchers’ interpretations and subjective judgments
might also render a partial account of reality, which could impact my own secondary
analysis. As discussed in the section on validity above, I sought to minimize the effects of
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these “secondary limitations” by using several sources of information and being mindful
of my own implicit biases and other researchers’ subjective judgments.
The other potential limitation is associated with my choice of cases. As already
illustrated above, I drew the preponderance of real-world examples from the Acholi
ethnocultural group in northern Uganda because I understand the Acholi to have strategic
importance to my research question. This could lead to a potential situation of selection
bias. Selection bias occurs when cases or research subjects are selected along the dependent
variable of the sample population of cases. 15 However, as George and Bennett noted,
selecting cases based on their value on a particular outcome could be appropriate in some
types of studies and must not be rejected outright.16 Selecting cases based on a particular
outcome of interest and preliminary knowledge of the said case allow for a more robust
research design, particularly in exploratory research and studies that aim to develop
theoretical arguments.17 This dissertation research falls within the categories of such
exploratory studies described by George and Bennett. Selecting the cases based on the
phenomenon of interest allows for identifying potential explanatory variables, which can
later be tested against cases in which there is a variation on the dependent variable.18
Related to the issue of selection bias is generalizability. Critics argue that case
studies are not suitable to provide generalizable conclusions, especially where the events
or phenomena under study are rare and unique to a specific context.19 This means that case
studies can make only tentative conclusions regarding how much particular independent
David Collier and James Mahoney, “Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research,” World
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16
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variables affect the outcome. This is particularly relevant to my present study because my
study does not go far enough to determine how much, in quantitative terms, each of the
customary reconciliation and reintegration rituals contributed to the current relative
stability in the Acholi region in the past couple of years. Nevertheless, the aim of this
current study is really about formulating theoretical arguments that could provide the
necessary foundation and entry points for researchers to contribute to constructing more
nuanced empirical generalizable studies.20 The theoretical arguments do not aim at making
generalizable conclusions to all situations of armed conflict.

Conclusion
This thesis is principally an inductive theory-building exercise in which I aim to understand
how customary justice could be used as instruments of measures of non-recurrence. I used
desk research and relied on available published sources as the primary means of obtaining
information. I used the case of northern Uganda as a lens through which to explore how
the conceptual claims I made could work in reality. The major limitation of this study
method is that because I relied on published sources of information, my own secondary
analysis might be impacted by researchers’ initial research errors and their subjective
interpretations of research subjects’ responses. To mitigate these limitations, I used several
sources of credible published materials to cross-check facts.
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Chapter 3

3

Literature Review

3.1 Introduction
In the wake of civil wars and other forms of mass atrocity, states face difficult decisions
about rebuilding and coming to terms with the past. Some of the competing issues that
must be addressed include how to bring perpetrators to account; reveal the facts and ensure
public disclosure of the truth about the past; ensure victims get redress for violations;
(re)establish trust and promote reconciliation; and put measures in place that will prevent
the reversion to conflict. This chapter reviews and analyzes the existing literature on
peacebuilding and traditional justice. The discussions set up the key concepts within which
I will develop the theoretical arguments in this study.
The first section discusses and identifies the central elements of peacebuilding. The
second section delves into the field of transitional justice and its three core approaches–
truth, justice, and reparation. In the next section, I provide a detailed review of the literature
on guarantees of non-recurrence, a fundamental concept in this study. It traces the origins
and how it evolves to its current application in transitional justice. This is followed by a
critique of the conventional understanding and practice of guarantees of non-recurrence in
post-conflict contexts. In particular, I illustrate the differences between transitional justice
in post-authoritarian context and the current application of transitional justice in postconflict context.
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3.2 Peacebuilding
Considerable work has been done by scholars and practitioners dealing with the concept of
peacebuilding. Galtung’s pioneering work on peace research in the 1960s and 1970s
arguably contributed in a significant way to elevate the idea of peacebuilding into an
intellectual, academic field. In his 1975 work, for instance, Galtung differentiated between
peacebuilding, peacemaking, and peacekeeping.1 Whereas peacekeeping aims to keep “the
antagonists away from each other under mutual threats of considerable punishment if they
transgress,” peacemaking, which Galtung associated with conflict resolution, seeks to “get
rid of the source of tension.”2 Both peacekeeping and peacemaking do not get at addressing
what Galtung called the “war machinery” in society.3 Peacebuilding, therefore, aim to
address the “war machinery.” It is more enduring, which “has a structure different from,
perhaps over and above, peacekeeping and ad hoc peacemaking… More particularly, a
structure must be found that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in
situations where wars might occur.”4
Building on Galtung’s work, other scholars such as Lederach, also defined
peacebuilding as “a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the
full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more
sustainable, peaceful relationships.”5 In Lederach’s framing, peacebuilding is more than a

Johan Galtung, “Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding,” in Peace,
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2
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3
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4
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5
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“postaccord reconstruction… It involves a wide range of activities and functions that both
precede and follow peace accords.”6
Many peacebuilding actors, too, including the United Nations, have been involved
in international peacebuilding. For instance, in the United Nations, the concept of
peacebuilding began to gain importance in the aftermath of the Cold War, especially with
Boutros-Ghali’s report on the Agenda for Peace in 1992.7 Boutros-Ghali defined
peacebuilding as an “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen
and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”8 The United Nations and other
international aid and development agencies use a more expansive approach to
peacebuilding. The argument is that since the underlying causes of conflict are often varied,
so too, must the means of addressing conflict be extensive and cover a wide range of
sectors.
In the agenda for peace, the United Nations views peacebuilding as rebuilding
institutions and infrastructures in war-torn states, addressing economic despair, social
injustice, political oppression, and re-establishing bonds of mutual trust.9 Through
successive UN policy documents, such as the 1996 Agenda for Democratization and the
2000 Brahimi report, the UN expanded the idea of peacebuilding. In these documents, the
UN conceives peacebuilding to include building the entire fabric of society, including
institutional strengthening, the rule of law, justice, electoral reforms, and other issues that

6
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would often be considered as development, such as equitable socio-economic and
humanitarian interventions.10 The scope and boundaries of peacebuilding have generated
debates among scholars and peacebuilding actors. Some central discussions include the
desired outcome of peacebuilding, the timing of interventions, and the sectors of
peacebuilding interventions.

3.2.1 The Outcome of Peacebuilding Interventions: Positive or Negative Peace
One of the central debates in peacebuilding is the desired outcome of interventions. Two
competing visions of the outcome of peacebuilding exist. While some have argued that
peacebuilding must aim to attain negative peace, others say peacebuilding must strive to
achieve positive peace.11 Galtung first introduced the concept of positive and negative
peace in his 1964 editorial in the Journal of Peace Research.12 He further theorized the
notion of positive and negative peace in 1969, in which he provided an expanded view of
violence as the basis for understanding the dimensions of peace. 13 To understand the two
visions of peace, Galtung distinguished between actor-oriented and structure-oriented
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explanations of violence.14 Actor-oriented violence is direct and often visible and personal,
whereas structure-oriented violence is built into the structure of society and is often
invisible.15 Galtung noted that the expanded view of violence to include direct and
structural violence implies peace is both the absence of direct and structural violence.16 He
therefore defined negative peace to be the absence of direct violence, which is actororiented and often personal or physical, and positive peace to be the absence of structural
violence and socio-economic transformation of society.17
Call and Cousens made parallel arguments regarding the outcomes of
peacebuilding. They identified three approaches to peacebuilding—the maximalist, middle
ground, and minimalist outcomes.18 Similar to the positive peace argument, maximalists
believe that peacebuilding must address the structural factors embedded in the society that
create the conditions for armed conflicts.19 Minimalists think it is more realistic for
peacebuilding to focus on ending overt organized violence and ensuring that there are
‘minimal’ security and political order that could ensure there is no renewed warfare.20 The
middle ground approach to peacebuilding advocates moving beyond the minimalist
position, but argues that the maximalist visions of peace, too, maybe so “demanding that
they cannot realistically be attained for several generations even under the best of
circumstances.”21 Instead, the middle ground conceptualizes peacebuilding that is more
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than a mere absence of overt organized violence, to include more attainable ‘decent’
institutional and structural transformations that meet a moderate, pragmatic, and normative
threshold of governance.22

3.2.2 The Timing of Interventions
Another debate is about the phases and timing of engagement of peacebuilding
interventions. In other words, when can actors engage in peacebuilding intervention and
when can they end? There is little agreement among scholars and peacebuilding actors
regarding the timeframes of engagements. Some scholars and peacebuilding actors tend to
see peacebuilding as only applicable to ‘post-conflict’ contexts.23 However, scholars like
Lederach envisions peacebuilding as a long-term engagement that is not limited to postconflict contexts. Peacebuilding can precede the cessation of direct violence and follow the
signing and implementation of a peace agreement, as well.24 Lederach argued that limiting
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peacebuilding to only situations of cessation of armed hostilities could undermine the
potential for societal transformations that are needed for sustainable peace. 25

3.2.3 The Sectors of Peacebuilding Interventions
Because it is often challenging to attribute armed conflict to only one variable, there are
often multiple issues to address in attempting to achieve sustainable peace. These issues
are often multi-sectoral, multi-dimensional, and multi-level.26 Generally, scholars and
practitioners believe peacebuilding engagements should address issues of security;
democracy and good governance; justice and the rule of law; economic and physical
recovery, and reconciliation.27 The importance of addressing various thematic sectors of
post-conflict societies has led to the development of several fields to deal with the legacies
of armed violence. One of these fields is transitional justice, which has evolved over the
past decades as a specialized area of practice and academic inquiry in post-conflict
societies. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between transitional justice and other
thematic sectors in the context of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.
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Figure 1. Thematic sectors in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.28

3.3 Transitional Justice
As states emerging from civil conflict, authoritarian regimes, and genocide struggle to deal
with difficult questions of how to deal with the past and move forward, the field of
transitional justice has emerged to provide solutions. Over the past decades, transitional
justice has developed as an academic field of scholarship and practice. The notion of
transitional justice as a field of scholarly interest and practice gained attention during the
third wave of democratization in Latin America and Eastern Europe.29 The term transitional
justice was used to refer specifically to the transition from a dictatorial regime to
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democracy.30 Scholars like Teitel define transitional justice within this framework of
democratic transition. Teitel conceives transitional justice to be associated with “periods
of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoing of
repressive predecessor regimes.”31
Over the past decades, transitional justice has evolved from being seen as a tool
used strictly in democratic transitions in former authoritarian states to a crucial component
of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. In its later conceptualization, transitional
justice involves a wide variety of measures that are used to respond to widespread systemic
violations, confront the past, and promote long-term peace and reconciliation in postconflict societies.32 Transitional justice is both backward-and forward-looking. This means
actors must find ways to bring closure to the past, while instituting measures to show
commitment to building a healthy civil society in the future that ensures violence does not
recur.33 Transitional justice mechanisms are therefore designed, with both their backwardand forward-looking functions in mind. Although the modalities of transitional justice
mechanisms are many, the key concepts that form the global paradigm of transitional
justice include justice and accountability, truth-seeking, and reparations.34 At least in
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theory, these processes work in complementarity to achieve the backward and forwardlooking aims of transitional justice.

3.3.1 Justice and Accountability
The events following World War II were perhaps the watershed moment of the
international focus on trials to achieve justice and accountability for human rights
violations.35 Following the Second World War, the victorious Allied powers established
International Military Tribunals (IMT) in Germany and Japan. The purpose of these
Military tribunals was to prosecute and punish people who have committed war crimes
during the Nazi aggression.36 The establishment of the international military criminal
tribunals was considered revolutionary in terms of seeking justice for atrocity crimes.
Teitel, for instance, argues that modern transitional justice began in 1945 with the
establishment of the “allied-run Nuremberg Trials, …[which] reflects the triumph of
transitional justice within the scheme of international law.”37
Despite the significant influence the Nuremberg trials have had on the development
of transitional justice, scholars have criticized both the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes
trials for pursuing victors’ justice and that “some of the charges were retroactive and
selectively applied.”38 The statute for the International Military Tribunal of the Far East
(IMTFE), for instance, was drafted exclusively by the United States (U.S.), leading some
to argue that the U.S. was looking to avenge the Japanese for their surprise attack on Pearl

Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy.”
Ruti G. Teitel, “Nuremberg and Its Legacy, Fifty Years Late,” in War Crimes: The Legacy of
Nuremberg, ed. Belinda Cooper, 1st edition (New York: TV Books, 1999), 44.
37
Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 70.
38
Kirsten Sellars, “Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo,” European Journal of International Law
21, no. 4 (November 1, 2010): 1085, https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chq070.
35
36

39

Harbor.39 Also, the global uptake of universal human rights norms, following World War
II, has also been criticized by critical scholars for its lack of understanding of group or
collective rights, which are both necessarily cultural and contextual.40
Trials to address human rights violations are not limited to international courts.
Several efforts have been made to prosecute war crimes domestically. For example, apart
from the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, post-World War II trials included
a variety of domestic national German criminal courts.41 In 2008, Uganda established an
international criminal division at its high court for the domestic prosecution of atrocity
crimes.42 In some cases, hybrid courts are created, like the Special Court for Sierra Leone
that was established after the Sierra Leonean civil war to prosecute people accused of
serious violations of international human rights law and domestic Sierra Leonean law.43
Scholars disagree about whether trials are beneficial to long-term peace and
reconciliation in states emerging from long periods of civil war and gross human rights
violations.44 On the one hand, some argue that the prosecution of political leaders who are
accused of committing egregious crimes could interfere with sustainable peace and
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reconciliation.45 These scholars argue that criminal trials may undermine peace settlements
because warlords may be crucial for ongoing peace negotiations.46 On the other hand, some
scholars and human rights advocates point to the deterrent effects of prosecutions. They
argue that there can be no sustainable peace and reconciliation without the prosecution of
perpetrators of those accused of human rights violations. 47

3.3.2 Truth-Seeking
Truth commissions are another formal means that post-conflict societies use to
acknowledge and come to terms with past violations. The mandate of truth commissions
varies. However, they coalesce around the idea of investigating periods of abuse and
making recommendations to remedy past violations. Hayner identifies four primary
elements of truth commissions. First, truth commissions center on investigating past
violations. Second, truth commissions do not focus on a specific event but attempt to
investigate patterns of human rights violations over a period of time. Third, truth
commissions are temporary bodies, and their operation ceases to exist after a report is
submitted. Fourth, truth commissions are vested with some authority that enables it to have
greater access to information.48 Although many scholars have adopted Hayner’s definition,
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others have noted that some of the elements she identified pose challenges. 49 Dancy et al.
note that Hayner’s emphasis on the submission of a report as the primary outcome of a
truth commission’s work seems to be limiting. They point to truth commissions in Bolivia
and in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that have taken testimonies but did not
succeed in submitting a final report. Dancy et al. argue that a final report must be the goal
of truth commission, but not the defining feature.50
There has been a remarkable increase in the number of truth commissions around
the world. Since the 1970s, more than forty-five truth commissions have been created.51
The majority of these are in Latin America and Africa. There is a great deal of variation
among them regarding their nature and mandate of investigation.52 For example, the
Argentinean National Commission on the Disappeared (Comisión Nacional sobre la
Desaparición de Personas) was created to investigate the disappearances of people during
the military rule between 1976 and 1983.53 The Commission for Historical Clarification
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(Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico) in Guatemala was established in 1997 to
clarify human rights abuses that occurred during the thirty-six-year conflict from 1960 to
1996.54 Other notable countries with truth commissions include Chile, El Salvador, Peru
and Colombia.55
Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Morocco, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
and Uganda are among the African countries that have created truth commissions to
investigate various forms of past abuses. Uganda, for instance, has had two truth
commissions. The Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearances of People in Uganda
Since 25 January, 1971 was first established in 1974 to investigate enforced disappearances
in the first years of Idi Amin’s Government from 1971 until 1974.56 Then, in 1986, Yoweri
Museveni created the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights to
investigate human rights abuses, including “mass murders, arbitrary arrests, the role of law
enforcement agents and the state security agencies, and discrimination, which occurred
between 1962 and January 1986.”57 Sierra Leone, too, created its Truth and Reconciliation
Commission in 2002, among other transitional justice instruments, to investigate and report
on the human rights violations that occurred from 1991 to 2002. The objective of the
commission was to “create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human
rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone…
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to address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing and
reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.”58

3.3.3 Reparations
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights spells out four forms of reparations,
namely, restitution, compensation, satisfaction, and rehabilitation.59 The purpose of
restitution is to “re-establish, to the extent possible, the situation that existed for the victim
prior to the violations of human rights.”60 The function of compensation is to cover any
economic damages, including loss of property, loss of opportunities, loss of earnings,
medical and other expenses, as well as other damages resulting from human rights abuses
and armed conflict.61 Beyond material compensation, symbolic reparations, which aim to
ensure the satisfaction of parties involved, are also commonly used. They may include
apologies, an official acknowledgment of government’s complicity or direct participation
in committing the atrocities, and/or public disclosure of the “names and positions of those
responsible” for the atrocities.”62 Public commemoration days and memorials could also
serve as measures of satisfaction. Rehabilitation may include legal, medical, and
psychosocial services with the view to restoring the dignity of the injured person. It should
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be noted that these forms of reparation are not mutually exclusive. They can be used
singularly or jointly. The critical consideration is to ensure victims have full and
appropriate redress, which are proportional to the injury caused.63 The question of full and
proportional reparation is important because it helps to put a check on states to uphold their
domestic and international legal obligations and prevent them from using reparations
programs as political tools instead of the purpose of eliminating the injury committed.64
Notwithstanding the importance of reparations, many governments have been slow
in implementing reparation programs. For example, truth commissions in El Salvador,
Guatemala, Panama, and South Africa have recommended the implementation of
reparation programs, but not much has been achieved in terms of the implementation.65
The difficulty in implementing reparations programs could be due to one or both of the
following reasons. First, there is often a lack of political will. Second, this difficulty could
be due to insufficient funds and competing uses of the states’ scarce resources.
In spite of the challenges regarding funds and the lack of political will, reparations
programs, whether material or symbolic, have increasingly been viewed to have the
potential to contribute to positive peace by addressing the specific needs of victims. RohtArriaza has proposed a range of ways reparation can take to address survivors and local
community needs. For example, by giving victims of extraordinary suffering preferential
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access to certain government services, encouraging the establishment of community-based
development initiatives, and instituting community-level acknowledgment.66

3.4 Guarantees of Non-Recurrence
States emerging from civil wars, genocide, and other armed hostilities are often met with
the need to bring alleged perpetrators to account, to seek the truth about the past violations,
and to help victims recover through various forms of reparations. While scholars and
practitioners have given significant attention to truth seeking, criminal accountability, and
reparation, little attention has been given to guarantees of non-recurrence as a TJ practice.
This section begins to trace the origins of guarantees of non-recurrence, how it has evolved
over time to its current application in transitional justice and post-conflict reconstruction.
I then consider how guarantees of non-recurrence progressed into public international law,
international human rights law, the United Nations soft law documents, and to transitional
justice in post-authoritarian and post-conflict contexts.

3.4.1 The Early Practice of Guarantees of Non-Recurrence
Historically, instances of guarantees of non-recurrence have been present in international
diplomatic practice since the19th century, although it has not always explicitly described
as such.67 Historically, guarantees and measures of non-recurrence are part of diplomatic
practices used to resolve disputes and to ensure the continuation of the diplomatic relations
between states. 68 It is important to note that the diplomatic use of measures of non-
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recurrence was not standard or uniform practice among states. The kinds of guarantees that
might be requested by an injured state were not always specific. In most cases, the accused
state has the discretion to adopt any measure, or a variety of measures deemed appropriate
to prevent the recurrence of the wrongful act.69 In some instances, the measures could take
the form of a verbal assurance or a promise by the accused state that it will not repeat the
unlawful act. In other cases, too, the measures might take the form of specific tangible
action(s), such as a change in policy or law that could result in the non-recurrence of the
unlawful act.70
For example, the events following the Boxer Rebellion, which occurred between
1899–1901, illustrate the diplomatic practice of guarantees of non-recurrence. A violent
anti-Western and anti-Christian insurgency broke out in Northeast China in 1899.71 In
September 1901, the Western powers signed the Boxer Protocol with China, which
formally ended the rebellion. The West sought several remedies from China because they
concluded that China did not do enough to stop the Boxers from carrying out the rebellion.
Among others, the Chinese Government agreed to take several measures aimed at the nonrecurrence of similar acts of violence. Article V of the Boxer Protocol states:
China has agreed to prohibit the importation into its territory of arms and
ammunition, as well as of materials exclusively used for the manufacture of arms
and ammunition. An Imperial Edict has been issued on the 25th of August,
forbidding said importation for a term of two years. New Edicts may be issued
subsequently extending this by other successive terms of two years in case of
necessity recognized by the Powers.72
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The Chinese Government took additional steps to prohibit the Chinese from
residing in areas near foreign embassies and determined that all such areas would be under
the exclusive control of foreign powers.73 In these examples, the accused state, China,
took specific formal measures in the form of policy changes and legislation that would
prevent the recurrence of similar unlawful acts, like the Boxer Rebellion. Although the
example of the Boxer Rebellion took place under the context of deeply colonized
relations, where the Chinese were under the occupation of foreign powers, I use it here to
illustrate how guarantees of non-recurrence progressed from interstate diplomatic
relations to become part of the reparative regime in public international law, international
human rights law, the United Nations’ instruments, and domestic national transitional
mechanisms. This is important because it illustrates the origin story of the concept of
guarantees of non-repetition and helps develop a more systematic understanding of its
focus. Thus, it shows how the concept evolves into its exiting use as a mechanism of postconflict reconstruction.

3.4.2 Guarantees of Non-Recurrence in Public International Law
Guarantees of non-recurrence entered mainstream public international law (PIL) through
the work of the International Law Commission (ILC).74 The ILC was established by United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 174(II) in 1947 for “the promotion of the
progressive development of international law and its codification.”75 Through its
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codification work, the ILC developed guarantees of non-recurrence alongside
compensation, restitution, and satisfaction as part of the general legal obligation of states
to redress any internationally wrongful act.76 Guarantees of non-recurrence have appeared
in several of the ILC’s draft articles on state responsibility. For example, in 1961, in his
Special Report on State Responsibility, García-Amador observed in Article 27 that “in any
such case [of a wrongful act which caused injury to a state] as aforesaid the state of
nationality shall have the right… to demand that the respondent State take the necessary
steps to prevent the repetition of events of the nature of those imputed to that state.”77 The
inclusion of Article 27, entitled “Measures to prevent the repetition of the injurious act,”
represents one of the initial efforts to include measures of non-recurrence in the work of
the ILC to develop and codify international law.78
In its 2001 draft articles, the ILC put guarantees of non-recurrence together under
the same section as the cessation of a breach of international law. However, while cessation
is “concerned with securing an end to continuing wrongful conduct,” guarantees of nonrecurrence “serve a preventive function and may be described as a positive reinforcement
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of future performance.”79 Here, the ILC viewed the cessation of the wrongful act and
measures of non-recurrence as separate, but linked aspects of remedying a wrongful act.80
The function of cessation is to put an end to a violation of international law and to
safeguard the continuing validity and effectiveness of the underlying primary rule.
The responsible state’s obligation of cessation thus protects both the interests of the
injured State or States and the interests of the international community as a whole
in the preservation of, and reliance on, the rule of law.
Assurances or guarantees of non-repetition… are better treated as an aspect
of the continuation and repair of the legal relationship affected by the breach.
Where assurances and guarantees of non-repetition are sought by an injured State,
the question is essentially the reinforcement of a continuing legal relationship and
the focus is on the future, not the past.81
The distinction above is important because cessation and measures of nonrecurrence are both necessary aspects of restoring and repairing a wrongful conduct. In the
case of a continuing violation, cessation must occur before the state responsible for the
internationally wrongful act may offer appropriate measures to prevent the future
occurrence of the breach. Roht-Arriaza further elaborated that measures of non-recurrence
are forward-looking and seek to “open up possibilities of addressing root causes and
continuing manifestations of the initial violations.”82

3.4.3 Guarantees of Non-Recurrence in International Human Rights Law
From public international law, guarantees of non-recurrence entered the sphere of
international human rights law and have appeared in different United Nations human rights
documents. While public international law governs relations between sovereign states,
international human rights law deals with violations that are committed by states against
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individuals. Unlike public international law, in international human rights law, breaches
and violations of the law are committed against human beings, not against a state. Hence,
guarantees of non-recurrence in international human rights law impose remedies and
measures that protect individuals from human rights violations and deter acts of future
abuses. 83 Guarantees of non-recurrence in international human rights law, therefore, put
obligations on states to refrain from rights violations and to carry out measures that will
also prevent other actors from violating human rights.84
Guarantees of non-recurrence have been imported into many United Nations human
rights instruments and policy documents. For example, UN Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Theo van Boven, captured guarantees of nonrecurrence as a form of reparation in his 1993 report.85 Under the section on guarantees of
non-recurrence, van Boven observed that states must take measures to “preventing the
recurrence of violations by such means [as]: (i) ensuring effective civilian control of
military and security forces; (ii) restricting the jurisdiction of military tribunals; (iii)
strengthening the independence of the judiciary.”86 These principles and guidelines were
further developed by various UN special rapporteurs and subsequently adopted by the UN
General Assembly in 2005.87
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There are several instances in which regional human rights courts have issued
orders to redress gross violations of human rights and to prevent future recurrence. The
Inter-American Court on Human Rights (IACtHR), for instance, in its jurisprudence on
several cases has issued recommendations to states to carry out measures to guarantee that
gross violations of human rights are not repeated. In some cases, the court may hesitate to
give specific instructions on the kinds of measures states should take to prevent future
violations. For example, in the case involving the forced disappearance of Trujillo Oroza
in Bolivia, the IACtHR observed in its ruling that Bolivia “has the obligation to take all
necessary steps to ensure that these grave violations are not repeated, an obligation whose
fulfillment benefits society as a whole.”88 Similarly, in 1997, when Ecuadorian police
unlawfully arrested and detained Iván Suárez Rosero on suspicion of Suárez’s involvement
in drug trafficking, the IACtHR observed that Ecuador is obligated “to adopt such measures
as may be necessary to ensure that violations such as those established in the instant case
never again occur in its jurisdiction.”89 In these cases, the court issued general and broad
recommendations without providing much detail on the specific legislative or policy
measures the accused state must take to prevent the repetition of violations.
Unlike the Inter-American Court, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR) takes a different approach in settling cases of human rights abuses.
Among other functions, the IACHR facilitates friendly settlement between parties at the
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commission’s own initiative or at the request of any of the parties.90 The commission has
reached friendly settlements in which states have agreed to take various specific modalities
and measures, including legislative measures, to prevent future occurrence of rights
violations. The friendly settlement of the Inmates of the Penitentiary of Mendoza v.
Argentina case illustrates an example of where specific measures were issued to guarantee
that violations would not be repeated. In 2003, inmates of the Penitentiary of Mendoza
lodged a petition with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights accusing the
Republic of Argentina for violating their right to life, health, and inhumane conditions of
detention.91 In the final report of the friendly settlement, the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights found that Argentina had violated the rights of the inmates as protected
by the American Convention on Human Rights. The province of Mendoza and the national
government of Argentina agreed to take normative legislative measures including:
a) create a local prevention agency within the framework of the Optional Protocol
of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel Inhumane and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, and take the necessary steps to achieve the approval
thereof;
b) create the office of the Human Rights Ombudsman of Mendoza, whose
responsibility shall be the defense of the human rights of the entire population (right
to health, education, security, development, a healthy environment, freedom of
information and communication, of consumer and users, etc.) and take the
necessary steps to achieve the approval thereof;
c) create an office of a Special Prosecutor to benefit persons deprived of liberty and
take the necessary steps to achieve the approval thereof;
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d) create a government Office of the Public Defender to litigate before chambers of
criminal sentence execution of the courts, and to take the necessary steps to achieve
the approval thereof.92
The above agreements illustrate explicit forward-looking measures determined by the
IACHR that aim to redress the root causes of the violations, ensure the protection and
enjoyment of individual rights, and “guarantee” that future violations would not occur.

3.4.4 Guarantees of Non-Recurrence in the United Nations System
From public international law to international human rights law, guarantees of nonrecurrence entered the sphere of the United Nations development of human rights
instruments. The end of the Cold War presented an opportunity for the UN to restructure
the international legal order and set clear standards that stipulate how to deal with gross
human rights violations.93 Since the 1990s, guarantees of non-recurrence have appeared in
various UN guideline documents regarding how to redress gross impunity and structural
violations of human rights. Similar to the work of the ILC, most of the earlier work of the
UN on preventing gross human right violations framed guarantees of non-recurrence as an
element of reparation.94 In 2005, the UN General Assembly adopted the Basic Principles
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations
of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
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Law. The principles that the General Assembly adopted expanded on the measures Theo
van Boven had initially proposed in his 1993 report, including the following:
(a) Ensure that all civilian and military proceedings abide by international standards
of due process, fairness, and impartiality;
(b) Protect persons in the legal, medical and health-care professions, the media and
other related professions, and human rights defenders;…
(e) Provide, on a priority and continued basis, human rights and international
humanitarian law education to all sectors of society and training for law
enforcement officials as well as military and security forces;
(f) Promote the observance of codes of conduct and ethical norms, in particular,
international standards, by public servants, including law enforcement,
correctional, media, medical, psychological, social service and military personnel,
as well as by economic enterprises;
(g) Promote mechanisms for preventing and monitoring social conflicts and their
resolution;
(h) Reviewing and reforming laws contributing to or allowing gross violations of
international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian
law.95
Subsequent revisions of the UN guidelines framed guarantees of non-recurrence as
a distinct transitional justice mechanism—not as a subset of reparation, as had earlier been
posited.96 The separation of guarantees of non-recurrence from reparation, and framing it
as a standard transitional justice mechanism, is highly influenced by the work of Pablo de
Greiff, a transitional justice scholar and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of
Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence (2012-2018). In 2015, de
Greiff provided further clarity in his special report, in which he noted that guarantees of
non-recurrence are “part of a comprehensive transitional justice strategy,” which states can
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develop into a policy to address the aftermath of mass violations.97 In his report, de Greiff
elaborated on some conceptual questions concerning: a) what constitutes a “guarantee”; b)
the beneficiaries of the guarantee measures—individual victims, a group of victims, or the
broader society; and c) the duty bearers who are to provide the guarantees.98 He observed
that the beneficiaries of guarantees of non-recurrence is the broader society and the state
institutions are the primary duty bearers, who are under obligation to provide guarantees
to prevent non-recurrence.99
Over the years, guarantees of non-recurrence have advanced still further, from
public international law into the sphere of transitional justice and post-conflict
reconstruction. The application of guarantees of non-recurrence in societies emerging from
armed conflict is more in line with international human rights law and the UN human rights
instruments than it is with public international law. This is quite understandable when one
considers the dominant debates associated with the origins of transitional justice. One of
the dominant theories scholars have espoused is about the wave of regime changes that
swept across many post-communist and authoritarian states, and the need to hold past
repressive regimes accountable.100 The transitional justice model that emerged as many
post-authoritarian states attempt to transition to liberal democracy was based on statebuilding,

institutional

reforms,

and

strengthening

democratic

governance.101

Subsequently, as civil wars, interethnic conflict, other intrastate violence raged after the
cold war, the original ideas of transitional justice which were developed during the periods
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of authoritarian transitions became core components of peace processes in many postconflict societies.102

3.4.5 The Uptake of Guarantees of Non-recurrence in National Level Peace
Processes
The uptake of guarantees of non-recurrence at the domestic level normally draws heavily
on peace agreement provisions. Badran defined peace agreement as “a consensual contract
between some or all conflict protagonists to settle all or part of the incompatibility and
regulate future interaction, with a view to ending armed conflict.”103 Since the end of the
post-cold war, there has been a remarkable increase in peace agreements as a means to end
civil wars and intrastate conflicts.104 Research has shown that between 1990-2001, only 18
percent of civil wars ended in victory by one side, while 38 percent ended with a peace
agreement.105 Intrastate conflicts in the aftermath of the cold war are five times likely to
end in peace agreements than during the cold war period.106 In negotiating peace
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agreements, warring parties are often involved in significant negotiation to construct
institutions and agreements that will advance their interests. 107
Peace agreements often contain a wide variety of provisions that aim to address and
mitigate the factors that could lead to the recurrence of civil wars.108 Along with other
initiatives, security sector reform; lustration and vetting; disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration; and institutional strengthening have become some of the standard provisions
in many peace agreements.109 Some of these provisions, such as lustration and vetting, and
security sector reforms, have become significant components in the implementation of
guarantees of non-recurrence in many national-level peace processes.110 Several reasons
can explain why some peace agreements provisions have become standard practices of
guarantees of non-recurrence at the national level. The first is due to normative shifts in
the international practice of conflict resolution, which has led to what Mac Ginty called the
“standardization of peacebuilding through ‘best practice.’”111 Secondly, and more
importantly, as Roht-Arriaza observed, these measures “have become the major
components in the practices of GNR in part as an artifact of early transitions” and the
normative obligation for states to respect human rights and prevent recurrence of
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violations.112 Thirdly, these measures are consistent with many of the UN and other
international instruments to combat impunity.113
Although peace agreement provisions have become significant components of
national-level guarantees of non-recurrence, the mainstream peace agreement literature
does not explicitly use the concept “guarantees of non-recurrence… The development and
peacebuilding communities do most activities [that are normally] grouped under the
category of guarantees of non-recurrence without using the term.”114 The focus of this
dissertation is much broader, and it utilizes the concept of non-recurrence not exclusively
as an instrument of transitional justice but also as an instrument of peacebuilding. This is
true because a notable number of measures that could terminate ongoing armed conflict
and prevent a future reversion to that conflict have included both peacebuilding and
transitional justice instruments. For example, one of the measures that could be utilized to
prevent societies from reverting to armed conflict is disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration (DDR). However, DDR processes often involve overlapping activities and
actors that fit within the broader peacebuilding and transitional justice agenda.115
As earlier illustrated, the fundamental characteristic that distinguishes guarantees
of non-recurrence from other core transitional justice mechanisms is that they are forwardlooking and preventive in nature.116 Guarantees of non-recurrence carry the general “idea
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that forward-looking changes need to be part of the mix of post-violation reconstruction…
and [guarantees of non-recurrence] should do what’s needed to make sure violations do not
happen again.”117 Several measures fall under the category of guarantees of nonrecurrence.118 However, the measures that post-conflict states often tend to use include
reforming state institutions and the security sectors.119
Guarantees of non-recurrence, in the form of institutional reform, therefore, involve
reviewing and restructuring state security institutions so that they are accountable to the
populations, respect human rights, and protect the rule of law.120 The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development states that the goals of the institutional, judiciary,
and security sector reforms are to i) establish effective governance, oversight, and
accountability in the security system; and ii) improve the delivery of security and justice
services. 121 Reforming public institutions so that they are accountable to, and trusted by,
the population can take various forms, including creating or adopting international legal
frameworks to ensure the protection of human rights and civilian oversight of the security
sector.122
Security sector reforms, too, have been implemented in various post-conflict
context. For instance, the European Union funded the implementation of security sector
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reform in Bosnia.123 In Sierra Leone, after the civil war, the government of the United
Kingdom funded and led comprehensive security and justice sector reform with the view
of creating accountable security institutions as pre-conditions for the attainment of longterm peace.124
As this historical development indicates, guarantees of non-recurrence have
evolved independently in different areas of practice. However, each level of development
and realm of practice is informed by previous developments of the concept. In other words,
although the realms of practices of guarantees of non-recurrence are institutionally
independent of each other, one can see a linear progression and application of the concept
from the international level to their uptake at the national level. For analytical purposes,
the historical evolution of guarantees of non-recurrence is summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: The Evolution of Guarantees of Non-recurrence.
Nature and the level of
GNR
International/interstate
GNR as a tool of
interstate
diplomatic
Practice

International/interstate
GNR
in
Public
International
Law
through
ILC codification of state
responsibility

Context of non- The aim and examples of measures
recurrence
Injury caused by one Repair diplomatic relationship
state against another
• Promise not to repeat the
Breach of bilateral
wrongful act
and
multilateral
• Recognition of the rights of
agreements
the abused state
• Adopt policy and legislative
measures
State responsibility to Repair legal relationship between
remedy
states
internationally
• Modification,
creation,
wrongful act
and/or adoption of pieces of
legislation/policies
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Breach
of
international criminal
law
National/intrastate
Gross Violations of
GNR in International International Human
Human Rights Law and Rights Law and
United
Nations Serious Violations of
Guidelines
International
Humanitarian Law

National/intrastate
GNR in Transitional
Justice
and
postauthoritarian context

Gross human rights
abuses
Torture
Enforced
disappeared
Summary killing
Unlawful detention
etc.

Prevent systemic abuses of State
power
Prevent other actors from human
rights abuses
Protect and ensure the enjoyment of
human rights
• Regional
human
rights
courts and human rights
treaty bodies issue various
orders to guarantee nonrecurrence

Prevent systemic abuse of state
power
Prevent commission of specific
violation and atrocity
• Reform and vet national
police and armed forces
• strengthen the judiciary and
the rule of law institutions
• civilian oversight of security
forces
• ratification of human rights
treaties
• human rights training for
government officials etc.
National/intrastate
Civil war, complex Prevent systemic abuse of state
GNR in Transitional interethnic conflicts, power
Justice and post-armed genocide
Prevent non-state armed groups from
conflict context
committing violence and restarting
armed conflict
• Reform and vet national
police and armed forces
• strengthen the judiciary and
the rule of law institutions
• civilian oversight of security
forces
• disband unofficial armed
groups
• transform
antagonistic
relationships
and
(re)establish trust etc.
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3.4.6 A Critique of Guarantees of Non-Recurrence in Current Transitional
Justice Practice
As scholars have observed, several of the guarantees of non-recurrence measures have been
technocratic and state-centered.125 Security sector reforms, which have been used in postconflict contexts, have had mixed records of success.126 Part of the reason for this is “the
reinforcement and replication of core ideas, discourses and frameworks” of transitional
justice without adequate consideration of local contexts.127 This section first critiques and
highlights some of the challenges regarding how guarantees of non-recurrence have been
applied in current transitional justice and post-conflict reconstruction. In particular, I
illustrate the differences between transitional justice in post-authoritarian context and the
kinds of post-conflict context in which it is currently applied. The key differences I note
concern the types of conflict, the scope of abuse, and the actors involved. In the second
part, I propose a different conceptual framing of guarantees of non-recurrence and illustrate
how I want to pursue it in this study.
For many years, the conventional understanding of guarantees of non-recurrence
has been situated within the liberal democratic framework and human rights discourse.
This is because, as discussed above, guarantees of non-recurrence and transitional justice
processes, in general, emerged during the process of democratization in Eastern Europe
and Latin America, in which armed violence was mostly vertical.128 That is, in most cases,
the state largely perpetrated the violence against its citizens. Therefore, guarantees of non-
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recurrence in the post-authoritarian context were framed with the view of preventing or
deterring (mostly) the state and its agents from committing future atrocities and human
rights violations against its population. In his special report, de Greiff observes that the
object of guarantee of non-recurrence is not to prevent isolated violations, but violations
that “presuppose systemic abuses of (State) power that have a specific pattern and rest on
a degree of organizational set-up.”129
Despite the continued emphasis and focus of guarantees of non-recurrence on the
abuse of state power, in recent times, the state cannot be seen to be the dominant author or
perpetrator of violence in most contemporary conflicts.130 Armed conflict and civil wars
are much more complex. Contemporary conflicts often involve horizontal armed violence
and multiple armed groups. The changing nature of conflicts from authoritarian contexts
to situation of civil wars and other forms of contemporary armed conflict presents practical
challenges to current practices of transitional justice and post-conflict reconstruction.
The fundamental problem is the large numbers of non-state armed actors involved
in contemporary armed conflicts, which often results in difficulties in attributing
responsibility.131 In recent times, a great deal of violence and rights violations are
perpetrated by several non-state armed groups. For example, more than seven non-state
armed groups fought in the Liberian civil war.132 In terms of the responsibility of

129

de Greiff, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and
Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, 2015, chap. III section B, paragraph 25.
130
Kerr, “Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Contexts: Opportunities and Challenges.”
131
Pablo de Greiff, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and
Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, Human Rights Council Twenty-First Session, A/HRC/21/46 (New York:
United Nations General Assembly, 2012), para. 53,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HRC-2146_en.pdf.
132
The TRC of Liberia, “Truth and Reconciliation Commission Consolidated Final Report” (Monrovia,
Liberia: Truth & Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, 2009), 336; available from
http://www.trcofliberia.org/resources/reports/final/volume-two_layout-1.pdf.

64

perpetrators, the final report of the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission
observed that “all armed groups whether affiliated with warring factions or with the
Government of Liberia are responsible for the commission of human rights violations…
including war crimes and egregious domestic laws violations of Liberia.”133 In Sierra
Leone, Human Rights Watch reported that non-state armed groups committed the worst
violations.134 In many other contemporary armed conflicts around the world, similar trends
exist about the involvement of many non-state armed groups.
In addition to the question of attributing responsibility, there is also the related
challenge of accountability. While non-state armed groups, in theory, are subject to
international humanitarian rights law, it is challenging to hold them accountable when they
commit atrocity crimes in armed conflict.135 Therefore, the emphasis of guarantees of nonrecurrence on reforming state institutions and the security sector ignores the reality that
non-state armed actors are often not under the control of state institutions and state-centric
measures would not be the most appropriate way to hold them accountable. As MayerRieckh alludes, violations in post-authoritarian context often have a specific pattern of
abuse of state power, and the causes, resources, and structures used to perpetrate the abuse
can be identified.136 Although contemporary armed conflict may have similar patterns of
violations, the violence is relatively localized and diffused with limited state repression or
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direct abuse of state power.137 In such a situation, it is often challenging to know which
armed group committed which specific violations.138 This presupposes that insofar as
guarantee of non-recurrence measures remain state-centric, they would be inadequate to
prevent the reoccurrence of violent conflict.
In spite of the above differences, the debate about guarantees of non-recurrence in
post-conflict settings is highly influenced by the post-authoritarian human rights context.
The literature on guarantees of non-recurrence does not adequately address how other
mechanisms beyond the purview of the state, such as customary justice mechanisms, could
contribute to any guarantee of non-recurrence. To apply the framework of guarantees of
non-recurrence from a post-authoritarian context to a post-conflict setting, there is the need
for further analysis of the contexts and the kinds of violations that we seek to prevent from
repetition. As de Greiff observes, interventions that could “approximate anything
resembling guarantees of non-recurrence following mass violations cannot be achieved
through ‘institutional engineering’ or institutional reforms alone… Lasting societal
transformations [to guarantee non-recurrence] require interventions not only in the
institutional sphere but also in the cultural sphere and at the level of personal, individual
dispositions.”139 Guarantees of non-recurrence need not only focus on preventing the
systemic abuses of state power. There is a practical need to include a variety of measures
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that could deter and dissuade non-state armed groups, who often maintain a close
connection to local communities, from committing atrocities.

3.4.7 Guarantees of Non-Recurrence in the Context of this Study
From the foundational reference documents, especially from the work of the International
Law Commission and other UN human rights instruments, guarantees of “non-repetition”
and “non-recurrence” have often been used interchangeably. The ILC has also used
“assurances” of non-recurrence. The ILC distinguishes “assurances” from “guarantees” of
non-recurrence: On the one hand, assurances of non-recurrence are verbal assertions from
the accused state that it will not engage in the wrongful act. On the other hand, guarantees
of non-recurrence could involve a more substantive commitment that results in a tangible
change in policy or law designed to avoid the repetition of the wrongful act.140
The ILC acknowledges that, depending on the nature of the obligation in question,
the “State may not be in a position to offer a firm guarantee of non-repetition.”141 MayerRieckh also observes that the term “guarantees” of non-recurrence is misleading because
“hardly any measure taken by a state can be a definitive guarantee that a violation does not
recur.”142 Roht-Arriaza, too, observed that aiming for “measures” aimed at non-recurrence
is more realistic description than guarantees, “since there are few actual guarantees in life,
or in transitional justice.”143 In light of this, I believe the term measures of non-recurrence
is a more appropriate term than guarantees of non-repetition, and have opted to use that
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term throughout the dissertation. My decision to use the term measures instead of
guarantees of non-recurrence, as is mostly used in the literature is not just a simple issue
of semantics. Rather, it is fundamental to the context in which I apply the concept. For
instance, the term “guarantee” is used more appropriately when considering the application
of the concept of non-recurrence in the context of inter-state relations where, in some cases,
the state’s actions are bound by enforcement mechanisms. In the context where there are
appropriate enforcement measures, actors could, for example, be held to account if they
renege on the agreements to terminate hostilities and not to renew violence. On the
contrary, in the current application of the concept at the domestic level, especially in the
context of customary justice, there are limited or no compliance mechanisms, and there is
no guarantee that all armed actors will comply to non-recurrence measures. Therefore,
measures, instead of a specific guarantee, aimed at securing non-recurrence, appropriately
conveys the intent of this study. I adopt this language in a broad sense to include a variety
of actions aimed at preventing the recurrence of armed conflict and violations.
It is also important to clarify what de Greiff calls the “object” of measures of nonrecurrence. The object relates to the sort of violations that we seek to prevent from
occurring again. He noted that the “object” of measures of non-recurrence “is not the
prevention of isolated abuses, but gross human rights violations… [that] presuppose
systemic abuses of (State) power that have a specific pattern.”144 Mayer-Rieckh elaborated
on the “object” of measures of non-recurrence when he noted that preventing recurrence
deals with “confronting specific acts that were committed in the past and maybe committed
again in the future, and that can be studied in terms of their causes, effects, agents,
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resources, and structures used to make them happen.”145 Understanding the object of
prevention as specific acts of violation which presuppose a certain degree of systemic abuse
of state power aligns more within the context of systemic human rights abuses in an
authoritarian regime, which do not fit easily in a modern post-conflict context. Unlike in
authoritarian regimes, most contemporary armed conflicts are not just the outcome of a
determinable linear pattern of cause and effect, but a result of complex factors involving
the state, various interest groups, individuals, and communities at large.146 And, whereas
“transitions from authoritarianism sought a form of justice that could enable the move to
[liberal] democracy, transitions from conflict have sought ways of dealing with the
[complexity of the] past that enable the move to peace.”147 The increasing complexity and
multidimensional character of contemporary armed conflicts require a more flexible and
broader approach to measures aimed at non-recurrence.
Therefore, from a post-conflict perspective, this study proceeds with a broader view
of measures of non-recurrence. Hence, rather than confronting “specific acts of violence”
that rest on “systemic abuse of state power,” it may be useful to conceptualize the object
of measures of non-recurrence in terms of establishing conditions and social
transformations, which has the potential to prevent the reversion to armed conflict.
Effective measures to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict in a post-conflict context
requires thinking beyond the instruments of liberal democracy, which are often outside the
reach of customary institutions–one of the important actors in securing long-term peace
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after armed conflict. The analysis in this study theorizes and develops a conceptual
framework for the utility of customary practices of justice to prevent the recurrence of
armed conflict and atrocity. The study does not aim to provide definitive customary
solutions to non-recurrence. Instead, it undertakes both theory building and conceptual
scoping to consider customary practices of justice as one of the varieties of measures that
could have the potential to prevent a future reversion to conflict.

3.5 The Local Turn in Transitional Justice
In the attempt to search for durable peace following civil war or authoritarian regimes,
many societies have turned to “local” approaches as a way to reckon with past violations.148
These local approaches are varied and they are context-specific. 149 They are communitybased and “draw upon traditional customs and ideas in the administration of justice.”150
Among others, the factors that prompted the local turn in transitional justice include the
relative failure of national and international-level justice mechanisms to secure long-term
peace in post-conflict societies. 151 Scholars have criticized national and international-level
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transitional justice practices as externally driven, state-centric, top-down, and technocratic
with little regard to the specific contexts in which armed conflict occurs.152
The debate regarding the local turn in transitional justice can be seen as two
competing strands. The first strand of the debate understands the local turn as a
fundamental shift from the hegemonic interpretation of the liberal peace.153 Scholars argue
that most national and international-level transitional justice practices are informed by
liberal democratic norms, which may not be universally applicable across different political
and conflict contexts.154 Mac Ginty observed that the liberal democratic framework had an
uncritical influence on peacebuilding and transitional justice in post-conflict societies,
where the socio-political experiences are different from those of the West. 155 For these
scholars, transitional justice must recast its focus away from its current fixation on liberal
state-building and international “universal” norms towards a model that recognizes and
utilizes local norms, practices, and alternative understanding of justice.156 The second
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strand of the debate conceives the local turn as a move to advance local participation and
ownership while preserving the normative and universal standards of the liberal framework
as the best route to achieve long-term peace.157 These scholars believe that the relative
failure of national and international transitional justice mechanisms is due to its lack of
participation of “local” actors and civil society.158 Hence, they consciously seek to involve
local actors through “sensitization” and “capacity building” workshops to enhance
participation and local ownership.159
This study draws from the first strand of the debate, which advocates transitional
justice to recast its focus away from the technocratic and standardized liberal framework
of transitional justice. It interrogates and reveals the limitations of the liberal-informed
interpretation of how we go about to advance peace in the aftermath of mass atrocity. The
study aims to understand whether and how customary practices in administering justice in
the wake of armed conflict could prevent the reversion of conflict and contribute to longterm peace.

3.5.1 Customary Mechanisms of Transitional Justice
Many societies emerging from destructive violence in Africa and other parts of the world
have relied on customary justice practices to come to terms with the past.160 For example,
in Liberia, the “Palava Hut” has been a local community-based conflict resolution
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mechanism that seeks reconciliation by providing the space for victims and perpetrators
to share experiences with the hope of fostering long-term peace.161 In Sierra Leone, the
Kpaa Mende ethnic group has used a combination of rituals and ceremonies to bring about
reconciliation based on their belief in the supernatural and local conception of forgiveness
and revenge.162 In Northern Uganda, customary justice mechanisms, such as mato oput,
moyo tipu, tumu kir, and the relatively rare gomo tong ceremony are practiced in local
communities affected by conflict as part of the measures to ensure accountability and
reconciliation.163 These practices have the potential to resonate with ex-combatants and
rebel groups, who draw their members from local constituencies and continue to maintain
a close connection with local communities. A compendium of local practices among the
Acholi in northern Uganda observed that “culturally-based ways of coping in Acholi are
characterized by, and based upon, high levels of mutual support in closely knit social
units… and they have the potential to make a considerable contribution to healing in postwar society.”164 The authors of the compendium emphasized that customary processes
are relevant for measures of non-recurrence because, among other things, they have their
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foundations in local culture, beliefs, and norms that bind communities together.165
Rose makes a compelling argument about the role of culture in customary justice
mechanisms. Rose observes that “culture pertains to knowledge transmitted across
generations through imitations and teaching rather than genes.”166 Rose’s understanding
is ideal because it suggests that culture is not an inherent static attribute of a group.
Instead, culture continues to change across generations and time. Rose’s definition is also
consistent with the use of the word “customary” instead of “traditional” practices, which
“conveys the idea that these practices are commonly used and founded upon longcontinued practices… and they have continued to develop and change across time.”167 In
Why Culture Matters Most, Rose argued that culture is key to producing high-trust
society, which promotes inter-group relationships.168 Applying the framework of Rose,
customary justice mechanisms could have the potential to achieve non-recurrence
because they are grounded in certain kinds of shared moral beliefs, which produces a
high-trust society. And high-trust society is an important attribute that could significantly
prevent the reversion to armed conflict.169
Additionally, customary responses depend on collectively-valued identities to
secure the much-needed voluntary cooperation of community members to adhere to
community values and norms which underpin customary justice practices. 170 Hall and
Lamont observe further that cultural dimensions such as social networks, identity, and
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social capital are useful in “securing the [voluntary] cooperation of others,” which are
very important to restore trust and relationships in a post-conflict context, which could be
useful to secure non-recurrence of armed conflict and atrocity.171 This means that
customary justice is not just merely an institutionalized set of practices. Customary
practices are a manifestation of collective community understanding and the social
construction of conflict and peace that is rooted in that community’s culture, traditions,
and religious beliefs—they reflect that community’s worldview, and respond to the
conflict by centering those thoughts and beliefs in the very foundations of what “justice”
means to that community. Therefore, peace and conflict resolution is rooted in human
interaction, the construction of identity, and social processes in the community. This
holistic and communal view of customary practices tends to be absent from the neoliberal
view of justice, which often fails to acknowledge the embedded and contextual nature of
conflict and peace.172
Hence, the fundamental claim is that measures of non-recurrence that is grounded
in the very life experiences, beliefs, norms, and culture of communities is more likely to
guarantee their acceptance and promote the non-recurrence of violence and abuses. Also,
measures of non-recurrence developed around culturally based norms and values will be
suitable in preventing horizontal conflicts, especially in communities where people depend
on each other’s continuous social relationships.
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Chapter 4

4

The Ongoing Debate of the “Local” Turn

4.1 Introduction
The key question facing societies emerging from civil war, genocide, ethnic conflict, and
other mass atrocities is how best to deal with the legacy of the past. Advocates of liberal
peacebuilding and transitional justice have long claimed that international norms and
values should lead in the search for sustainable peace and reconciliation. Following the end
of World War II, the Cold War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the dominant world
order sought to promote liberal states, democratization, a free market, and individual
human rights. Many scholars then argued that the way to support sustainable peace was to
promote or, in some cases, ‘transplant’ this ‘ideal-type’ world order in war-torn societies.
The widespread acceptance of the liberal forms of peacebuilding and transitional
justice, though, seems not to live up to expectations. “Rather than creating conditions for
stable and lasting peace, efforts to hold a quick set of elections and economic reforms [in
many war-torn societies] did little to address the drivers of conflict, and in some cases,
produced perversely destabilizing results.”1 Some scholars, therefore, have raised serious
concerns regarding the promise of the liberal peace project. Critics expressed the worry
that the liberal forms of peacebuilding and transitional justice are overly externally driven,
state-centric, top-down, and without significant regard to the needs of those affected by
armed violence.2 Bolstering this view, many critical scholars, peacebuilding and
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transitional justice practitioners have advanced several arguments to eschew one-size-fitsall models.3 They claim peacebuilding and transitional justice must recast away from its
current fixation on liberal state-building and universal norms. They advocate for a model
that recognizes and utilizes local norms, practices, and alternative understanding of
justice.4 This ‘new’ model, they claim, will be sensitive and compatible with the cultural,
political, and social conditions of societies emerging from violent conflict.
Drawing on the literature on peacebuilding and transitional justice, this chapter
examines the theoretical paradigms of the local turn. It highlights the potential positive
attributes as well as the weakness of the local turn. To set the context within which I
advance the main theoretical arguments of this study, the chapter begins by setting the
broad parameters within which the local transitional justice debate is located. To do that I
highlight the events leading to the internationalization of transitional justice based on the
liberal peace and international human rights discourse. It is vital to start the discussion from
this broad perspective because, as I illustrate below, transitional justice took shape at the
time when human rights issues and demands for accountability were high on the global
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landscape. The second section delves into the theoretical paradigms of the local turn. It
begins with the debates in peacebuilding because the discourse on the local turn in
peacebuilding has a significant influence on the move towards the local in transitional
justice. I identify and discuss two competing claims about the local turn: those who view
the local turn as a fundamental shift from the hegemonic interpretation of the liberal peace,
and those who conceive the local as a move to achieve local participation and ownership
of the peace process, while maintaining the normative standards of the liberal framework.
The third section highlights some notable positives and potential excesses of the
local. While it is impossible to generalize, it is frequently taken that customary justice could
make the following notable contributions to securing justice in the aftermath of armed
violence. First, customary justice tends to be flexible and could adapt to deal with the blurry
victim-perpetrator identities, which is a reality in contemporary conflicts. Second,
customary justice could be accessible, affordable, and has a greater reach than formal
justice systems. Third, the emphasis tends to focus on healing, building social harmony,
and the continuation of future relationships. Fourth, victims’ diverse ideas about what
justice means could be accommodated in customary justice practices. While
acknowledging these positives, customary justice may be discriminatory and could reenforce pre-war exploitative structures. The social fiber of communities, on which
customary justice depends, may also be devastated by several decades of violence, which
could negatively affect its utility. Researchers are also concerned about the ability of
customary justice to deal with inter-communal conflicts and mass crimes such as genocide.
The final section of this chapter attempts to locate the local in this study and to clarify some
key terminologies I have used throughout this dissertation.
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4.2 Transitional Justice and The Liberal Peace: The Internationalization
of Transitional Justice
The events following the Second World War, especially through the Nuremberg trials,
provided the foundation for the “triumph of transitional justice within the scheme of
international law.”5 The legacy of the Nuremberg trials to criminalize wrongdoing after the
Second World War “forms the basis of modern human rights law” which, in turn,
influences current transitional justice.6 Over the past decades, transitional justice has
evolved into a global project that includes legal institutions, international human rights
norms, and United Nations’ policy frameworks.7
Taking cues from the Nuremberg trials, transitional justice was initially formulated
to respond to the excessive abuse of state power, especially in places that were transitioning
from authoritarian rule to democracy.8 The primary measures included judicial
interventions and the proliferation of international norms that seek to uphold human rights.9
The fundamental premise underlying the universality of international human rights is to
prevent governmental abuse of state power and to place obligations and duties on states to
uphold universal values and protect human rights.10 The enormous importance of enforcing
international human rights standards is explicitly stated in the United Nations Charter,
which obligates member states to “respect… human rights and fundamental freedoms for
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all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”11 Further to the notion of the
universality of human rights “is the assumption of a universal human nature,” which
confers human rights as “natural rights inherent” in all human beings.12
In addition to normative standards to protect human rights, the need to institute
criminal accountability measures was also a principal component of transitional justice.
For example, prompted by the Nuremberg trials, the United Nations created several
International Criminal Tribunals to deal with war crimes in various jurisdictions. In 1993,
the United Nations passed a Resolution to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia to prosecute persons accused of war crimes and violations of
international humanitarian law in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia.13 In 1994, the
United Nations established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute
people responsible for the Rwandan genocide and other violations of international law.14
Similar criminal prosecutions were carried out in a hybrid court system. Sierra Leone’s
hybrid Special Court is a prominent example.15 Beyond criminal accountability measures,
various United Nations policy frameworks, too, have given further impetus for the
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internationalization of transitional justice. Notable examples include the right to truth, the
right to a remedy and reparations, and the International Criminal Court.16
Although the transitional justice field pursued a separate track from peacebuilding,
both fields are increasingly seen to be tightly linked. 17 As Sriram observed, the link
between peacebuilding and transitional justice is necessary, as “it would be a mistake to
seek to ‘do justice’… without addressing the horrors of the recent past.”18 However, the
linkage has meant that a lot of the peacebuilding apparatus, including its fixation on liberal
democracy and state-building, are subsumed in transitional justice.19 In other words,
transitional processes are explicitly linked to democratization, the rule of law, and
institutional reform strategies.
The fundamental claims of liberal peace are structured around western discourses
and interpretations about conflict and peace. For decades, there has been increasing support
to promote liberal democratic values in countries emerging from violent conflict. The
liberal peace framework claims that liberal values such as individual freedoms, human
rights, active civil society, individual accountability, and democratic governance are
considered fundamental to promoting sustainable peace and development.20 These
universal international human rights frameworks and western liberal democratic values
gradually became the de facto standards of the field and practice of transitional justice.21
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Inevitably, transitional justice suffers similar, if not the same, flaws and limitations of the
liberal peacebuilding.

4.3 Strands of the Local Turn Debate
The discourse on the local turn in peacebuilding has had a significant influence on the move
towards the local in transitional justice. This is because, in the post-conflict context,
peacebuilding and transitional justice have dealt with similar issues. 22 Most of the
arguments about the local turn in transitional justice parallel the debates in the
peacebuilding literature. Hence, this section begins with the debate about the local turn in
peacebuilding, followed by a discussion of the literature on the local turn in transitional
justice.

4.3.1

The Local Turn in Peacebuilding

After the Cold War, the international community and researchers in post-conflict
reconstruction and peacebuilding believed that the (re)building of liberal democratic
institutions to promote the rule of law, respect individual freedoms, human rights,
marketization, and active civil society offered the greatest prospects for long term peace.23
In the early 1990s, the United Nations led the global community in promoting
peacebuilding, focusing on mediation, peacekeeping, and liberal state-building.24 The
UN’s 1992 Agenda for Peace became the primary foundational document for
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peacebuilding globally.25 However, the challenges and the limitations of the liberal
democratic recipe became evident after the failure of the UN to support long-term peace in
many countries that had endured years of armed conflict.26 For example, Paris observed
that postwar elections and democratic institutional reforms in Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia,
El Salvador, and Rwanda did not address the drivers of conflict as anticipated. “Rather than
creating conditions for stable and lasting peace, efforts to hold a quick set of elections and
economic reforms did little to address the drivers of conflict, and in some cases, produced
perversely destabilizing results.”27 After analyzing the global liberal peace approach and
the factors that led to its limited success, the United Nations, a number of international
peace practitioners, and researchers understood that there is a need for a change in
approach.28 In response to the limited achievements of the liberal democratic peace, an
understanding emerged among international peacebuilding practitioners and scholars for a
shift to a context-specific peacebuilding model.
Two theoretical frameworks have fundamentally influenced this shift in focus
towards the local. The first strand of the local turn debate emphasized the necessity of local
ownership and the empowerment of local and grassroots actors, while the second strand of
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the debate drew from critical post-structural scholarship and understand the local turn as a
form of resistance against the hegemonic discourse of the liberal peace paradigm.29 These
two strands of the local turn debate are elaborated below.
The first strand of the local turn argued for the necessity to empower local actors
and increase their ability to take ownership of peacebuilding interventions.30 In this
framing, local actors are construed to be primarily middle-level civil society leaders,
religious leaders, and other subnational domestic actors. 31 Local actors are empowered to
set the agenda of peacebuilding but it is apparent that they still need “support from the
international community in the form of training, and the building of peace
infrastructures.”32
One of the theoretical underpinnings of the necessity to empower local actors for
effective peacebuilding is Lederach’s “middle-out” conflict transformation approach.33
Lederach divides peacebuilding actors into three levels: Level one actors include the top
government representatives, leaders of opposition movements, and key political and
military leaders who have interest in the conflict. Level two involves “middle-range” actors
who occupy formal positions in various sectors of the society such as “education, business,
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agriculture, or health.”34 They may also include leaders of non-governmental
organizations, religious groups, and academic institutions. Importantly, middle-level actors
must “know and be known by the top-level” actors, but their influence is not controlled by
formal government authority.35 Level three actors represent the masses at the grassroots.
They include leaders of indigenous organizations, traditional institutions, and other
community leaders who “understand intimately the fear and suffering with which much of
the population must live.”36 To sustain the peace process, Lederach affirmed that
peacebuilding theory should focus on the middle-range actors. The middle-range actors
have the potential to connect both the top and the grassroots actors, and they hold the
“greatest potential for establishing an infrastructure that could sustain the peacebuilding
process over the long term.”37
Beyond academic research, the local turn has also become prevalent in the
peacebuilding work of many intergovernmental organizations, aid agencies, and
international non-governmental organizations.38 For example, the United Nations’ 2000
Brahimi Report recommended that “effective peacebuilding requires active engagement
with the local parties, and that engagement should be multidimensional in nature.”39 In reexamining its international peace processes, the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) acknowledged that to improve the quality of its international
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peacebuilding approaches, there is the need to build and “deepen global, regional and local
partnerships… [and] combine local/regional versatility, understanding, and political
legitimacy.”40 In the view of the OECD and other international aid agencies, building
partnerships with local actors is a cost-effective way to pool the resources needed to
improve the quality of international peacebuilding.41
The key idea here is to enhance the participation of the middle-level actors to make
peacebuilding work efficiently and gain legitimacy. This approach of the local turn takes
as given the assumptions and institutionalized structures of the liberal peace framework
and try to make it work efficiently at the local level.42 Practitioners and scholars who
subscribe to this view of the local turn believe that “there is no realistic alternative to some
form of liberal peacebuilding,” and the liberal peace can be saved insofar as it is made more
adaptable to the local context.43
Critical peacebuilding scholars have, however, raised concerns regarding this kind
of framing of the local turn. Critics have noted that the view of the local as merely
increasing the participation and empowerment of local actors, risk being dominated by the
inherent power of international peacebuilders under the guise of local empowerment.44
Implementing the liberal peace interventions under the guise of local ownership is viewed
by some scholars as a form of Eurocentrism which privileges the West’s interpretation of
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social reality while casting doubts on other forms of knowledge.45 Mac Ginty pointed to
the risk of co-opting local elites to implement the agenda of the liberal peace, which he
argued can “minimize the space for alternative versions of peace.”46 The critique of the
hegemony of the liberal peace and its potential for the co-optation of local elites have
shifted the conceptualization of peacebuilding to critical, locally produce ways of thinking
about peace. The second theoretical perspective of the local turn emerged from these
criticisms.
In the second strand of the local turn, critical researchers like Richmond, Mac
Ginty, and Jabri conceptualize local peacebuilding as an emancipatory project and a form
of resistance against the hegemonic liberal peace.47 This conceptual approach unpacks
peacebuilding as a discursive framework that allows for different viewpoints and
understandings, which take into consideration the complexity of social interactions that
may give rise to violent conflicts.48 These scholars advocate for the “need to more deeply
explore the complex and multi-faceted roots of the conflicts themselves, discounting onetrack, linear explanations that seek a direct cause of conflict in favor of a more locally
attuned understanding of cultural, historical and political contexts.”49 The call for a locally-
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attuned understanding of conflict invites a conceptual reconsideration of the methodologies
employed to study the conflicts we want to resolve.50 These researchers see the local as a
space for resistance against the dominant discourse of liberal peacebuilding.
Analytically, the fundamental differences between the first and the second
theoretical approaches of the local turn lie in how the “local” is understood. The first
framing understood the local as a site where the liberal universal norms and peacebuilding
methodologies assumed technical superiority.51 The local is essentially “reproduced
through the lens of the universal, to the neglect of the socio-cultural” context.52 In other
words, using this theoretical approach, the presumption is that liberal peace and its focus
on state-building, free markets, democracy, and human rights promotion remain the
principal route to attain sustainable peace. The local is important insofar as it serves to
achieve effectiveness, ownership and help remedy the potential “foreignness” of the liberal
peace.
On the opposite end, the second school of thought interprets the local as having its
own agency and call into question the standardized practices and ideas of the liberal
framework—state-building, free markets, democracy, and human rights promotion. Instead
of liberal universal norms taking technical superiority, the second approach espoused a
“new” understanding of peace that is based on local agency and ways of knowing. In other
words, the local is not merely an instrument for ensuring the efficiency, effectiveness, and
ownership of peacebuilding, but sustainable peace could emerge through and constitutive
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of the social, historical, and cultural context of communities affected by years of armed
conflict.53

4.3.2

The Local Turn in Transitional Justice

Similar to the local turn in peacebuilding, the field of transitional justice has taken a shift
toward the local in recent years. The increasing interest in the local is linked to the
limitations in conventional approaches of transitional justice. As explained in the first
section of this chapter, transitional justice emerged in part as a response associated with
transitions from authoritarianism to democracy.54 The conceptual boundaries of
transitional justice were defined by the practical challenges human rights activists faced in
countries where authoritarian regimes had crumbled.55 Violence under these authoritarian
regimes “was largely experienced by citizens at the hands of the state.”56 Therefore, much
of the focus of transitional justice processes was on “legal-institutional reforms and
responses—such as punishing leaders, vetting abusive security forces, and replacing state
secrecy with truth and transparency.”57
These initial transitional justice processes are now commonly used in post-conflict
contexts where there is no clear transition from oppressive authority to democracy, and
where the state is not the main perpetrator of violence and human rights abuses.58 For
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instance, although state power abuse was a feature of armed violence in places such as the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guatemala, Liberia, Peru, Sierra Leone, and northern
Uganda, a complex range of non-state armed actors perpetrated human rights abuses, too.59
Theidon adequately described the peculiarity of abuses in such places as “intimate
violence” where, “frequently, the enemy is a son-in-law, a godfather, an old schoolmate,
or the community that lies just across the valley.”60 Transitional justice processes pursued
after such experiences of “intimate violence” require more than legal-institutional reforms
and other liberal notions of peace and justice. As a result, the application of the initial
western-inspired transitional justice frameworks in these radically different contexts of
violence yielded limited successes in producing reconciliation and long-term peace.
Due to the limited success of the liberal form of transitional justice, practitioners
and critical scholars increasingly recognized that the liberal transitional justice model could
not be applied universally across different political and conflict contexts. They argued that
moral rights and values, including human rights, are culturally determined and are relative
to the societal context in which they arise.61 Others have also argued that liberal democracy
cannot claim universal validity because it is designed for a particular cultural context.62
Therefore, attempts to claim universal validity of liberal democracy is to impose “on other
countries systems of government unsuited to their talents and skills, destroys the coherence
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and integrity of their ways of life, and reduces them to mimics, unable and unwilling to be
true either to their traditions or to the imported norms.”63 Scholars argue that principles
such as individual criminal accountability and the protection of human rights, which are
associated with liberal notions of peace, are less likely to lead to long-term peace.”64
The concerns raised by critical transitional justice scholars mirror the debate raised
by critical peacebuilding scholars. The fundamental interest of these scholars is to recast
transitional justice away from its focus liberal statebuilding and democratic governance
towards a model that recognizes and utilizes local norms, practices, and alternative
understanding of justice.65 Hence, one of the key catalysts for the local turn is about the
profound need to take “a deeper, more critical look” at transitional justice practices and
reframe the conversation based on broader understanding of justice.66 For McEvoy, the
debate is about developing a thicker understanding of transitional justice to let go the
legalism, while encouraging the “willingness to countenance the role of other [non-legal]
actors and forms of knowledge.”67 And, in Gready’s framing, justice needs not to be distant
but be embedded within and established in such a way as to “engage the communities,
cultures and contexts of conflict.”68
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The second major strand of the local turn in transitional justice arose from the
concern of scholars and practitioners that transitional justice has conventionally been stateled and deployed from top to bottom. Scholars argued that the top-down nature of
transitional justice is due to the field’s over-reliance on trials, state-led truth commissions,
reparations, and institutional reforms, which prioritize global norms over local forms of
justice.69 Scholars therefore proposed what has been called “transitional justice from
below,” which emphasizes the need for tailored solutions to different transitions rather than
“ready-made” models. 70 To attain longer-term sustainability, transitional justice needs to
shift “away from the top-down ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to allow ‘voices from below ‘to
be heard and heeded.”71 Robins argues for a victim-centered approach in which survivors
prioritized their basic needs instead of resigning their fate to elites in distant national
capitals.72
Beyond scholars, global intergovernmental organizations such as the UN and
international non-governmental organizations have also acknowledged the limitations of
the liberal peace model of transitional justice. The UN, the United States Agency for
International Development, the Danish International Development Agency, the UK’s
Department for International Development, and others have undergone a shift in thinking
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and practice towards the local.73 The 2004 UN Secretary General’s report on the rule of
law and transitional justice seemingly opened the global space for widespread support for
the relevance of local transitional justice mechanisms, among international development
organizations. The report reads, in part:
Success will depend on a number of critical factors, among them the need to ensure
a common basis in international norms and standards and to mobilize the necessary
resources for a sustainable investment in justice. We must learn as well to eschew
one-size-fits-all formulas and the importation of foreign models, and, instead, base
our support on national assessments, national participation and national needs and
aspirations…
Similarly, due regard must be given to indigenous and informal traditions
for administering justice or settling disputes, to help them to continue their often
vital role and to do so in conformity with both international standards and local
tradition. Where these are ignored or overridden, the result can be the exclusion of
large sectors of society from accessible justice. Particularly in post-conflict settings,
vulnerable, excluded, victimized and marginalized groups must also be engaged in
the development of the sector and benefit from its emerging institutions.74
A closer reading of the UN’s observation, however, reveals a paradox. On the one
hand, the Secretary General’s report acknowledges the explicit importance of transitional
justice measures to recognize and utilize “indigenous and informal traditions for
administering justice.”75 Yet, while expressing a commitment to the use of indigenous and
informal tradition, the report claims this must be done according to “common basis in
international norms and standards,” which necessarily subsumes local approaches into
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“international legal norms.”76 The view of the UN about the local meant that the state and
the principles of liberal democratic governance are the standard practices through which
post-conflict countries could reckon with past abuses.77
Nevertheless, the UN’s commitment to localizing transitional justice encouraged
several international organizations to adopt policies that recognize local agency and
participation as important considerations in transitional justice processes. Because of the
overlapping goals of peacebuilding and transitional justice, international organizations
have developed local engagement policy frameworks to address both peacebuilding
interventions as well as transitional justice activities. 78 At the global level, one of the
landmark policy frameworks is the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. 79 The New
Deal recognizes that international global engagement in transitional states has often failed
because of the lack of inclusiveness, local ownership, and country leadership. Therefore,
the New Deal “commit[s] to focus on new ways of engaging, to support inclusive countryled and country-owned transitions out of fragility.”80 Several donor countries in the West
have developed in-country policies that seek to ensure context-specific peacebuilding and
transitional justice approaches. In its conflict Assessment Framework, the United States
Agency for International Development explicitly observed that “it is an all-too-common
tendency to look to models that appear to have worked in other contexts without sufficient
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regard for the country-specific conditions and dynamics. Conflict programming must be
rooted in local dynamics if it is to be effective.”81
In summary, while peacebuilding and transitional justice have historically pursued
separate tracks, and have sometimes been viewed to be in tension, they have inexorably
been working in the same geographies and on very similar issues.82 Because of the
overlapping footprints of peacebuilding and transitional justice, they have borne similar
critiques from scholars and practitioners. Both peacebuilding and transitional justice have
been criticized for being externally driven, state-centric, top-down, and without significant
regard to the needs of those affected by armed violence. 83 Prompted by these criticisms,
both peacebuilding and transitional justice witnessed a noticeable turn to the local.
Although scholars and practitioners agree that there has been a shift from the liberal statecentric paradigms to engage more with “local” constituents as the drivers of transitional
justice and peacebuilding processes, they have a different understanding of how to get
there. Two main perspectives underlie the local turn debate. On the one hand, some argue
that the local turn is about critically reframing the discourse from Western perspectives.
For these scholars, the local turn is one of “critical agency… and contested, post-liberal
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conception of peace.”84 One the other hand, some argue the local turn is motivated by the
need to enhance local participation through empowerment. For this group, the limitations
of the liberal paradigm in transitional justice and peacebuilding can be remedied by
deepening local engagement, while international norms and standards remain the ‘best’
practices. In this view, transitional justice practitioners seek the opinions of local actors,
civil society, and other local authorities through outreach and sensitization workshops.85

4.3.3

The Positive Attributes of the Local Turn

Despite the differences in theoretical perspectives, scholars and practitioners are mostly
agreed in touting the benefits of the local turn. Before I delve into the various debates about
the benefits of the local turn, it would be naïve to assume that customary justice approaches
are the panacea to terminating armed conflict and securing long-term peace. Rather, their
applicability and effectiveness are context-dependent and cannot be applied in every case.
These customary justice practices are never all the same, but on balance, they are generally
thought to make the following positive contributions.
First, for practical reasons, scholars argue that local processes of transitional justice
are more beneficial when it comes to dealing with very complex situations of victimperpetrator dynamics and the artificial dichotomy of ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ verdicts
associated with formal prosecutorial justice.86 Contemporary violent conflicts “are
characterized by moral ‘grey zones,’ in which different forms of guilt and innocence are
mixed.”87 Huyse observed that in civil wars, “there are circumstances in which it is almost
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impossible to draw a clear line between victims and perpetrators… and this alternation of
roles is an important consideration in preparing and implementing reconciliation
programmes… [and] no coexistence or mutual trust will develop if the rotating nature of
violence is not recognized and admitted.”88 For instance, in the conflicts in Liberia,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and northern Uganda the concept of “child soldiers” muddles the
victim-perpetrator categories because abducted children who fought in these conflict were
sometimes forces to murder their own family members and terrorized their villages.89
Supporters of local transitional justice, therefore, argue that in such circumstances,
conventional criminal prosecutions, which often require a ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ verdict,
are not suitable to deal with the subtleness needed to address such a mix of guilt and
innocence.90 Customary responses to armed violence, scholars argue, are beneficial to deal
with such complex situations because they could provide the flexibility needed to deal with
the intricacies of survivor identities.91 As Baines reported, abducted children and youth in
northern Uganda continue to maintain their innocence when they return from combat to
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live in the midst of the communities they once victimized.92 In such a situation, customary
justice mechanisms could be the appropriate avenue to achieve social reconstruction.93
The second practical argument is about the question of access and the capacity of
the formal justice system after violent conflict. Accesses and capacity of formal justice
systems in the context of post-conflict societies can take different forms, including cost,
availability, physical infrastructure, and personnel. Scholars have argued that in many
societies emerging from conflict, where there have been years of mass atrocity crimes, the
states’ formal justice systems are often destroyed, which can make formal justice delivery
difficult. For example, in 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front-led government in Rwanda
arrested thousands of alleged perpetrators of the genocide. However, no prosecution took
place for several years after the arrest because the Rwandan legal systems had been
destroyed by the conflict, “with the vast majority of the judges, lawyers, and magistrates
dead or in exile.”94 In Sierra Leone, a part of the country’s Supreme Court building was
burned down due to the conflict, and since the 1970s, no “legal opinions had been
published” in the country, which hampered the delivery of formal justice.95 In such
circumstances of devastated formal justice systems, proponents suggest that customary
justice provides the natural option for communities to utilize in their attempt to deal with
the legacies of armed violence.
The two arguments above are quite pragmatic in their approach to discussing the
benefits of the local transitional justice because they are not based on value judgments
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about local culture and traditions but based on the practical realities that exist in some postconflict contexts. The shifting identities of survivors of armed violence is a reality in many
contemporary armed conflicts, which has significant implications of how a victim or
perpetrator is defined. Criminal prosecutions, and in some cases, state-led formal truth
commissions, often use strict criteria to identify the kind of crimes that should or can be
investigated or prosecuted. However, as Huyse observed, this definition of crimes excludes
some crimes as irrelevant, yet, in the view of the numerous victims of armed violence, all
such crimes are relevant and need redress.96 Therefore, unlike the fixed legal rules of the
formal justice system, customary responses are said to be flexible and could practically
adapt to resolve conflicts even when the line between victim and perpetrator is blurred.97
Similarly, on a practical level, the destruction of legal infrastructure in the aftermath
of armed conflict often means that communities emerging from armed conflict have little
or no option but to turn to customary systems of justice. Besides the destruction of legal
infrastructure by armed conflict, there are many situations in which formal justice systems
are limited and not accessible to most marginalized people.98 In such situations of limited
access to formal justice systems, customary and traditional modes of justice become the
natural option for the majority of people who have been in one way or another affected by
years of violence. For instance, it is estimated that about 85% of Sierra Leone’s population
resorts to customary justice systems to resolve disputes. 99 In Burundi, the bashingantahe
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is the traditional system of dispute resolution, and plays an important role in maintaining
social cohesion and peace in the collines, where about 90% of the population live.100
On the normative side, the key argument is that unlike formal justice, which focuses
on individual criminal accountability, local and customary systems of transitional justice
tend to focus on restoring community harmony and communal atonement.101 Supporters of
local justice mechanisms argue that criminal prosecutions may increase instability and
thwart the quest for peace. However, local justice often aims to repair, create social
harmony, and enable social healing.102 This argument is based on the belief that
relationships with the larger community shape a person’s social identity.103 Proponents
assert that local forms of justice prioritize restorative justice and the restoration of
communal harmony to the extent that “the relationship between parties to the conflict has
to be preserved to a mutually satisfying level, even if this is to the detriment of the outcome
about the issue at stake.”104
A related argument about the benefit of local forms of justice concerns the notion
of justice. A lot has been written on the question of what justice means to victims of armed
conflict. Robins, for instance, argues that transitional justice interventions in Nepal did not
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work as expected because the processes were built on the human rights and legalistic
frameworks, which prioritized prosecutorial justice over restorative and victims’ needs.105
He observed that although prosecutorial justice may address violations and hold
perpetrators accountable, they are limited in promoting remedies since they often ignore
the social, cultural, and economic rights of victims.106 Millar, similarly observed that
justice is a “culturally variable,” which must reflect local peoples beliefs about the world.107
Baines, too, observed that “justice” cannot be delivered from above, but rather, that “justice
is a social project,” which should be delivered through strategies employed by the waraffected population.108 Proponents, therefore, note that local forms of transitional justice
could work better to deal with the legacies of armed conflict because they could incorporate
victims’ own conceptions of justice.

4.3.4

The Weaknesses of Customary Transitional Justice

Local forms of transitional justice have increased in places as diverse as Afghanistan,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Timor Leste, and Uganda. This increased attention to the use of
local forms of transitional justice has not occurred without criticisms. Critics argue that the
‘local’ is not homogenous, but is a contested space that produces unequal power relations,
discrimination, and violence.109 Some maintain that the scope and several years of violence
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could destroy the social fiber of communities that traditional systems of conflict
management depend.110 Others also question the applicability of local transitional justice
approaches in inter-communal conflicts, especially in increasingly heterogeneous and
pluralistic societies.111 Finally, human rights advocates and international organizations are
worried that local transitional justice measures are ill-equipped to deal with mass atrocities
such as genocide and other atrocity crimes.112 Each of these points is unpacked below.
One of the most commonly cited pitfalls of local transitional justice is that there are
ethnic, gender, and generational hierarchies embedded in their practice. Scholars argue that
in many communitarian societies, especially in African contexts, social relations are
closely connected with hierarchies, which could be a tool to repress particular groups,
especially women and youth.113 Critics are concerned that local systems of justice are often
dominated by men, community-level elites, and power holders. In some African societies,
women and children are not allowed to be active participants in some of the traditional
conflict management practices. For example, Quinn reports that in parts of Uganda,
including Karimoja, women do not play active roles in traditional practices of conflict
resolution and peacemaking.114 Women and men received different ‘punishment’ if both
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were to commit the same type of crime.115 In Khost province in Afghanistan, Schmeidl
raised concerns about the problematic customary practice of settlement, which involves the
exchange of girls to compensate for criminal offenses. 116 In other post-conflict contexts,
researchers have documented that the younger generations are also concerned that
customary practices could be used as a vehicle to arbitrarily discipline them and take away
their land and other possessions. 117 These criticisms indicate that while the local has some
utility, it may re-enforce pre-conflict structures such as contestation of power, violence,
and hierarchical structures, which can have a detrimental effect on the way customary
transitional justice is practiced.118
The second fundamental criticism presents a dilemma because it is predicated on
one of the most cited benefits of local transitional justice mechanisms. Thus, the argument
that local justice systems depend on social connections and harmony. But critics argue that,
in the most likelihood, the very social networks that customary mechanisms depend on are
sometimes destroyed by many decades of violent conflict. Quinn made a related
observation when she remarked that the scale of conflict, too, has a considerable impact on
the way communities could use customary mechanisms to resolve disputes.119 She noted
that the scale and magnitude of the conflict in Uganda, may “have caused such traditions
to become dislocated or modified beyond any useful form.”120 Critics are therefore
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skeptical whether local justice can live up to its expectation when years of brutal violence
have destroyed “the very social and material systems upon which indigenous processes
depend.”121
On a similar line of argument, critiques are worried whether local process of
transitional justice could resolve inter-communal conflict since their scope is often limited
to a specific ethno-cultural group. They question the utility of customary justice
mechanisms in resolving conflicts that cut across different ethno-cultural groups who do
not share the same belief systems. In a related argument, Quinn noted that the stratification
of contemporary society and rapidly increasing urbanization makes it difficult for the
practice of local transitional justice mechanisms.122 A similar concern, especially among
international human rights groups, is that local customary practices are ill-equipped to deal
with large scale impunity committed by high-level government officials, state military, or
rebel commanders. Human rights advocates who support this view claim that to achieve
long-term peace, there must be some form of deterrence of crimes, which can come about
through criminal prosecution.123 However, they fear that customary justice mechanisms are
not equipped to handle such ‘high’ level prosecutions, which could lead to many alleged
perpetrators of human rights abuse and violators of international humanitarian law escape
punishment.
While researchers recognize that some of the criticisms of customary justice
systems are legitimate, they argue that the criteria used for the assessment are too strict and
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legalistic, and often fail to view customary justice and traditional conflict management
approaches within their unique contexts.124 Critical decolonial scholars argue that the
criticisms about the weaknesses of customary justice and other traditional conflict
resolution mechanisms, particularly in Africa, are hinged on the Western outsiders’ view
that African societies are not capable of managing their affairs and cannot be left on their
own to address conflict and manage their societies.125 Keeping customary justice and other
forms of traditional conflict management systems at bay is how Western countries imagine
they are keeping their homelands safe from the threat of the “Other.” Still, many scholars
and practitioners remain optimistic about local transitional justice’s potential to prevent
conflict recurrence and attain long-term peace. This optimism stems from customary
justice’s rootedness in long-standing practices, systems of beliefs, and values, that have
held, and continue to hold, African communities and societies together for centuries.

4.3.5

Locating the ‘Local Turn’ in this Project

As discussed earlier in this chapter, scholars and practitioners approach the local from
different theoretical perspectives. The lack of conceptual consensus adds a layer of
complexity to any project–such as mine–that uses the ‘local’ as a central frame. To avoid
ambiguity, it is necessary to develop a conceptual understanding of where the local is
located in my work. This section begins by addressing the ‘elephant in the room’: that is
the fundamental question of the temptation to essentialize the local. In researching the
potential of local forms of transitional justice, there is a tendency to romanticize the local.
But, as Richmond reminds us, “caution is needed in approaching, interrogating, and
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deploying culturally ‘sensitised’ approaches: culture should not be re-essentialised nor
necessarily perceived as a benign site of agency.”126
It is important to talk about the risk of romanticizing the local because, first, it opens
up avenues to have frank conversations about the potentials and limits of what customary
justice can and cannot achieve. Second, a conversation about romanticizing the local opens
opportunities for customary justice and other local interventions to be vertically and
horizontally connected to the broader peace processes and actors “in ways that contribute
to the emergence of a renewed social contract between state and citizens.127 Without being
open about idealizing customary justice, they risk “being atomized… [and occurring] in
isolation from other local, national, or international peace processes,” which can impede
on the efforts to create the conditions for sustainable peace. 128
The call for the turn to the local is neither a project to dismiss the liberal peace, nor
a project to exalt the superiority of local transitional justice over conventional liberal forms
of justice. In Richmond’s words, the local is neither necessarily “a benign site of agency,”
or an “idealised and homogenised construction,” which has the inherent potential to be the
panacea to the challenges in post-conflict societies.129 Instead, the emphasis on a local turn
is a call for increased attention to the realities on the ground in post-conflict societies. It is
an exercise to “uncover its positive attributes as well as the more normally perceived
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negative attributes,” too.130 The question of the source, nature, and limits of knowledge has
relevance to the various approaches that we employ to end violent conflict.131 Therefore,
the turn to the local is an attempt to 1) critically interrogate and reveal the limits of the
dominant interpretation of how we go about to advance peace in the aftermath of mass
atrocity, and 2) invite alternative interpretations and sources of knowledge about how to
advance peace in the wake of mass atrocity.132

Conclusion
While peacebuilding and transitional justice have historically pursued separate paths, they
dealt with similar issues. Because of their overlapping footprints, they have both witnessed
similar criticisms from scholars and practitioners. Both have been criticized for being
externally driven, state-centric, top-down, and with little regard to the needs of those
affected by armed violence. Prompted by these criticisms, both peacebuilding and
transitional justice have now witnessed a noticeable turn to the local. Although there is
agreement about the need to shift from the liberal state-centric paradigms to engage more
with “local” constituents of armed violence, scholars and practitioners have different
opinions on how to achieve the shift. On the one hand, some wish to maintain international
norms and standards while increasing the engagement of local actors mainly through
outreach, sensitization, and local empowerment. They maintain that any involvement with
local actors must conform with international norms and standards. On the other hand, the
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second strand of argument maintains that the local turn is one of critical local agency to
recast transitional justice from its focus on the liberal framework.
Despite the different paths scholars pursue to get to the local, they agree that
customary justice offers several positives. First, it has greater flexibility to deal with the
blurry identities of victims and perpetrators. Second, it has the capacity and could serve
local communities when state formal justice systems are either devastated by the conflict
or not available to the thousands of post-conflict victims. Third, it prioritizes social
harmony and building social relations over retributive justice, which has the potential to
disintegrate peace processes. Fourth, customary justice pays attention to victims’ own ideas
of what justice means to them, unlike the legalistic understanding of justice associated with
conventional, transitional justice approaches. Equally important, though, are some notable
weaknesses of customary justice approaches. Critics worry that customary justice could reenforce pre-war discriminatory structures in communities. They argue the social fiber of
society, which customary justice depends on may be destroyed by years of violence, which
could render customary justice challenging to administer. Finally, the ability for customary
justice to deal with inter-communal conflicts, as well as deal with mass crimes such as
genocide, has also been cited as potential weaknesses.
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Chapter 5

5

Resituating Measures of Non-Recurrence at the Local Level: The Potentials of
Customary Justice

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the potential of customary justice and advances theoretical arguments
about how customary transitional justice instruments could stop ongoing hostilities,
prevent future reversion to armed conflict, and secure long-term peace. I argue that
customary justice approaches grounded in the customs and culture of conflict-affected
societies could play important roles to terminate conflict and ensure that society does not
revert to armed violence. As I noted in the previous chapter, by customary justice, I mean
practices that have their roots in the indigenous societal structures, customary institutions,
and traditional conflict resolution instruments that have been practiced over a considerable
period. To demonstrate the relevance of customary justice practices to measures of nonrecurrence, this chapter first addresses the changing discourse of armed violence and the
hybrid nature of recent armed conflicts. I argue that because of the changing discourses of
armed violence and the hybridity of armed conflict, it is important to pay greater attention
to customary justice responses to armed violence. In the second section, I outline a
framework and the elements of effective measures of non-recurrence. In the final section,
I explain how customary justice mechanisms might end conflict and prevent its recurrence.
Although this chapter argues that customary justice could have the capacity to
terminate armed conflict and prevent its recurrence, it is essential to emphasize that my
arguments are primarily normative and only seek to illustrate the promise customary justice
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holds and how its strengths could be drawn upon to prevent the reoccurrence of armed
violence. As I illustrate below in chapter 7, the causes of armed conflict are diverse, and
often lead to a highly complex post-conflict environment. As a result, the advocacy for the
use of customary responses to address armed conflict does not suggest they are adequate
in terminating violence in all situations. The complexity of the post-conflict environment
requires a range of interventions, including interventions from the national and
international arenas. I take on these issues below in chapter 7 and show how customary
justice could co-exist with and complement other transitional justice interventions at the
national and international levels.

5.2 Discourses on Armed Conflict and Civil War
This section aims to critically inquire into armed conflict and civil war analysis to
interrogate narratives that have dominated the civil war and violent conflict discourse.
Here, I challenge the hegemonic position of the mainstream rationalists’ analysis of
conflict. It is important to point out that an analysis of the extant literature on the theories
of civil war and armed conflict is not the focus of this section. While I discuss, at least in
part, some of the theories of the causes of armed conflict and civil war, I do so primarily
to set the basis on which I advance the main arguments in this chapter.1 In other words, I
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base the main arguments in this chapter on a specific understanding of armed conflict,
which differs from rationalists’ explanation of violent conflict and civil war. First, I discuss
the rationalists’ explanation of civil war. Second, I shift away from the rationalists’
explanations and draw on a normative framework to argue that armed conflict is a social
construct and a form of human action centrally located in the relational encounters of social
agents and the structural properties of social systems.

5.2.1.1 The Rationalist’s Explanation of Armed Conflict/Civil War
Rationalists’ explanations of civil war and violent conflict emphasize the “rationality” of
individual social agents.2 Rationalists explain civil wars in terms of economic variables
and argue that wars occur when the incentive for rebellion is larger than the cost of waging
civil war or insurgency.3 Following Collier and Hoeffler, scholars have advanced various
arguments suggesting that actors are motivated to engage in armed violence when there are
credible opportunities for private economic and material gains.4
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However, these scholars have arrived at different results and conclusions regarding
the role of economic and material benefits in violent conflict and civil war. Their points of
disagreement are largely around whether opportunities for material gain, in terms of
availability of natural resources, exploitable commodities, and access to political power,
increases the risk of civil war onset or, access to material resources only have effects on
the longevity of armed conflict. For instance, Fearon doubts Collier and Hoeffler’s
argument that natural resource and primary commodity exports increase a country’s risk of
civil war onset. Instead, he suggested that rebel groups’ access to resources that can be
exploited tends to enable longer civil wars, but the availability of economic resources in
themselves are not a good measure for rebel groups to take up arms.5 Ross agrees with
Fearon and argued that the characteristics of specific economic resources are important in
determining how they impact violent conflict and civil war.6 He observed that resources
that can easily be looted or require minimally skilled labor to extract are correlated with
armed conflict duration but not the onset of armed conflict.7 Similarly, Lujala observed
that the resource’s location is also important in determining how they can impact civil war.8
He argued that oil resources located onshore tend to increase the risk of civil war onset by
50%, while offshore oil resources do not affect civil war onset.9
Despite the varying conclusions, the point of convergence of the rationalist’s strand
of argument is that armed actors are motivated by economic opportunities, material gains,
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and political power. The individual actor is considered a purposive agent and a utility
maximizer. Conflict analysts take the individual as the primary unit of analysis and a
rational utility maximizer who will “conduct a civil war if the perceived benefits outweigh
the costs of rebellion.”10
Although rational actor models have empirical utility, they seem to focus more on
the individual’s instrumental rationality as the central unit of analysis. Rationalist
explanations often neglect the fact that the acting subject is a social agent whose actions
are situated within the structural properties of societies of which they are members. Instead
of rationalists’ economic explanations of armed conflict, social theories seem better able
to explain and locate civil war and armed conflict in society. In particular, the notion of
civil war as a social and human phenomenon or a social construct that emerges through,
and constitutive of, social practices advanced by Jabri has real relevance.11 The framework
argues that although material and economic elements are important, violent conflict is
essentially a human action that takes place within the context of social relations and
through such processes as group formation, identity, symbolic affiliations, and the
construction of normative expectations and codes of conduct.12

5.2.2

Armed Conflict as a Human and Social Phenomenon

Understanding armed conflict as a social phenomenon must begin with what Jabri calls the
continuities of social life. The continuities of social life are understood in terms of the
production and reproduction of social properties or systems that make community life
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possible. These social properties are conceived as a society’s culture, including beliefs,
ritual practices, ceremonies, and customs that define the relationship between individuals
and their society.13 The social properties then serve as modes where discourses take place
and the processes through which certain values and discourse come to be salient around
which actors “come to be willing participants in violent conflict.”14
In this framework, conflict parties are viewed as situated members of complex
societies whose identities are “constructed through and constitutive of the structural
properties of pattern and regularized social systems.”15 The ability for conflict actors to
mobilize others to be willing participants in violent conflict could be explained first by the
individual’s membership of a group, and second, by the complex societal norms, beliefs,
values, and institutions which are embedded in the “histories and memory traces of
collectivities… and in the nature of the societies in terms of their common beliefs and
sentiments.”16 The meanings of ideas such as “sacrifice,” “honor,” and “prestige” are
constructed by bounded social communities that “reify and reward such actions [as armed
conflict] taken by individuals” in the name of their community.17
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5.2.2.1.1 The Underlying Mechanisms of Armed Conflict as a Human and Social
Phenomenon
To support the conception of armed conflict as a human and social construct, it is important
to understand the processes that link social systems such as norms, values, beliefs, and
regularized structural properties to conflictual relations and armed conflict. Giddens
introduced three structural properties of social systems. He calls these structures of
signification, legitimation, and domination.18 Structures of signification constitute the
interpretative schemes and modes of discourses actors draw upon to make meaning of their
social interactions. For Giddens, structures of signification are central to the
communicative processes of social actors.19 Structures of signification may include shared
symbolic orders, language, modes of discourse, and other cultural codes, which make the
interaction between social actors meaningful.20 Structures of legitimation are those codes
of conduct and normative expectations in society that enable and simultaneously constrain
social conduct.21 Structures of legitimation can be both formal and informal codes of
conduct that “legitimate some actions while censoring others.”22 Structures of domination
are defined as social actors’ power asymmetries and differential capabilities to mobilize
allocative and authoritative resources to further their actions.23 In addition to actors’
differential capabilities to mobilize allocative and authoritative resources, structures of
domination also exist by the very presence of codes of signification and legitimation
norms—norms that allow certain discourses while sanctioning others. 24
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These three structural properties of social systems—signification, legitimation, and
domination—become institutionalized into political, legal, and symbolic orders in the longterm, which are central to the day-to-day activities of social agents. It should be noted that
each of the three elements or structural properties is linked to the other and social agents
draw on them in various contexts in time and space in their daily encounters and
relationships to solve different problems.25 Over time, as social actors draw on these
properties of social systems in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems,
contestations could emerge as some discourses, and institutionalized social and political
orders become dominant while others are rendered invisible. In such situations of
contestation, situated actors employ structures of domination—asymmetries and
differential capabilities in allocative and authoritative resources—to generate counter
discourses that unsettle the established order. As Jabri argued, this leads to a dialectical
process, and a realm of conflictual relationship arises as actors attempt to produce “new”
modes of dominant discourses, symbolic affiliations, and normative expectations. 26 The
following are the two key theoretical assumptions undergirding the view that armed
conflict is a social and human phenomenon.
First, the theory considers conflict actors not as rational and autonomous agents,
separate from society, but as constitutive of societies whose actions produce and reproduce
social systems, such as customs, beliefs, normative expectations, and shared meanings,
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which define the institutional continuities of social life.27 The central point here is that the
individual and society are mutually constitutive, which means the individual’s actions
cannot be separated from society’s constitutive elements. These social systems are both
enabling and constraining factors that are central in the decision-making of armed actors.
In Jabri’s view, these enabling and constraining factors are vital in determining “the mode
of behavior [of actors] within situations of conflict,” and these enabling and constraining
factors “cannot merely be analyzed in terms of immediate cost/benefit” calculations or
reduce to the “rationality” of actors.28 Therefore, the motivations and actions for warring
parties in a conflict are not considered given but are constituted in the individual’s situated
nature as a community member.
Second, this framework argues that instances of civil war and armed violence are a
manifestation of social processes and “deeply held social norms institutionalized across
time and space and reinforced through structures of domination.”29 The relationship
between the individual and their community is situated in identity and group formations
constructed along the lines of inclusion and exclusion, which is reinforced by institutional
structures that legitimate violence.30 In other words, violent conflict is a human, relational,
and social construct deeply embedded in societies’ historical and social continuities.31 This
means that conflict analysis and the approaches to addressing it must consider actors’
historical and social situatedness.
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5.2.3

Hybrid Violent Conflict

Many of today’s armed conflicts cannot be viewed as conventional civil wars between the
state and an organized armed opposition with a defined political agenda.32 Since the1990s,
armed conflicts, especially in Africa, continue to be much more complex, involving a
diversity of actors, issues, and interests, and different forms of atrocities.33 For instance,
violent conflicts in Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan have
witnessed large-scale atrocities against civilians, including killings, rape, and the
destruction of villages.34 These acts of violence are often committed by not only
government-backed forces but by a range of paramilitary groups, self-defense groups, and
rebel groups.35 The characteristics of hybrid violent conflict are twofold—the involvement
of a multiplicity of armed actors and issues, and the wars often emerge in weak or fragile
states.
First, in terms of actors, recent intra-state wars and violent conflicts have generated
new players who hold significant sway over how peace can be attained. These actors range
from military groups, rebel leaders, political elites, and community-level traditional
leaders. In today’s conflicts, “traditional social entities such as extended families, lineages,
clans, ‘tribes’… and ethnolinguistic groups become parties to the violent conflict(s),
introducing their own agendas into the overall conflict setting.”36 For example, in the
northern Ugandan conflict, researchers suggested that many Acholi supported the rebels
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due to grievances that they hold against regimes that have ruled over them over the years.
Yet others, too, supported the government due to the rebel incursions, abductions, and
merciless murders of Acholi people.37 The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo
is also described as a mosaic of insurgent groups, including various rebel movements,
ethnic militias, and state military.38
Second, in addition to the constellation of actors and issues, these “new” wars often
emerge and are fought in the context of weak or fragile states. State fragility is a contested
concept, and different labels have been used, including collapsed states, failed states, crises
states, and so on.39 This study used fragile and weak states—sometimes interchangeable—
to refer to states in which the government cannot or is unwilling to deliver core functions
and meet the expectations of the majority of its people, including the provision of security,
which often leads to a failure or breakdown of state-society relations.40 In weak states,
other non-state actors often wield a considerable amount of power, and the state is often
one actor among other actors that claim authority and legitimacy within the state’s
sovereign territory.41 In other words, there are often competing institutions in weak or
Tim Murithi, “African Approaches to Building Peace and Social Solidarity,” African Journal on Conflict
Resolution 6, no. 2 (2006): 9–34.
38
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fragile states, and different logic of orders co-exist.42 “The logic of the ‘formal’ state, the
logic of traditional ‘informal’ societal order, the logic of globalization and international
civil society with its abundance of highly diverse actors… and development aid agencies”
are examples of different competing orders that claim to provide peace and security in
fragile states during, and in the aftermath of violent conflict.43
In this context of hybrid violence and competing logic of orders in recent conflicts,
non-state traditional institutions, actors, and customary justice mechanisms add an essential
dimension to the toolbox of instruments used to respond to armed violence. Although state
forces have often been complicit in perpetrating abuses, the trend of recent conflicts shows
that all sides commit abuses against civilians.44 In contemporary armed conflict, statecentric socio-political, economic, and traditional social factors often overlap, in which
traditional actors and tribal warriors might become warlords or members of rebel groups.45
Through the efforts to understand conflict as a social and relational construct,
valuable theoretical insights could be gained regarding non-state and traditional
mechanisms of dealing with the aftermath of armed conflict. Therefore, effective efforts to
terminate violent conflict and ensure that society does not revert to violence must overcome
state-centric methods.
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5.3 A Framework of Measures of Non-Recurrence
This section builds on the discussions presented in chapter 3 about the historical
development of measures of non-recurrence. In this chapter I put special focus on the
uptake and applicability of measures of non-recurrence in national level peace processes.
The following discussion lays out how guarantees of non-recurrence relate to transitional
justice and the specific approaches that are used at the national level to prevent the nonrecurrence of armed conflict. Measures of non-recurrence, broadly, are interventions taken
to terminate violence and prevent the future reoccurrence of armed conflict or prevent
future rights violations.46 This section proceeds, first, by outlining measures of nonrecurrence based on more formal state measures. Next, I argue for an alternative model
outside of the realm of formal state legal and institutional processes.

5.3.1

A State-Centric Model of Measures of Non-Recurrence

Formal mechanisms of measures of non-recurrence often point to, among other things,
reforming institutions, disbanding unofficial armed groups, vetting the security forces and
the judiciary, and protecting human rights.47 Based on these mechanisms, Mayer-Rieckh
identified three elements that underlie effective measures of non-recurrence in the
aftermath of serious and massive human rights violations. These include, first, disabling
the capacities of abusive institutions and actors. Second, building the integrity capacity of
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abusive institutions, and third, verbal or symbolic signaling.48 Each of these elements is
described in detail below.
First, Mayer-Rieckh focused his framework of measures of non-recurrence on
disabling the abusive and operational capacities of state security, justice institutions, and
groups “that allowed, facilitated, promoted, or committed violations.”49 He argued that
serious human rights violations often require resources, skills, and a degree of organization
to perpetrate. These resources can include weapons, ammunition, and other operational
expertise. Therefore, effective measures of non-recurrence must consist of measures that
can disable these operational capacities that enable institutions to perpetrate violations.
Some of the measures he noted include “disbanding abusive groups, units, or institutions;
disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating combatants; decommissioning and destroying
ammunition, weapons, armored vehicles and other equipment used to commit such
violations.”50
Other measures may also include vetting, particularly the security forces and the
judiciary. The central idea is to rid institutions of abusers and render it difficult for abusive
institutions and groups to repeat violations.51 As de Greiff clearly articulated, the idea of
ridding institutions of abusers as well as the structures that enable them to commit abuses
is “something akin to an anti-Mafia measure.”52 That is, to “disable structures within which
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individuals… in fact, carried out criminal acts, who may have refrained from criminal
activity were it not for those structures.”53
The second element is to build integrity capacities. Building integrity capacities
involve efforts to strengthen trust and build accountability in state institutions. These
accountability-, trust-, and integrity-building mechanisms can include “reinforcing internal
accountability, such as ethics codes, internal accountability procedures, line supervision,
and internal discipline; building external oversight, such as parliamentary oversight.”54
Building integrity capacities fosters trust, promotes the inclusion of victims and other
marginalized groups in governance processes that reinforce the validity and respect of
fundamental human rights.55 As Davies argued, conflicts can be prevented when
institutions respect human rights and allow individuals and groups to express their views
without fear.56
Efforts to promote institutions’ integrity are essential because, after periods of
conflict, corrupt, weak, or dishonest institutions may resist facing the past, and they may
also work to undermine the rule of law and other transitional justice processes. 57 Credible
and transparent institutions are needed that will be receptive and more willing to cooperate
in disclosing the full truth of past abuses. Building inclusive institutions may involve a
comprehensive restructuring of the judiciary and security services to be efficient and fair,
which can help get other transitional justice mechanisms off the ground.
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The third element of effective measures of non-recurrence is what Mayer-Rieckh
calls verbal or symbolic signaling.58 He observed that this prevention strategy involves
states “verbally or symbolically signaling a commitment to overcome the legacy of human
rights violations and an endorsement of fundamental human rights norms.”59 Symbolic
signaling measures can include official apologies, memorials and museums, and other
verbal or symbolic commitments. Scholars have argued that interventions such as
memorials and museums seek to prevent future violence and atrocities by educating the
public and revealing the horrors of past conflicts.60 Memorials could help in trauma healing
and serve as a site of “learning from the past and perpetual vigilance,” which could help
prevent future conflicts.61
Mayer-Rieckh’s framework provides a viable way to prevent the recurrence of
violent conflict. However, the concern is that his framework relies heavily on the state as
the principal point of reference. As Boege argued, “the problem does not lie with the state
as such, but with the tendency to overwhelmingly rely on political structures and
institutions that are in many ways alien to the societies that they are expected to govern.”62
For transitional justice efforts, particularly measures of non-recurrence, to be effective,
they must resonate with the societies and the cultural context within which they are
expected to be used. I develop below an alternative view of measures of non-recurrence
beyond the state-centric interventions.
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5.3.1.1 Rethinking Measures of Non-Recurrence Beyond a State-Centric Model
Measures of non-recurrence should not only be conceptualized as being within the purview
of formal state and governmental apparatus. Instead, they must also be thought of as a
holistic approach that engages a series of actors at different levels, especially non-state
actors at the local level. As I have argued above, recent trends in armed conflicts
increasingly show that there are cases where a wide variety of non-state armed groups
commits violence. Often, people who engage in violence against one another must live
together again in the same communities.63 In many instances, children and youth are forced
“to join armed groups and often to exercise power, control, and brutality against families
and neighbors.”64 To ensure peace, members of the society must find ways to (re)build
trust and begin to recognize the shared values and norms that bind the community together.
To strengthen community ties and inter-connectedness, conflict resolution mechanisms
must allow people to reconstruct their lives based on the shared community norms that
could restore the conditions for peace and communal coexistence. This process of restoring
community ties and rebuilding trust must draw upon cultural values and traditional norms
of justice and peace. Therefore, efforts to terminate armed conflict and prevent its
recurrence at the community level are “not a matter of political accommodation at the
highest level; rather it involves interdependent relationships in the everyday lives of a
considerable number of people.”65 Based on these structural shifts in armed conflict and
the idea that armed conflict is embedded within social relations or is a social phenomenon,
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I advance three explanations about how locally-based customary “justice” could help
prevent the recurrence of violent conflict.
First, customary justice mechanisms could address the reintegration component of
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration more efficiently. Second, customary
justice approaches could establish local zones of peace through customary mediation peace
agreements, which could terminate inter-communal violence. The termination of intercommunal conflicts directly influences national peace processes, which eventually have
implications on conflict non-recurrence. Third, the communal orientation of customary
justice approaches creates a social control and accountability mechanism which could
dissuade non-state armed groups, who often have social and kinship ties to their
communities, from engaging in violence, thereby preventing conflict recurrence. Each of
these points is discussed in detail below.

5.3.1.1.1 Customary Justice could Sustain Reintegration to Prevent Conflict
Recurrence
In many post-war societies such as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Uganda, ex-combatants
often commit atrocities against the civilian population—sometimes against their own
communities. In these situations, they may face challenges in returning to their
communities. Some of these challenges may include stigmatization, “finger pointing and
name calling by community members, family and elders.”66 Name-calling and
stigmatization could be sources of stress and emotional pain, which could jeopardize
returnees’ opportunities to adjust to civilian life after years of fighting. Therefore, in the
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wake of relative peace, when armed groups lay down their arms and fighters begin to return
to their communities, reintegration measures could be more effective if they are rooted in
the cultural and social norms of communities’ expectations.
Mayer-Rieckh asserted that disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)
is an important element that makes up any process to formulate measures of nonrecurrence, which could disable the capacity of abusive institutions and prevent armed
factions from reverting to armed conflicts.67 DDR is a “process that contributes to security
and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of
combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures, and helping them to integrate
socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods.”68
DDR is a multi-layered process involving three major components. The first
component is disarmament, which involves collecting, documenting, controlling, and
disposing of small arms, light and heavy weapons, ammunition, and explosives from
combatants.69 The second is demobilization, which is when active armed factions are
dismantled or formally decommissioned.70 The third component is reintegration, which is
the aspect that is most relevant to my current argument. Reintegration consists of measures
to assist ex-combatants in acquiring a civilian status. These measures may include
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economic activities in which ex-combatants are offered economic incentives such as land,
credit, and sometimes skills training to help them settle into civilian life.71
Reintegration is a complex process that involves grassroots cooperation, especially
from communities where ex-combatants are returning. However, reintegration programs
have conventionally been formulated within a military and security framework, which
often fails to pay sufficient consideration to the social and cultural context of armed
conflict.72 Kaplan and Nussio, for example, have noted that the technocratic nature of
reintegration and the lack of sufficient consideration of the social and cultural context have
led to reintegration failures and ex-combatants’ recidivism.73 They observed that
recidivism is the most severe form of reintegration failure, which could drive armed actors’
remobilization back into conflict.74 For instance, Themnér noted that the lack of
community involvement is among the factors that led to reintegration failure and renewed
armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.75
The importance of local communities and customary justice mechanisms in the
reintegration process relates to the notion that the community, rather than the individual, is
the primary unit for attaining reconciliation and long-term peace. Ex-combatants are not
isolated from their communities but are part of a collective with a shared history and
collective normative expectations. Ex-combatants’ familial relations, kinship ties, culture,
and community norms are salient factors for reconstructing their relationships after years
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of living a combatant life. Customary justice mechanisms serve important performative
aspects such as rituals and traditional “purification” ceremonies that seek to (re)establish
group unity and connect ex-combatants to their communities.76 The rituals and symbolic
aspects of customary justice could deal with the deep cleavages in communities caused by
years of violent conflict. Kaplan and Nussio assert that social institutions and norms of
expectations could serve as social control that could restrain ex-combatants and reduce the
risk of renewed conflict.77 Similarly, Hill et al. observed that social reintegration in terms
of acceptance by ex-combatants’ family and community could counteract the possible
stigmatization and discrimination, which could reduce recidivism among ex-combatants.78
As ex-combatants seek to construct a new way of life, customary justice
mechanisms rooted in the traditions, culture, and social norms of expectations could ensure
social control and create a stable environment where they could safely reintegrate into the
local communities. Among the Acholi in northern Uganda, for instance, researchers
reported that most people believe in the phenomenon of cen—vengeful spirit of a dead
person.79 Many ex-combatants and warlords often have social ties to traditional beliefs
such as cen, and when they returned after years of fighting, they often “feel ‘haunted.”80
The belief in cen illustrates the “centrality of the relationship between the natural and

Theidon, “Transitional Subjects,” 88.
Kaplan and Nussio, “Explaining Recidivism of Ex-Combatants in Colombia,” 70.
78
Richard Hill, Taylor Gwendolyn, and Jonathan Temin, “Would You Fight Again? Understanding
Liberian Ex-Combatant Reintegration” (The United States Institute of Peace, 2008), 4–5; available from
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr211.pdf.
79
Erin Baines, “Roco Wat I Acoli Restoring Relationships in Acholi‐land: Traditional Approaches to
Justice and Reintegration” (Liu Institute for Global Issues. Gulu District NGO Forum. Ker Kwaro Acholi,
September 2005), 72; available from https://sppga.ubc.ca/wpcontent/uploads/sites/5/2016/03/15Sept2005_Roco_Wat_I_Acoli.pdf.
80
Baines, “The Haunting of Alice”; see also Thomas Harlacher, Francis Xavier Okot, Caroline Obonyo,
Mychelle Balthazard, and Ronald Atkinson, Traditional Ways of Coping in Acholi: Cultural Provisions for
Reconciliation and Healing from War, 59.
76
77

129

supernatural worlds in Acholi, the living and the dead, and the normative continuity
between an individual and the community.”81
As documented by Baines, for most ex-combatants, participation in customary
justice and cultural rituals, such as removing cen, is thought to have a therapeutic effect,
which could help prevent ex-combatants’ dangerous or abnormal behaviors once they
return.82 Researchers into Acholi traditional practices have reported that customary justice
mechanisms could prevent revenge killings and the reversion to armed violence by
restoring the “bitterness” that exists between family members of people who have been
killed during the northern Uganda conflict and returnees or ex-combatants.83 Customary
justice mechanisms in northern Uganda, such as “stepping on the egg,” “washing of tears,”
and “drinking the bitter herb,” are useful instruments that could facilitate reintegration by
restoring broken relationships and building unity across clans, and promoting a spirit of
forgiveness.84
Also, customary justice is more effective in sustaining reintegration because it
could help provide avenues to assure ex-combatants’ safe return to communities, often
without fear of revenge.85 In the absence of an assurance of a safe return to communities,
ex-combatants may consider it worthy to go back to the “bush” and combat life. The return
of armed groups to fighting might occur because periods of conflicts or social instability
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may create “unsettled lives” where different ideologies often compete with other sets of
beliefs.86 Ex-combatants may, therefore, adhere to a given ideology that may push them
back into fighting. In such situations of unsettled periods, societies need to reassert cultural
norms that provide order to social relations and interactions. Hence, while providing
economic opportunities and other state-led interventions might help reintegrate excombatants, customary justice could help reaffirm community values, which sends the
signal to other rebel members and combatants that “should they return home, they will be
welcomed and forgiven.”87 On this basis, customary justice ceremonies could build the
foundation to reduce recidivism and prevent combatants from returning to violent conflict,
thereby substantially eliminating the risk of conflict recurrence.

5.3.1.2

Customary Mediated Peace Agreements

In the liberal peace framework, it is assumed that most peace processes and other measures
to terminate armed conflict and prevent it from reoccurrence occur at the national level.
These processes often involve negotiated political settlement among state apparatuses,
political elites, high-level rebel leaders, and sometimes with the support of the international
community. However, efforts to terminate conflict and prevent it from reoccurring could
be thought of in terms of local peace agreements, which are often mediated at the local
level. Andrieu observed that locally negotiated peace agreements could create local zones
of civility or democracy in parts.88
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Customary mediated peace agreements are locally based and are rooted in
traditional cultural beliefs and norms. Such peace agreements are vows between warring
parties to end hostilities, which are often facilitated by traditional indigenous institutions
and local leaders such as tribal elites, chiefs, and other community elders. The content of
these agreements varies, but they commonly include addressing inter-communal
grievances, community feuds, or tit-for-tat killings commonly associated with
insurgencies.89 As Lederach argued, these local peace agreements are characterized by a
reliance on local elders who often engage in “lengthy oral deliberations” regarding the
immediate safety and survival concerns of the masses of the population at the local level.90
Unlike national-level peace agreements, the agreements made in customary
mediated peace agreements are often verbal declarations and assurances. The traditional
elders from the various communities make verbal declarations and vow to stop the conflict,
live in harmony, and that the killing will not be renewed.91 The agreements are affirmed as
a social contract through rituals and customary ceremonies. While the nature of the
ceremonies and ritual practices differ across ethnic groups, weapons and other instruments
of war such as guns, spears, bows, and arrows are collected in most situations. The
collected items of war are bent, broken, and then buried or thrown into a river.92 The parties
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seal the agreement with oaths and ritual ceremonies, which mark the “official” end to the
hostilities. The rituals administered are often embedded in the cultural and traditional belief
systems and norms of expectations of the communities involved.93
The verbal declarations made in the ceremonies are morally binding, and they
become the inter-cultural codes of conduct that guide future inter-communal interaction of
the societies concerned. Future interactions are guided by the adverse consequence of
defying the agreement, and community members actively seek non-violent ways to resolve
grievances. As a compliance measure, traditional elders from all the relevant communities
involved in the peace pact will make incantations and invoke ancestral spirits to “punish”
any group or community that might defy the peace pact. In some cases, material
compensations are required when a community reneges on the peace pact. 94 It is important
to note that it is not the cost of the material compensation per se that serves as a compliance
or deterrent mechanism that prevents the reversion of armed violence. The enforcement of
these traditional peace agreements lies in the belief in the supernatural powers of ancestral
spirits and other cultural taboos invoked during the rituals to reaffirm communal values.
These rituals are “considered a highly sacred act that evokes ancestors and requires that,
once the ritual is completed, no further blood may be shed.”95 “In the act of bending the
spear, the spirits of both sides are evoked and promised killings would stop. If, without due
cause, conflict started again, the tip of the spear would turn back against the aggressor.” 96
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The ancestral supernatural powers are believed to be beyond the individual and could affect
a whole clan, ethnic group, or community when invoked. 97
In many parts of the world, especially in Africa, these customary mediated peace
agreements have maintained peace between groups for many years. For instance, it is to a
customary mediated peace pact between the Pokot and Samburu communities in Kenya
called a miss, which was brokered about a hundred years ago, that the current peace
between the two communities is attributed.98 This agreement solidified peace between the
two groups, and it meant enough that peace has held for a century. A similar miss was
brokered in 2000 between the Pokot and their neighbors in Uganda, the Sabiny, ensuring a
cordial relationship between the two communities.99 In Acholi culture, the gomo tong—
the bending of spears—was an interethnic ritual that was performed to end violence
between a number of neighboring groups, in which each group bent a spear to signal a
commitment not to return to armed violence.100 Gomo tong was a “vow by both sides
evoking ‘the living dead’ and promising that such killings would not be repeated.”101 A
gomo tong was carried out in 1985 between the Acholi, Alur, Lugbara, and Madi, and that
peace continues at the time of writing.102
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Customary mediated peace agreements could emerge for several reasons. First,
local peace agreements could come about when the state has limited influence or has lost
its trust and legitimacy in certain high-intensity fighting areas. This might be the case when
the state is an active perpetrator of violence in those areas. In this situation, traditional
leaders and indigenous institutions hold a higher degree of trust and legitimacy with
conflict parties. Customary justice mechanisms and indigenous institutions become
important arenas of power and legitimacy that could be deployed effectively to dissuade
local armed actors from engaging in abuses and preventing the repetition of violations.
Second, the state’s lack of political will or a mere abdication of duty may spur local actors
to take up peacemaking responsibilities in their communities. Because most contemporary
conflicts are nested in local-level conflicts, when national-level peace negotiations stall,
local peace processes could remain ongoing and maybe the bedrock from which the
national-level peace could emerge. Third, at times too, local peace agreements could
emerge due to exhaustion since war is experienced at the grassroots level “with great
immediacy, both in terms of violence and trauma… as people (warring parties often) live
in close proximity and continued interdependency.”103
Hence, in discussing measures to prevent the repetition of armed violence,
customary mediated peace agreements could create local zones of peace, which could stop
hostilities between armed groups. The sophisticated cultural beliefs guide local
communities’ moral order, and when a community reneges on a customary mediated
agreement, it is believed a misfortune will befall the offending community.104 Hence, the
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“punishment” and the communal consequences associated with violating such customary
vows and rituals could serve as dissuasive measures to prevent future conflicts.
As I discussed above, the notion of the hybridity of violent conflict holds that,
although most contemporary armed conflicts and civil wars may have a national character,
they are often fluid and entangled in complex local conflict dynamics. There are often
spillover effects, and violence is not confined to one community. Things like weapons and
armed groups could easily cross from one community to another. These spillover effects
occur because local communities are often inter-connected socially and culturally. The
fluidity and inter-communal dimensions in recent armed conflicts meant that these conflicts
need more than a national-level approach to manage and address. As a result, customary
mediated peace agreements could be viable options to end inter-communal hostilities,
which are often nested in wider national-level conflict dynamics.

5.3.1.2.1 Restorative, Relational, and Future-Orientation of Customary Justice
The draft articles on state responsibility explicitly spell out that assurances and guarantees
of non-recurrence are essentially about “the reinforcement of a continuing legal
relationship and the focus is on the future, not the past.”105 On this basis, customary justice
could be thought of as intrinsically geared at conflict prevention and non-recurrence. This
is so because, although customary justice carries out several functions, including redressing
past harms and punishment, they are fundamentally oriented towards restoration and
continuing the future relationship between warring groups. Traditional elders often show
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extreme care to “limit as much as possible any disruption in the social equilibrium.”106 The
“cooperation between conflict parties in the future has to be guaranteed.”107 To guarantee
future cooperation between conflict parties, communities often take deliberate acts
necessary for the community “to save face and to restore personal and communal
harmony.”108
The restorative principles and the focus on maintaining future relationships allow
for armed conflict to be viewed as an unwelcome disturbance to the community’s balance
and harmony, requiring corrective intervention by elders and community leaders.109
Restoring future relationships is guided by the principle of justice in which the whole group
to which an individual belongs takes the guilt and responsibility for their member’s
wrongdoing.110 Therefore, armed conflict could be prevented through the following: 1)
collective guilt and responsibility could serve a dissuasive function by creating social
control and accountability mechanism, which could redress violations and prevent conflict
recurrence; 2) the communal orientations of customary justice mean communities tend to
have a shared destiny and a common sense of collective security. Particularly, community
members feel obligated to draw on their customary justice to maintain their own security
and prevent conflict recurrence when the state loses its moral obligation to provide security.
Each of these two points is discussed in detail below.

Guy Oliver Faure, “Traditional Conflict Management in Africa and China,” in Traditional Cures for
Modern Conflicts: African Conflict “Medicine,” ed. William I. Zartman (Boulder, Col: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2000), 163.
107
Boege, “Potential and Limits of Traditional Approaches in Peacebuilding,” 439.
108
“National Institute of Justice Restorative Justice Symposia Summary” (U.S. Department of Justice,
1998), 12; available from https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248890.pdf.
109
Faure, “Traditional Conflict Management in Africa and China,” 159; see also “National Institute of
Justice Restorative Justice Symposia Summary” (U.S. Department of Justice, 1998), 13; available from
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248890.pdf.
110
Faure, “Traditional Conflict Management in Africa and China,” 163.
106

137

5.3.2.3.1 The Communal Nature of Customary Justice could Serve as a Dissuasive
Measure to Non-Recurrence
In order to restore future relationships, customary justice places a high value on communal
life. “[M]aintaining positive relations within the society is a collective task in which
everyone is involved.”111 Customary justice conceives the individual as bounded through
kin-relations, not only to their community but also to the spirit world. The spirit world is
believed to have the dual power to inflict suffering and, at the same time, heal and restore
the relationship between individuals and communities that have been divided by war.112
Such an understanding of selfhood is what Ross described as embedded and relational. 113
In other words, people and their communities are connected, and communities are not
merely a collection of individuals, but their “existence” is intricately linked based on
reciprocity and mutual exchange of privileges and obligations. 114
The view of the individual as embedded and relational is expressed in the traditional
belief of ubuntu. In ubuntu’s traditional practice, when an individual commits a severe
crime like murder, the entire community feels obligated to share in the blame.115 In
situations of conflict, too, “each member of the community is linked to each of the
disputants, be they, victims or perpetrators… and a law-breaking individual thus transforms
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his or her group into a law-breaking group.”116 During dispute resolution, if there is some
form of compensation owed, the offender’s clan is often responsible for mobilizing
payment of that compensation imposed by customary leaders as part of remedial measures.
Therefore, the collective nature of taking responsibility for crimes and other violations
creates an obligation owed to the community by the offender.117 In this case, the offender
is brought under a form of social control, and the clan or community members make sure
that the “offender” does not revert to committing crimes and violations in the future.118
Family and clan members make efforts to bring their members under social control because
they deem it necessary to regain dignity, trust and restore communal harmony, which might
have been lost due to their members’ “crimes.”119

5.3.2.3.2 Communities could Pursue Socially Regenerative Pathways to Prevent
Conflict
To prevent conflict reoccurrence and foster future coexistence, communities take actions
that reinforce mutually beneficial relationships that self-replicate to build inclusive and
stronger communities. I call these self-replicating mutually beneficial relationships,
socially regenerative pathways to non-recurrence. Socially regenerative pathways to nonrecurrence invoke a relational view of a community that includes organic living,
reciprocity, and solidarity instead of an individual rights-based view of a liberal democratic
framework.120 A socially regenerative model is based on cultural values and attitudes in
which community members’ daily life and interactions are “inextricably bound up,”
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thereby fostering a climate within which peace could flourish.121 In such a model, the social
set-up is such that community members’ security is highly dependent on their kin group or
community.122 The dependence on one’s kin group or community to provide security is
especially crucial when the state retreats or jeopardizes its moral obligation to provide
security guarantees to its citizens. In situations where there has been a retreat of the state,
which often occurs in most fragile states, community members evoke their shared social
order to keep peace and ensure that society does not revert to armed violence.123
Liberal democratic efforts to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict often pay
attention only to perpetrator structures and state security institutions.124 These institutional
structures and state-level mechanisms are not designed to foster social regenerative
pathways such as re-building social solidarity and reciprocity that promote community
support systems that could be relied upon when the state fails in its duty to provide security.
Customary justice approaches could fill this gap by pursuing pathways that strengthen
group relations in ways that produce and replicate shared beliefs, common sentiments, and
norms that provide a rationale for “letting go revenge,” which is significant to prevent the
reversion of armed conflict.125 In the aftermath of the conflict in Mozambique, for instance,
traditional healers and local chiefs urged the war victims “to rule out ku hirindzira
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(revenge)… [Instead] to do ku lekererana (to forgive one another) as the best strategy to”
prevent conflict and create the space to restore social relations.126

Conclusion
In this chapter, I advanced three theoretical arguments regarding how customary justice
could work towards measures of non-recurrence. First, I argued that for DDR to disable
the capacity for abusive institutions to effectively prevent conflict recurrence, reintegration
efforts have to be culturally sensitive and rooted in the social norms of expectations.
Customary justice approaches could provide effective ways for ex-combatants to
reconstruct their lives after years of combat life. This prevents ex-combatant from
remobilizing and engaging in future violence. Second, as armed conflicts increasingly
become complex, diffused, and entangled in a web of actors, customary justice approaches
could create local zones of peace, which could help stop inter-ethnic hostilities. Customary
justice approaches could become important avenues for measures of non-recurrence
because the cultural beliefs and moral order which are invoked to broker local peace
agreements dissuade the relevant communities from engaging in future violence. Third,
customary justice could also prevent conflict recurrence because they are fundamentally
oriented towards maintaining future relationships among people who had been divided
because of conflict. Because customary justice tends to focus on maintaining community
harmony and future interactions, communities often take a collective responsibility to
correct their members’ wrongs and serve as a collective social accountability mechanism
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that could be a powerful tool in preventing community members from engaging in armed
violence.
It is important to clarify that, while I highlighted above some of the ways customary
justice could work towards measures of non-recurrence, I do not aim to make a causal
argument. Thus, instead of “intervention A will lead to outcome B,” my argument is rather,
that “intervention A may open up a space for action in this location, which might have an
effect on people and relationships elsewhere, which may open up spaces for further
action.”127 In other words, my working propositions are primarily ontological. They are
normative arguments regarding the nature of being and the constitution of communal
societies, who often draw on customary justice mechanisms to deal with armed conflict.
As Mayer-Rieckh warned, conflict “non-recurrence can never be fully guaranteed by any
set of measures.”128 More theorizing and close contact studies are needed to establish
whether these theoretical propositions will have the intended effects. In the next chapter, I
draw on documented case studies to provide an in-depth illustration of how customary
justice might work to terminate conflict and prevent its recurrence.
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Chapter 6

6

Customary Justice and Measures of Non-Recurrence: Reflecting on the
Experiences from Northern Uganda
6.1 Introduction
No individual member of a given community lives as though detached from a
history of that particular community to which one belongs. This sense of belonging
to a past is not only treasured by members of a given community, as it fully explains
their origin (both mythical and historical); it is also what shapes their primary
conviction of good or evil, what they hold onto as ‘values’ as well as all that
constitutes the justification for their acts. What is even more specific is the fact that
a people’s past becomes the most referential element to reckon with in the aftermath
of a violent conflict.1

In chapter 5, I constructed three theoretical propositions to illustrate how customary justice
could prevent violent conflict reoccurrence. First, customary justice could address the
reintegration component of ex-combatants more efficiently, reducing the risk of reprisal
from community members. Second, traditional authorities and fragmented armed actors
could negotiate “localized” peace agreements, which could have wider implications in
stopping violence and preventing conflict reoccurrence. Third, the future-looking
orientation of customary justice approaches makes communities adopt practices that
“assure” the continuation of future relationships among warring parties. But as the above
quotation aptly illustrates, one cannot appreciate how the Acholi customary justice
practices could be useful in achieving the above propositions without the history of the
northern Uganda conflict and knowledge of the Acholi sociopolitical system. In large part,
the shared history and socio-political system, and common identity shape the values and
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belief systems of the Acholi, which is very important in their effort to reckon with the
aftermath of 20 years of brutal conflict.
This chapter looks specifically at the experiences of the Acholi following the 20
years of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency, as a lens to understand the
theoretical arguments I mounted in previous chapters. This is not a conventional case study,
per se. However, reflecting on the Acholi experiences, using what others have reported can
add contexts, reify, and illustrate how the theory-building exercise in this thesis might look
like in reality. Section one deals with the historical background of the northern Uganda
conflict. Section two highlights discourse on the Acholi ethnic identity and their social and
traditional governance institutions. Section three draws on some practical examples to
illustrate how the Acholi customary practices might help terminate violence and prevent
armed conflict reoccurrence.

6.2 Historical Background of the Northern Uganda Conflict
As many scholars have noted, the northern Uganda conflict is a complex one—there is no
consensus or one theoretical and factual account of the causes of the conflict in northern
Uganda.2 Hence, this section should be read as a partial account of the historical events of
the conflict. Nevertheless, it is an important account as it illustrates how the Acholi of
northern Uganda mainly became the victims of the brutality of the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA). And yet, the LRA emerged from the north intending to liberate the people of the
north from the “National Resistance Army and on seeking revenge on behalf of the Acholi
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for the atrocities committed by soldiers [of the NRA].”3 I begin by situating the northern
Uganda conflict in a wider national post-colonial political context.

6.2.1

The Legacies of Colonialism

An important historical fact one cannot ignore in discussing the northern Uganda conflict
is British colonial legacies. I must, however, caution that a discussion of the impact of
British colonial rule and the historical development of the conflict does not suggest that
colonialism caused the conflict. As many scholars have observed, the discussion of
colonialism and the conflict in Uganda is important because British colonial rule
predisposed the country to violent conflict by exacerbating existing inter-group
differences.4
Until the British arrival, present-day Uganda was made up of centralized and
decentralized states. 5 The centralized states were hierarchical kingdoms, with Kings as the
head of the polity.6 Pre-colonial centralized kingdoms included Ankole, Buganda,
Bunyoro-Kitara, and Toro.7 Although one cannot claim uniformity in the degree of
decentralization and democratic practices, most of the decentralized states were governed
by a heterarchical structure, including clan leaders, village heads, heads of hamlets, and
down to the household level.8 The decentralized societies included Acholi, Alur, Bugishu,
Refugee Law Project, “Compendium of Conflicts in Uganda: Findings of the National Reconciliation and
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Bukonjo, Karamoja, Lango, Madi, and Teso.9 The Bunyoro-Kitara kingdom was
considered the largest and most powerful in central and eastern Africa in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries.10 However, by the time the Europeans arrived in the late nineteenth
century, the Buganda Kingdom had developed the most powerful, “elaborate and tightly
knit centralized state in the region.”11 When Britain officially declared a protectorate over
Uganda in 1894, the Kingdom of Buganda became their main allies, perhaps due to
Buganda’s powerful centralized command and control structure.12
In 1900, Britain signed the Buganda Agreement, which conferred special privileges
on the Buganda Kingdom, one Kingdom among many in the Protectorate. The agreement
stipulated the relationship between Buganda and the imperial power. It redefined the
Kingdom’s boundaries, including annexing other territories that essentially expanded the
Buganda Kingdom’s authority across the Protectorate.13 To establish the colonial state, the
imperial powers carried out warfare and conquest. 14
In the 19th century, for example, [in a different kingdom in what is now the Northwest Uganda] they killed the West Nile traditional leader, Chief Aliku, and gave
military support to the Tooro Kingdom against the Bunyoro Kingdom when the
latter refused to sign a cooperation agreement similar to the one the Baganda had
signed. When the people of Lamogi in Acholiland rebelled against colonisation in
the early 20th century, these rebellions were violently crushed. The newcomers also
indirectly caused conflict in different areas of society amongst Ugandans. This
occurred, for example, through the introduction of money, the subjugation of
traditional leaders and Kingdoms, and the introduction of foreign religions.15
9
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The warfare and conquest were used to restructure and redefined many of the pre-colonial
polities’ territorial boundaries.16 Diverse pre-colonial polities of varying forms and
strengths were forcefully aggregated and lumped together with new bureaucratic chiefs
appointed to take charge of the affairs of the newly constituted polities.17 “Peasant
communities were reproduced,” and indirect rule became the model of colonial
administration and domination over the colonial state. 18 Over time, the powers and
authority of the newly appointed bureaucratic chiefs grew into patronage and coercion.19
The “increasing powers of coercion and their [the appointed chiefs] accumulative control
of patronage led to the emergence of a class interest,” which changed the relations between
the “chiefs” and the people.20 The coercive indirect rule and patronage led to political and
civil inequality resulting in what Mamdani calls “a mediated—decentralized—
despotism.”21 From 1894 to 1962, Uganda’s political landscape was characterized by
alliance formation where the north and south were granted different privileges. For
example, the north was predominantly the source of labor recruitment, while the south was
much more likely to benefit from formal education.22 The north-south divide evolved partly
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due to the colonial project that reorganized the existing hierarchies within Ugandan society
to support the capitalist interests that brought Uganda into the global economy for
exploitation for the benefit of the imperial powers.23 The division, rivalries, and alliance
that characterized the colonial state “continued to pervade early political party formation
in Uganda.”24

6.2.2

Politics and Instability in Post-colonial Uganda

Towards the end of the colonial period, the major organized political parties included the
Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), The Democratic Party (DP), and the Kabaka Yekka
(KY), which means Kabaka Alone in Luganda.25 The political parties were formed along
ethnic, religious, and regional divisions, which reflected the “fragmented nature of the state
and the political culture of discrimination… that [had] dominated the political landscape”
since colonial rule.26 For instance, the UPC, was affiliated with the north and was an antiBuganda party.27 The KY was a loyalist party to King Kabaka.28
After independence, the first election occurred in 1962, which saw the UPC, under
Milton Obote’s leadership, form an uneasy alliance with the KY.29 The UPC/KY alliance
won the majority of the seats and formed a government with a politician from Uganda’s
northeast, Lango, Milton Obote as the Prime Minister, and the Kabaka Mutesa of Buganda,
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as President.30 However, the UPC and the KY alliance was short-lived due to political and
ideological difference, which led to weakness in the government, and culminated in a coup
in 1966 in which many Baganda were killed, and the Kabaka fled to the UK.31 Obote
imposed a unitary constitution and led many reforms, including abolishing the kingdoms’
independent powers and revoking the Buganda Kingdom’s privileges.32
Obote began to purge the military of army officers he deemed were not loyal to him
to consolidate his power.33 Obote’s purging spree resulted in the emergence of two camps
in the army—one loyal to Obote, and the other to General Idi Amin.34 Soon tensions began
to emerge between the Obote camp who are overwhelmingly soldiers from Lango and
Acholi on the one hand, and Idi Amin and his loyalists from West Nile, on the other hand.35
The tensions culminated in Idi Amin seizing power through a coup in 1971.36
Amin governed the country with great terror and widespread violence and torture.
As a de facto dictator, he set up a military tribunal, and gave the military powers to arrest,
prosecute, and punish those Amin considered his political enemies, especially Obote’s
supporters from Acholi and Lango.37 In 1979, Amin was overthrown by a joint military
force, the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) and the Tanzanian People’s Defense
Force (TPDF).38 Following a brief interim administration, a general election took place in
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1980. Only four political parties competed in the election.39 Amidst allegations of election
rigging, the UPC won the election, which marked the second coming of Obote as Uganda’s
President.40
Obote’s second term was marked by a roughly equal number of human rights
abuses, torture, looting, and widespread violence as Amin’s term.41 In 1981 the National
Resistance Army led by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, an ethnic Ankole from Uganda’s
southwest, launched an insurgency against the government of Obote in Luwero.42 Obote
continued to face many internal tensions and was unable to mount a unified force against
the NRA. In particular, Obote was accused by the Acholi of favoring his own ethnic group,
the Langi.43 The internal divisions culminated in a military coup in 1985 led by two Acholi
commanders, Bajilio Olara Okello and Tito Okello.44 A Military Council was announced,
with Tito Okello as the Chairman and Head of State, which governed Uganda between
August 1985 and January 1986.45 Amidst a continued demands and attacks on the
government, The Military Council agreed to peace talks with the NRA in Nairobi, Kenya,
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which resulted in a peace agreement in December 1985.46 The peace agreement fell apart
and the NRA renewed its assault against the government of Okello, leading to the defeat
and overthrow of the Military Council in January 1986.47 At that time, Yoweri Museveni,
who was then leader of the NRA/NRM, became and has remained President of Uganda up
to the time of writing.

6.2.3
The War in Northern Uganda: The National Resistance
Army and the Lord’s Resistance Army (1986-2006)
After the capture of power from Okello in 1986, the National Resistance Army (NRA)
under the leadership of Museveni pursued a “revenge campaign” against the north over
“alleged atrocities committed by the former Northern-led governments [the Okello, Obote,
and Amins’ regimes.”]48 The NRA embarked on Operation Fagia (to sweep), especially in
Kitgum and Gulu districts in the north, leading to torture, abduction, burning of villages,
and killing many civilians and former soldiers with the UNLA.49 To resist the NRA
atrocities in the north, former UNLA soldiers regrouped in southern Sudan and formed the
Uganda People’s Democratic Movement/Army (UPDM/A) with the support of the
Sudanese.50 The UPDA launched an attack on the NRA, and atrocities and violence in the
north continued until a Peace Accord was brokered by a civil society organization, the
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Goodwill Peace Mission, in June 1988 in Gulu.51 The Peace agreement resulted in members
of the UPDA being integrated into the NRA.52
However, not every member of the UPDA supported the Peace Accord with the
NRA. As a result, many soldiers of the UPDA broke ranks and formed splinter insurgent
groups with their own identities.53 Some of these splinter groups included “Ci-lil (Go and
spread the rumors [to the NRA]), Cel-ibong (Shoot and charge/feel [the NRA soldiers to
see whether they are dead]) and Agoyo-ayaro (Smash [the NRA] completely).”54 Most of
the insurgent groups that opposed the Peace Accord joined what was known as the Trinity
Wars, led by Alice Auma’s (Lakwena) Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF), which
continued to fight the NRA.55
Joseph Kony, who was a key member of the HSMF launched the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA) after Alice was forced into exile in Kenya.56 The NRA had committed many
atrocities against the Acholi communities, and because of their promise to seek revenge
against the NRA, the LRA initially gained widespread support among the Acholi. Many
former HSMF followers and soldiers joined the LRA to continue the rebellion to fulfill
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HSMF’s goal of liberating the “Acholi people and Uganda, [from the terror of the NRA].”57
Joseph Kony initially followed the principles of the HSMF and claimed he was directed by
the Holy Spirit to “teach the Acholi to follow the Ten Commandments.”58 However, Kony
does not seem to have been motivated by religion and soon abandoned the HSMF’s prayers
and stones strategy and launched a full-scale violent insurgency against the NRA.59
The NRA responded to Kony’s insurgency by unleashing violence and terror on
civilian populations in Acholi, especially in Gulu and Kitgum.60 The NRA’s violent
campaign made “the [civilian] general population [in Acholi] afraid to associate with
Kony.”61 The fear in the civilian population to associate with Kony made him feel betrayed
by the Acholi. He, therefore, responded with violence, looting, abduction, and forced
recruitment of civilians into the LRA.62 The LRA brutality and forced recruitment made it
impossible for many people in Acholi communities, including children, to stay uninvolved
since they would be suspected of collaborating with the NRA. Many men, women, and
children were drawn into combat. As a result, “everybody” in Acholi was affected in one
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way or the other, either actively fighting in the bush or in a supporting role.63 For nearly
two decades, the LRA-NRA war in the north caused massive human rights violations and
widespread atrocities on the civilian population, creating a situation where many abductees
were forced to turn into killers.64
The accurate figures of the number of people killed in the conflict vary depending
on the reporting institution, however, it is generally accepted that the northern Uganda
conflict was one of the most horrific atrocities in Africa.65 For example, in 2003, the United
Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs described the situation in
northern Uganda as “one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.”66 Estimates put
the people who were internally displaced by the conflict to be between 1.8 and 2 million,
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a figure that represented more than 80% of the population in the region.67 As of 2006, the
number of camps for internally displaced people in northern Uganda stood at 202.68
Beyond an unknown number of direct combat deaths, reports estimate that about 129
people died daily in the internally displaced peoples’ camps due to poor sanitation, health
care, and deplorable living conditions within the camps.69 Amnesty International estimates
more than 25,000 children were abducted by the LRA and carried into the bush as child
soldiers during the conflict.70
Despite the horrific suffering, abduction, and cycle of killings of many northern
Ugandans, the actions of the Government of Uganda (GOU) suggest it had little desire for
a genuine attempt to end the conflict. The lack of capacity or unwillingness of the GOU to
defend the population and end the LRA insurgency was evident in the repeated rhetoric of
high-ranking officers that the LRA had been defeated and the war was over.71 Some of the
GOU counter-insurgency campaigns were considered damaging and woefully failed to
protect the civilian population from the LRA atrocities. For example, the decision to force
the people from Acholi – about 200,000 people – into supposedly protected camps “in
effect surrendered much of the countryside to the LRA.”72 The GOU’s army failed to
protect the civilian populations within these “protected” camps. Scholars have offered
several explanations for why the Museveni’s government failed to protect the Acholi
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civilian population. One explanation is that the “continuation of the conflict provides a
crisis environment that enables the government” to adopt arbitrary policies to consolidate
its political power.73 The majority of the NRA constituency was also based in the south,
and the Acholi, who are northerners, have been viewed by the NRA as the enemy against
Museveni and his government.74 The LRA’s killing and abduction continued within the
protected camps, which further threaten the peace and security of the people in the Acholi
sub-region.75
In response to sustained pressure from the international community, civil society
actors, and several successive attempts at peace talks, the GOU and the LRA convened
peace talks in Juba, South Sudan, in 2006.76 Although the peace talks were beset with
problems, a peace agreement was eventually signed between the Republic of Uganda and
the Lord's Resistance Army in Juba, in what was then Sudan, on 29 June 2007, paving the
way for reconciliation efforts to begin.77
As the guns fell silent and ex-fighters began returning from the bush, the blurred
lines between the victim and perpetrator dichotomy became staggering and revealing. An
uneasy tension and strained relations exist among, for instance, those who felt they had no
choice but to join either the rebels or the government forces; those who were perceived to
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have joined the fighting willingly; those who stood by; and the members of the wider
community.78 This complexity explains, in part, the motivations to look beyond statecentered mechanisms to prevent the recurrence of violent conflicts. Since state-centered
mechanisms often focused on a neat distinction between perpetrator and victim, the road
to preventing the reoccurrence of violent conflict requires steps beyond the boundaries of
state-centered mechanisms. In the sections that follow, I discuss the Acholi traditional
Governance, their worldview and draw on some examples to illustrate how Acholi
customary justice could provide a meaningful way to prevent conflict reoccurrence.

6.2.3.1 Ethnicity, Traditional, and Governance Institutions of the Acholi
To understand the workings of the Acholi traditions in relation to customary justice and
conflict management, one needs to understand the historical identity of the Acholi, their
institutional governance systems, and the legitimacy of local authority. In explaining how
a group’s shared history and identity impacts on how they respond to situations of
adversity, Adler observed that when a group of people are metaphorically tossed in the air
[w]here they go, how, when and why, is not entirely determined by physical forces
and constraints; but neither does it depend solely on individual preferences and
rational choices. It is also a matter of their shared knowledge, the collective
meaning they attach to their situation, their authority and legitimacy, the rules,
institutions, and material resources they use to find their way, and their practices,
or even, sometimes, their joint creativity.79
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6.2.4

The Acholi Ethnic Identity

Ethnicity has been variously conceptualized. For Weber, ethnic groups are “those human
groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of
physical type or of custom or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration…
it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists.”80 Others view
ethnic identity based on groups having a real or imaginary association and a specified
territory recognized by others.81 Two theories dominate the debate regarding ethnicity,
identity, and the theory of belonging—the social constructivist and the primordialists
views.82 Social constructivists essentially focus on how individuals and groups “construct”
their social reality. They look at how social phenomena are created and institutionalized.
For social constructivists, social reality is not given but produced and reproduced based on
peoples’ experiences, knowledge, interpretation, and shared meaning.83 Hence, ethnic
identities are constructed based on historical, social, and political configurations.84
Primordialists, on the other hand, argue that ethnic groups held together an infinity
of personal ties such as extended kinship relations, which tend to be endured over many
generations.85 Others view the primordial conception as the “essentialist view of ethnicity
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in which ethnic groups are taken as given.86 The significant difference between the
constructivist and primordial views is that, while constructivists argue that individuals have
multiple, not single, ethnic identities, which can vary depending upon a set of social,
economic, and political processes, “primordialists see a single ethnic identity with multiple
dimensions.”87
With specific reference to the Acholi ethnic identity, the constructivist school of
thought argues that the Acholi ethnicity is a colonial construction, emphasizing that
“Acholi as a distinct and collective identity are a British creation.”88 The primordialists
school of thought rejects the view that the Acholi ethnic identity came about due to the
colonial “modernity” project and the creation of the Uganda state. Instead, they assert that
the evolution of the Acholic ethnic identity began with the earliest settlement of people in
the area we now call Acholi, long before the first known European arrival.89 The debate
about the ethnic identity of the Acholi is vital because it situates the politics of Acholiland
within the national context regarding the institutions, relationships, and values that govern
societal interactions.
Although the origin story of the Acholi ethnic identity continues to be a source of
debate, historical evidence suggests that the formation of the Acholi ethnic identity started
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around the late seventeenth century.90 The earliest settlers in the present Acholiland claim
to be direct descendants of the Luo-speaking Central Sudanic and Eastern Nilotic group.91
Presently, the Acholi can be found mainly in the northern Uganda districts of Agago,
Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum, Lamwo, Nwoya, Omoro, and Pader.92 Their neighbors include
Karamoja Sub-region in the east, Lango in the south-east, Bunyoro in the southwest, West
Nile in the west, and South Sudan in the north.93

6.2.4.1 Socio-Political Organization and Governance Institutions
The chiefdoms are the macro-level of community governance. The chiefdom comprised a
collection of villages under the political authority of the rwodi moo (chief of the oil).94 The
authority of the rwodi moo was, however, not absolute. Power was shared with lineage
elders and clan heads. The totality of the socio-political system—that is, from the
elementary family unit to the chiefdoms makes Acholiland’s traditional system and
political order. There are currently 52 recognized chiefdoms in the Acholi sub-region
headed by the Lawi Rwodi (paramount chief).95 The chiefdoms down to the hamlet have a
similar structure, evolutionary origin, and governance arrangements, yet distinct and
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separated from other political units in terms of hierarchical power and authority. The
relationship between the various structures of governance was not based on hierarchy and
superiority. Instead, they were heterarchical interwoven governing arrangements based on
respect, not fear, and regulations, not command.96
Before colonialism, the Acholi governance system was rooted in the people’s
norms, customs, and traditional beliefs.97 The rwodi moo, was “chosen by supernatural
powers, and was enthroned and specifically anointed with fat preserved from the carcasses
of lions in solemn religious ceremonies.”98 They were held in high esteem and believed to
have a relationship, communicate, and take instructions from “invisible deities and spirits
of ancestors.”99 The Acholi system of belief is based on a supreme being, Jok-kene, which
lives in the Acholi sacred shrines in hamlets, villages, and chiefdoms.100 The elders resolve
conflicts amicably through well-developed customary conflict resolution and management
mechanisms. The institution of the Grand Council was responsible for dealing with cases
including “mass killings and land disputes between different clans… it made laws… dealt
firmly with recalcitrant individuals and groups and ensured that everyone conformed
strictly to the Acholi world view.”101
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Unfortunately, the authority of the anointed chiefs was severely weakened by
colonialism. The imposition of “invented” traditional chiefs and colonial administrators
meant that “power dynamics have shifted drastically… [and] the ability of kin-based
groups to provide checks and balances was taken away,” which severely compromised the
ability of cultural leaders to perform their duties. 102 Nevertheless, in the absence of
functioning democratic governance, the Acholi in northern Uganda have employed their
nuanced customary practices of conflict management and traditional cleansing rituals to
regain control and agency over their lives and address some of the effects of the almost 20year brutal war.

6.3 Customary Justice, the Reintegration of Ex-combatants, and NonRecurrence
There is a repertoire of traditional conflict management systems used for centuries among
the Acholi, which are still relevant today, and they continue to provide a strong system of
dealing with the aftermath of conflict outside of formal state-centric approaches.103 The
use of customary justice became even more necessary because the state had failed to
provide security and protection to the people of the north. The lack of decisive government
response in ending the LRA insurgency meant that these traditional practices were
necessary for local communities to address the violence and ensure stability and safety.
These customary mechanisms vary, and the procedures are not quite the same for every
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clan. In the case of reintegration of ex-combatants, the nyono tong gweno and mato oput
have been widely used.

6.3.1

Nyono Tong Gweno (Stepping on the Egg)

Traditionally, the nyono tong gweno ceremony was used to welcome members who have
been away outside of their clan for a long time.104 One’s absence from a community could
be voluntary or forced. These situations could include embarking on a long period of
hunting expedition or a temporal relocation to a different community for farming. A person
could also leave their homestead due to a dispute with people from their clan or community.
Upon their return, individual families and clans often performed nyono tong gweno to
formally welcome the person back home and fully reintegrate them into the community.
The belief is that when one is away outside of their clan or territory for an extended period,
one “could contract spirits that—if not cleansed—would bring misfortune to the whole
community.”105
From the height of the LRA insurgency, community members began to adapt nyono
tong gweno to welcome and facilitate ex-combatants’ reintegration. In most situations,
mass nyono tong gweno has been performed involving hundreds of LRA returnees,
including some of their top commanders such as Brigadiers Banya and Sam Kolo.106 The
ceremony is often the first important welcoming ritual conducted before the ex-fighters are
then moved to their communities or designated reintegration centers.107 While at the
reintegration centers or in the communities, village elders would follow up with other
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traditional rituals to reconcile the ex-fighters with the communities. Prominent among
these traditional ceremonies is the mato oput. Mato oput marks “the peak of a process of
conflict resolution, specifically referring to a killing that has occurred in the
community.”108

6.3.2

Mato Oput

In the Acholi culture, the killing of a human being is strictly forbidden. If a killing does
occur within the same clan or involving different clans, the Acholi supreme deity, jogi, and
ancestral spirits of the victim’s clan will be provoked against the offender’s clan.109 This
creates a “supernatural barrier between the clan of the killer and the clan of the person(s)
who has/have been killed.… This supernatural barrier remains in force until the killing is
atoned.”110 Mato oput is the traditional Acholi ceremony used in situations involving either
intentional or accidental inter-clan killing or within the same clan.111 When the killing has
not been atoned the clans of the perpetrator and victim abstain from participating in
communal social and economic activities until mato oput is performed and compensation
is paid for the wrongful death.112 The period where both clans must undertake no common
activity serves two purposes. First, it provides the elders of both clans the opportunity to
investigate and determine the facts of the case. Second, it serves to keep the two clans apart
to prevent reprisal and revenge killing. The fact-finding exercise involves both the alleged
perpetrators, their families, and the victims. With the encouragement of family members,
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ex-combatants are expected to voluntarily reveal and confess their role in the conflict and
the crimes they have committed to their community.113 This fact-finding is important
because for mato oput to proceed, it requires identifying the victims and the alleged
perpetrators’ voluntary acknowledgment of guilt.114
The actual mato oput ritual is the culmination of a long process of mediation
between the two clans, which involves the establishment of the truth about the killing,
accountability, and acknowledgement of wrongdoing by the perpetrator.115 Once the
“facts” of the case are determined, the two clans, in most cases, determine an appropriate
compensation according to the culture, traditions, and norms of the clans. After
successfully completing the ritual, the social interactions between the two clans can
resume, and both clans can now share common sources of water, grazing land, and so on.
The mato oput ritual provides an opportunity for the clans of the victim and the perpetrator
to deal with the consequence of the conflicts and show a commitment to live together again
in harmony. As Latigo observed, the aim of mato oput is the “pursuit of a decent society,
with the primary focus on coexistence and the restoration of relationships between former
enemies as a basis for the prevention of the recurrence of gruesome crimes. 116
Several researchers who have written about the impact of traditional rituals on the
reintegration of ex-combatants in northern Uganda found that rituals such as nyono tong
gweno and mato oput could be viable ways to reintegrate ex-combatants in a way that
minimize the possibilities of reprisal and revenge killings.117 Researchers have reported
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that some ex-combatants often display anti-social behaviors, including the use of violence
and “threatening to kill a family or community member, beatings and in some cases,
murder.”118 Traditional Acholi believes these violent behaviors come about due to cen—
the vengeful spirit of a dead person. If these traditional rituals are not performed, they
believe “the cen of the killed person would be expected to haunt the killer and cause disease
in his family or clan.”119 In some cases, the returnees who engage in violent and anti-social
behaviors are banished from the communities or camps, and some often end up returning
“to the bush or join the UPDF [or the LRA).”120
Nyono tong gweno and mato oput provide two levels of benefits—at both the
individual and community levels—that could help prevent conflict recurrence. First, at the
individual level, nyono tong gweno and mato oput help facilitate the psychological
reintegration of returnees.121 The rituals serve to atone the atrocities the ex-fighters have
committed—they cleanse and chase away cen and other potential violent behavior that
might befall individuals. Research reports suggest that returnees “often felt more accepted
following a communal cleansing ceremony, and they were better able to communicate and
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socialize with community members.”122 After a communal cleansing ceremony, a former
combatant reported that he “felt that people also loved them and were thinking about them”
despite the atrocities they have committed.123 In an in-depth interview conducted to
ascertain the impact of rituals on returnees, the researchers reported observable positive
changes in the behaviors of returnees, such as less aggressive behaviors and a general
improvement in their social relationship.124
Second, at the community level, nyono tong gweno and moto oput illustrate the
communities’ readiness to welcome ex-combatants and give them a “second chance”
despite the atrocities they have committed, sometimes against their own communities and
families. The rituals signals that “the door of the family [and community] is open,
encouraging the returnee to pass through it and join the family again… By reunifying the
person and their family, the returnee is encouraged to contribute to the health and
productivity of the community.”125
The ceremony calls upon entire communities to bear witness, including local
leadership, in this process of welcoming. It is an occasion where the general
community comes together and ascertains the return of one of their members. It is
an opportunity for the general community to share benefits of uniting as members
of the same clan. It also instills a feeling of belonging to the community. Communal
cleansing ceremonies are also a form of sensitization as they help the community
accept and welcome returnees back home. In some ways, it serves as a reminder to
them that they are indeed a community, that they share the same Acholi culture and
values.126
As the above quotation illustrates, carrying out customary justice through rituals such as
nyono tong gweno and mato oput could have an impact at the individual and community
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levels to ensure social control and create a stable environment where ex-combatants could
safely reintegrate into the local communities. The feeling of belonging to the community
removes the fear of revenge from ex-combatants and provides assurances of a safe return
to communities. During unsettle periods created by conflict, communities need to reassert
cultural norms that give order to social relations and interactions. Nyono tong gweno and
mato oput provide such avenues of assurances to reassert social and cultural values. Such
assurances of community acceptance reduce the fear of revenge killing, reducing excombatants’ potential of being banished (to the bush) or fleeing from hostile community
attitudes. This could substantially minimize ex-combatants’ desire to return to combat life
and/or engage in activities that could derail the peace process and plunge the community
back into violence.

6.4 Local Peace Agreements and Conflict Non-Recurrence: The Potential
of Gomo Tong
Given the increasing influence of non-state armed actors in civil wars, such as the LRA
insurgency, an alternative starting point to ending atrocities and preventing reoccurrence
of armed conflict could be to start by exploring avenues of peace at the local level and
asking how the local peace could feed into national-level processes. Historical examples
show that customary justice mechanisms have been drawn upon to create local peace
agreements between different ethnic groups. In northern Uganda, although there is only
one recorded use of gomo tong, it has significant potential to preventing armed conflict.
Gomo tong (bending the spear) is an interethnic reconciliation ritual that marks the
end of a violent conflict resolution. As I described in chapter 5, the gomo tong ritual is a
sacred vow between two conflicting parties, which is performed by invoking ancestral

168

spirits to end hostilities.127 The completion of the ritual signifies an agreement between the
two parties not to shed any further blood.128 The performance of gomo tong is very rare,
and probably the most recent record of gomo tong practice is the one between the West
Nile and the people of Acholi following the fall of Amin.129 During the colonial invasion,
gomo tong was also used to consolidate peace between the Payira and Koch clans.130 There
are also records of similar local peace agreements being performed elsewhere in Uganda.
For example, a similar ritual, amelokwit, cemented a local peace agreement between the
Iteso and the Karamojong in 2004, which paved the way for the two communities to carry
out joint activities to address their disputes.131
The following statement regarding the local agreement between the West Nile and
Acholi is noteworthy when it comes to local peace agreements’ potential to prevent the
reoccurrence of violent conflicts.
In 1985, gomo tong was used in a landmark effort to resolve the serious tensions
between on the one side the Acholi, who were killed on a large scale by Idi Amin
and his henchmen during his dictatorial regime, and on the other the people of West
Nile (where Amin came from), who suffered severe reprisals in 1980 after Amin’s
fall. It is instructive to note that later on the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) I & II,
composed mainly of people from West Nile who had joined Museveni’s army,
refused to be deployed to fight the LRA, citing the 1985 gomo tong ceremony
between the two communities, which remains eternally binding.132
The above quotation’s significance is that it illustrates how local peace agreements
embedded in the customary practices could be invoked to prevent different ethnic groups
from going to war against each other. More importantly, it demonstrates that some
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customary practices could have interethnic relevance. Gomo tong could be performed
between different Acholi clans or between neighboring ethnic groups—as in the Acholi
and the West Nile case. Like the mato oput, the performance of the ritual itself is often
preceded by a long mediation process between the two ethnic groups involved in violent
conflict. “Elders of the two groups would sit down to discuss the reasons that triggered and
perpetuated the conflict. After agreeing to end the fighting, chiefs and elders of both sides
would warn their people to stop the killing… [and] discuss how to limit any possibilities
of future conflicts and killings.”133
The above examples show that customary justice that creates spaces for local
agency and is rooted in people’s local culture and traditions merits further investigation in
terms of efforts to terminate violent conflict and prevent its recurrence. Although there is
wide variation in customary practices among ethnic groups, practices such as gomo tong
show enormous potential and could have wider and strategic importance in terminating
interethnic violence to advance the prospects of nationwide stability. A series of local peace
agreements between various fragmented armed groups could end hostilities at the local
level, serving as a springboard for a national peace process to emerge. Therefore,
considering that contemporary armed conflicts are often fragmented and inexorably
connected, locally mediated peace arrangements rooted in culture and traditions deserve
closer inquiry in terms of their viability to terminating violence and how they could be
effectively deployed to prevent conflict recurrence.
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6.5 The Communal Nature of Customary Justice in Preventing Conflict
Recurrence
In most communitarian African societies, communities are not merely composed of a
collection of individuals, but their very “existence” is made “meaningful” through their
connection with other community members.134 However, recent complex conflicts often
create intimate enemies, thereby effectively weakening the social fabric that holds society
together.135 As I illustrated in the section on the history of the northern Uganda conflict,
both the LRA and the NRA have used extreme violence to exercise control over civilian
populations, forcing children to commit brutality against families and neighbors.136 The
severe brutalities of the conflict have in many ways fragmented social cohesion and
undermined social trust, community values, and norms. As a result, to prevent conflict
from reoccurring, the mechanisms we employ must seek to heal social divisions, focus on
the restoration of broken relationships, and involve the family and general community.137
As I argued in chapter 5, Acholi social, moral belief, and justice practices are
fundamentally based on reinforcing a continuing relationship, and the focus is on the future.
In other words, although customary justice may redress past harms and punishment, they
are fundamentally oriented towards restoration and continuing the future relationship
between warring groups. To prevent new crimes, revenge killings, and the potential return
to armed violence, community elders work toward forging a “social future where both
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perpetrators and victims, and their respective families, live together.”138 To forge future
cooperation between conflict parties, communities often take deliberate acts necessary for
the community to restore personal and communal harmony. Restoring future relationships
is guided by the principle of justice in which the whole group to which an individual
belongs takes the guilt and responsibility for their member’s wrongdoing. To illustrate how
this works in practice, let us consider the following case reported by Lamony Stephen.139
Before the rituals of nyono tong gweno and mato oput could be performed, Otim,
an ex-combatant must confess and acknowledge his wrongdoings.140 Otim’s clan elders are
obligated to inform the family and elders of the person(s) Otim had confessed to have
killed—In this case Otim confessed he killed Okeny’s. When Otim’s elders arrived at
Okeny’s clan, they (Otim’s clan elders) announced that “we unfortunately abducted and
killed your son, Okeny… now we have come to humbly beg for pardon and declare that we
are ready to pay compensation for such capital offense [italics added].”141 Take note of the
use of the pronoun “we” by Otim’s clan leaders in reporting the death of Okeny. Once
Otim’s clan takes responsibility and announces that they, not Otim, killed Okeny, the
individual perpetrator, in this case, Otim “goes into the background.”142 His clan and, in
most cases, his community’s elders, become collectively involved to ensure a non-violent
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and peaceful resolution of the situation, with the maintenance of social harmony and the
preservation of future relationship between the two clans a priority.143
This sort of collective responsibility cultivates a social fabric that “keeps the Acholi
people in harmony with the forces of life around.”144 Collective guilt does not suggest
individual perpetrators do not account for their actions. As already discussed in earlier
sections, a requirement for the mato oput and nyono tong gweno, and indeed many of the
customary justice, is that the individual perpetrator must accept full responsibility,
voluntarily and truthfully admit to the crimes they have committed. Individuals often take
full responsibility because they, too, take the preservation of future relationships very
seriously. As a result, even if the alleged perpetrators do not believe in the traditional
interpretation of cen, they often take proactive steps to participate in ceremonies to absolve
themselves of responsibility for any future misfortune that may befall their clan or
community.145
The following case illustrates the commitment of individuals to work towards
preserving a future relationship. Harlacher reports a case of a young man from Pabo,
Whether the communitarian nature of customary justice encourages or impedes perpetrators’ willingness
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refuse to participate in traditional communal rituals because the shame and guilt is too great to bear, and the
confession to their crimes may threaten their family or community’s positive image. See for instance, Adam
Azzain Mohamed, “Shame Culture and Inter-Group Conflicts: Experiences From Sudan,” Journal of
Cultural Studies 5, no. 1 (2003): 68–86; John George Peristiany, Honour and Shame: The Values of
Mediterranean Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974); Noa Weiss-Klayman, Boaz Hameiri,
and Eran Halperin, “Group-Based Guilt and Shame in the Context of Intergroup Conflict: The Role of Beliefs
and Meta-Beliefs about Group Malleability,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 50, no. 4 (2020): 213–
27, https://doi.org/10.1111/jasp.12651. Nevertheless, customary justice has well-developed mechanisms to
encourage acknowledgment of responsibility. For instance, the very idea of restorative justice emphasizes
the relationship between the victim, the perpetrator, and the community as opposed to punishing the offender.
Restorative justice sometimes encourages perpetrators to come forward and admit their wrongdoing, with the
hope that their families and community will welcome them back into the society.
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northern Uganda, who wanted the ritual of mato oput performed for a killing he had
committed. In narrating his motivation to take part in mato oput, the young man noted: “I
want that everything ends well [alluding to the spiritual and social dimension of mato oput]
so that in future, if malaria comes [to befall my children], people would not have a pretext
to accuse me. I also hope that when the ceremony is concluded, good relationships will
again exist.”146 The narratives of Otim and the young man from Pabo are not isolated but
could be said to be the fundamental feature that drives the Acholi communal justice
practices.
These narratives are significant for conflict prevention in three fundamental
respects. First, they illustrate that customary justice is future-looking, and community
members and individuals take actions that will reinforce future relations and prevent any
disruption in the social equilibrium.147 Second, the communal approach to conflict
resolution ensures that the communities act as witnesses to the decisions reached and the
promises made.148 Communities continue to “serve as a standard for monitoring the
subsequent behavior of the miscreant… [and] performs the function of correctional
services while allowing the culprits to continue their usual productive activities” in the
community.149 Third, the rich cultural expression where communities perform
“correctional services” and collectively monitor perpetrators’ subsequent behavior brings
offenders under a form of social control and accountability. In the aftermath of violent
conflict, the Acholi have employed various creative ways, including relying upon
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collective respect for the norms, values, and social institutions that regulate its members’
behavior. These forms of customary justice of social control and accountability are crucial
in securing communities’ safety and preventing future violence, especially when the state
is absent, or its apparatus is not equipped to address community reconciliation where
“intimate enemies” must live side-by-side in the future.

Conclusion
I set out in this chapter to reflect on and use the experiences of the Acholi as a lens to
understand and solidify the theoretical arguments I raised in previous chapters about
whether and how customary justice might be useful means for measures of non-recurrence.
The argument advanced here takes a starting point that armed conflict is a relational
construct where warring parties’ identities are constructed through and constitutive of
social systems’ structural properties. Understanding conflict as a social construct is useful
in thinking about the intimate nature of the northern Uganda conflict and how customary
practices have played a key role in reckoning with the past. Similarly, instead of viewing
measures of non-recurrence as largely formal state-led intervention, they need to be thought
of as a wholistic approach that engages a series of actors at different levels, especially at
the local level.
Continuing from the above theoretical setup, this chapter first discussed the
historical background to the northern Uganda conflicts, locating it within the wider national
post-colonial political context. I traced the Acholi ethnic identity to a shared history,
territory, and claims to being direct descendants of the Luo-speaking group. Although the
imposition of colonial administrative chiefs has weakened the traditional authority of the
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“anointed chiefs” and, to some extent, the customary justice system, the Acholi have
managed to maintain and have utilized customary justice to reckon with the aftermath of
the civil war in northern Uganda. Drawing on research reports and policy documents, I
showed how the Acholi customary justice helped integrate ex-combatants in ways that
reduce stigmatization, name-calling, and the risk of ex-combatants being declared pariahs.
Customary justice could also help terminate violence and prevent conflict recurrence
through local peace arrangements. Finally, I argued that a fundamental feature of the
Acholi customary justice practices is the moral understanding of collective responsibility,
which is essential in preserving harmony and social fabric. The communal nature of the
justice practices enables society to monitor ex-combatants’ behavior and bring them under
social control and accountability, which is important to reduce the risk of communities
reverting to conflict.
Although the conflict has officially ended, its impacts continue to linger. Despite a
semblance of democracy, researchers have described the Ugandan government as semiauthoritarian, where many government institutions are despotic and serve at the behest of
the President.150 State institutions and national political leaders seem “too far removed from
the communities they are supposed to serve,” creating uncertainties for many northern
Ugandans who are still grappling with the impact of the civil war.151 Amid such uncertainty
and an unsettled period, I agree with Adler that the Acholi’s future would not be entirely
“determined by physical forces and constraints… [and] solely on individual preferences
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and rational choices. It is also a matter of their shared knowledge, the collective meaning
they attach to their situation,” and the legitimacy of traditional authority, rules, and
institutions.152 Indigenous institutions and traditional authority will continue to remain
important to many northern Ugandans. As I wrap up in the next chapter, I will make some
recommendations regarding how indigenous institutions and customary practices could be
strengthened to complement national efforts to forge a peaceful future to reduce the risk of
violent conflict reoccurrence.
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Chapter 7
7

Beyond the Near-Exclusive Focus on the Local: The Interaction Between
Formal and Customary Transitional Justice

7.1 Introduction
I approached this thesis from a bottom-up perspective and have advanced arguments that
prioritized local agency, resources, and ways of knowing. I only mentioned the central state
as a point of reference in juxtaposition to the local to highlight the imperative of the local
as a site of measures of non-recurrence. I did not explicitly discuss the central and necessary
role the state and international actors play in preventing the reversion of armed violence
and pursuing long-term peace. My arguments could incorrectly be understood as an attempt
to absolve the state of responsibility in post-conflict transition and free national actors of
their complicity in producing and sustaining the structures that tend to ignite and contribute
to conflict.
I do not wish to suggest a bypass of the state and international actors or an exclusive
focus on the local. In fact, most post-conflict societies are often fraught with competing
interests, power asymmetries, and the risk of returning to armed violence is often present.
The fact that post-conflict states tend to be arenas of competing interests and power
asymmetries brings to the fore the inevitable need to employ several carefully balanced
transitional justice initiatives at multiple levels to prevent the reversion to armed conflict
and pursue reconciliation and long-term peace.
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This chapter addresses the question of how formal justice could interact with
customary justice in a post-conflict state.1 To establish the interaction between formal and
customary justice, I begin with a discussion of the complexity of the post-conflict
environment. I argue that the post-conflict environment often is an arena of contested
power dynamics and competing narratives. As a result, customary justice at the local level
only serves a necessary but partial role.
Considerable research exists, especially in the peacebuilding literature, about the
complexity of the post-conflict environment and the need for interdependent actions at
various levels and by different actors. Lederach, for instance, uses the web as a metaphor
to describe the complexity of the social context in which post-conflict reconstruction can
occur. Lederach observed that “peacebuilding [and transitional justice] is an enormously
complex endeavor in unbelievably complex, dynamic, and more often than not destructive
settings of violence.”2 As a result of such complexities in the post-conflict environment,
Lederach advocates for a non-linear approach to dealing with the aftermath of conflict.3
On a similar line of thought, de Conning argues sustainable peace requires a complexity
informed approach, in which international actors focus their effort on creating the “space
for societies to develop resilient capacities for self-organization.”4 Millar argues for a trans-

The use of the term “formal justice” in this thesis refers exclusively to transitional justice instruments that
are often state-centric and led by national and international actors. This distinction is important because in
some contexts customary justice can be formalized with some degree of codification and protocols.
2
John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace, Reprint edition (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 33. See also Gearoid Millar, “Toward a Trans-Scalar Peace System:
Challenging Complex Global Conflict Systems,” Peacebuilding 8, no. 3 (July 2, 2020): 261–78,
https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2019.1634866.
3
John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, D.C:
United States Inst of Peace Press, 1998). See also Daniela Körppen, Norbert Ropers, and Hans J.
Giessmann, eds., The Non-Linearity of Peace Processes: Theory and Practice of Systemic Conflict
Transformation (Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2011)
4
Cedric de Coning, “From Peacebuilding to Sustaining Peace: Implications of Complexity for Resilience
and Sustainability,” Resilience 4, no. 3 (September 1, 2016): 166,
https://doi.org/10.1080/21693293.2016.1153773. See also Kristoffer Lidén, “Building Peace between
1
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scalar approach—across the local, national, and international—to peace research which
could provide a “deeper understanding of the non-linear impacts of peace interventions.”5
Richmond, too, advocates for “a pathway towards creating a liberal-local hybrid form of
peace” that engages with local voices and their experiences of violent conflict.6 While these
are important bodies of work in the peacebuilding literature regarding non-linearity,
complexity, trans-scalar peace, and hybridity, this chapter draws heavily on transitional
justice literature. The chapter draws on the transitional justice literature to show how the
relationship between Uganda’s customary and state justice systems have shifted over time,
from pre-independence to the present. The illustration of the shifting relationship between
the customary and formal justice systems is vital to the notion of legal pluralism, which is
the foundation through which I advance my argument regarding how customary and state
justice systems could co-exist synergistically. In other words, this chapter emphasizes on
questions of the different forms of justice practices but not peacebuilding per se.
Therefore, in the second section, I reiterate some of the significant contributions of
international and national actors in transitional justice. In the third section, I draw on the
concept of legal pluralism as an analytical tool to understand the various legal orders in
Uganda before, during, and post-independence. In the fourth section, I advance a
framework by which customary and formal transitional justice could interact. I argue for
integrating and harmonizing customary and formal justice that could lead to a complete

Global and Local Politics: The Cosmopolitical Ethics of Liberal Peacebuilding,” International
Peacekeeping 16, no. 5 (November 1, 2009): 616-34, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310903303255.
5
Gearoid Millar, “Trans-Scalar Ethnographic Peace Research: Understanding the Invisible Drivers of
Complex Conflict and Complex Peace,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 15, no. 3 (May 27,
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cooperative pluralist legal environment. In the final section, I raise the issue of codification
which may arise if customary justice processes must be integrated and harmonized with
the formal justice system.

7.2 The Post-conflict Environment: Fragility, Complexity, and Competing
Imperatives
The arguments in chapter 5 of this thesis are primarily developed around the idea that
armed conflicts and civil wars in recent decades are increasingly becoming much more
complex, involving a diversity of actors, issues, and interests. Consequently, the postconflict environment is often unpredictable, complicated, and characterized by competing
imperatives. Some of these factors include the lack of clear transition; the history and
nature of the conflict; the type and scope of violence; and the variety of actors involved.
Other important factors include the relationship and degree of involvement between
international and national actors.
One of the fundamental complexities associated with the post-conflict environment
is when the transition begins and ends. Transitional justice has traditionally been viewed
as a clear transition with a break from the past regime.7 However, in places like Uganda,
the old regime is still firmly in place, and as such, “no genuine transition to democratic
governance and the rule of law has ever really begun.”8 The privileged economic and social
status of political elites remain deeply embedded in governmental structures, and the

Joanna R. Quinn, “Whither the ‘Transition’ of Transitional Justice?,” Interdisciplinary Journal of Human
Rights Law 8, no. 1 (2015): 67.
8
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Instrumentalisation,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 9, no. 3 (July 3, 2015): 354-74,
https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2015.1089698; Susan Dicklitch, “The Incomplete Democratic Transition
in Uganda,” in Economic Liberalization, Democratization and Civil Society in the Developing World, ed.
Remonda Bensabat Kleinberg and Janine A. Clark, International Political Economy Series (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 109–28.
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regime continues to carry out various forms of campaigns of “repression and violence,
[which] may stay the same or even worsen.”9 A context like Uganda where the old regime
is essentially still in place raises important policy implications regarding the kind of
strategy that could be useful for state-local interaction without the capture and co-optation
of customary justice.
The post-conflict environment is also influenced by the history, scope, and nature
of the conflict, including the number and variety of armed groups. For example, in Uganda,
violence was attributed to both the LRA and government forces.10 In addition, children
were also conscripted as fighters, “many forcibly, which led to questions about whether at
trial they should be treated as villains… or victims.”11 These factors regarding armed
groups and the scope of violence are essential in designing post-conflict transitional justice
measures. For instance, in cases where children have been conscripted, further complexity
arises since the “line between victim and perpetrator might be difficult to determine, and
who might be better served by a restorative and rehabilitative approach.”12
The interaction between international and domestic politics is also another
important factor that influences the post-conflict environment. Domestic and international
politics bound most post-conflict settings. In Uganda, the presence of the ICC presented its
own set of challenges when the persecutor issued an arrest warrant for Joseph Kony and
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some of his high-profile commanders.13 A major concern was the potential of the arrest
warrant to jeopardize the Juba Peace Talks.14 In Sierra Leone, the establishment of the
Special Court also influenced the way Sierra Leone’s truth and reconciliation commission
conducted its proceedings.15 Hence, the presence or absence and varying degrees of
interaction between domestic and international actors cannot be ignored when considering
how customary justice could interact with other formal national and international level
transitional justice measures.
From what is discussed above, the post-conflict environment is best described as
what Pratt calls a contact zone where “radically asymmetrical relations of power” co-exist
and interact.16 An understanding of this complexity suggests that post-conflict transitional
justice processes are not often and cannot be straightforward or “crafted… and rolled out
in neat factory packaging.”17 Instead, transitional justice processes in most post-conflict
environments are “complex and messy, involving a disparate range of political, social,
emotional, and psychological factors, all operating at different levels— individual,
familial, group, societal, state and regional” levels.18 As a result, it is crucial to explore the
inescapable role of the international and national actors and how they could effectively
interact with customary processes at the local level. Although I approach my work from a
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bottom-up perspective, one must be realistic in their expectations and be modest regarding
what each intervention can and cannot achieve. The following section looks at some of the
vital roles international and national level actors play at the formal level in preventing
conflict from reoccurring and helping societies deal with the aftermath of violent conflict.

7.3 The International and Global Gaze
Historically, transitional justice has been driven primarily by international and national
level actors.19 Since the Nuremberg trials, after the second World War, several
developments in the international front, such as establishing International Criminal
Tribunals, Hybrid Courts, the International Criminal Court, and international norms such
as the right to truth, the right to reparation, have strengthened the role of international actors
in transitional justice. The establishment and proliferation of international research centers
and non-governmental organizations, such as the International Center for Transitional
Justice, have also contributed and influenced the direction of the theory and practice of
transitional justice. Among the diverse roles international actors play in transitional justice,
include institutional strengthening, pursuing individual criminal, and developing
international norms, principles, and best practices. Each of these is discussed below.

7.3.1

State Building and Institutional Strengthening

One way international actors influence transitional justice is to support (re)building the
government and state institutions necessary to promote stability and internal order to ensure
long-term peace. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, for
instance, observed that building state institutions is one of the main ways to promote
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stability and order in a post-conflict environment.20 The role of international actors in
institutional strengthening and state-building is relevant in transitional justice because,
after years of violent conflict or civil wars, national institutions and political systems tend
to be weak.21 This is especially true in cases such as in Uganda where despotic leaders
continue to hold power and “the state and its institutions are in a state of slow decay, rotting
from the top down.”22 In the context of the slow decay of the state and its institutions,
international transitional justice actors can play a vital role in building strong and
accountable institutions under which individual rights and the rule of law are respected.

7.3.2

Individual Criminal Accountability

In highlighting the genealogy of transitional justice, Teitel characterized the first phase of
transitional justice to be “associated with interstate cooperation, war crimes trials, and
sanctions.”23 Perhaps one of the fundamental core principles undergirding transitional
justice, especially at the international level, as the Nuremberg trials demonstrate, is the
pursuit of individual criminal accountability. Following the Nuremberg trials, the pursuit
of individual criminal accountable gained momentum in most post-conflict states.
The involvement of the international actors to prosecute war crimes is often
necessary due to several reasons, including the lack of resources, a lack of political will, a
lack of technical expertise, or a combination of all. Consequently, the international
community has been actively involved in pursuing criminal accountability in various postconflict contexts. For instance, in 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
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Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established to prosecute crimes against humanity.24 A year later,
in 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was also established by
United Nations Security Council.25 Similar to the ICTY, the mandate of the ICTR was to
“hear cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of Article 3 common to
the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.”26 In addition to these criminal
tribunals, other hybrid courts have been used in the past. The Special Court for Sierra Leone
is one of the prominent examples of such hybrid courts, which was established jointly
between the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations in 2002.27 Besides the
criminal tribunals and the hybrid courts, the coming into being of the permanent
International Criminal Court (ICC) solidified the central role of the international
community to hold individuals criminally accountable for war crimes and violations of
international law and international humanitarian law.

7.3.3

International Instruments and Norms

Another crucial means by which international actors contribute to transitional justice is by
developing international instruments and norms. Some of these include Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, and the Right to
the Truth.28 These international principles and norms perform several vital functions in the
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transitional justice enterprise. Some of them include codifying and identifying a range of
ways victims, disenfranchised groups, and survivors of crimes under international
humanitarian law may exercise their fundamental human rights, including access to remedy
and reparations.29 These international instruments and norms also shape states’ behaviors
and put them under obligation to investigate cases of human rights abuses, crimes against
humanity, violations of international law, and international humanitarian law.

7.4 The National Gaze: The Central Role of the State and its Institutions
The centrality of the state in transitional justice is one of a “contradiction, albeit perhaps a
necessary one.”30 This is because, in most post-conflict societies, such as in northern
Uganda, the state is often absent, and local communities must instead utilize their timetested traditional conflict management measures to prevent conflict and ensure peace. Yet,
given the complex nature of armed conflicts, a multi-layered and multi-sectoral approach
to transitional justice is often needed to reckon with past atrocities. As a result, it would be
naïve to think that one could prevent the recurrence of conflict or ensure long-term peace,
more broadly, without the involvement of the central state.
No matter what one thinks about the relative strengths of customary justice, some
interventions are vital to the transitional justice enterprise that traditional institutions and
customary justice are not adequately equipped to address. The state’s role is particularly
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important in strengthening accountability mechanisms that could help create some of the
conditions needed to restore confidence and trust in the state and its institutions. For
instance, at the state level, reformed and accountable courts “can more impartially render
judgment.”31 A reformed police service or prosecutor’s office, too, could professionally
investigate state officials who have been complicit in committing human rights abuses
during periods of armed conflict.32 These are a few examples of vital things that could help
restore trust and confidence in the state after years of armed violence, which the state and
international actors are more placed to lead in the process.
Scholars such as Roht-Arriaza and de Greiff have argued for transitional justice to
move beyond its narrow focus on civil and political rights to include redress for other rights
violations such as economic, social, and cultural rights.33 Undoubtedly, for transitional
justice to effectively redress socio-economic rights, the state has a vital role to play. This
is because the violations of socio-economic rights could become embedded in society and
become “normalized” over time. Positive change could most successfully be brought about
by new legislations or policies by the state that address social, economic, and cultural rights
violations.34
As the above illustrates, national and international level actors have a tremendous
influence and will continue to play critical roles in the theory and practice of transitional
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justice. National and international level contributions and functions will continue to be
diverse, intricate, and imperfect. In chapters 1, 3, and 4 of this thesis, I highlighted several
relative weaknesses and criticisms of the formal transitional justice processes. One notable
complaint is that state-centric formal processes often fail to meet the expectations of
victims and people at the community level. At the international level, too, the international
tribunals, for instance, have been criticized for being located far from the victims and
communities they were supposed to serve and also “poorly understood by the wider
public.”35 The International Criminal Court has also been accused of biases in selecting its
cases, and some of its interventions could potentially jeopardize the gains in
peacebuilding.36
Despite these challenges, it is only when there is a meaningful engagement with
formal international and national-level transitional justice interventions that practitioners
and scholars could move closer to ensuring that formal interventions reflect the needs of
victims and are responsive to the context in which they are applied. It would be a mistake
to ignore formal national and international level approaches because of their shortcomings.
A rejection of formal national and international transitional justice approaches due to their
weakness will be a failure “to recognize the omnipresence of legal processes which will
continue to result in hegemonic structures unless engaged with [other informal processes
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such as customary justice].”37 In the following section, I propose a framework by which
formal national and international transitional justice processes could interact with
customary justice in ways that ensures meaningful and active participation of sub-national,
local level actors, traditional institutions, and customary justice processes. I employ the
concept of legal pluralism as an analytical tool to identify and reveal the dynamic
interactions between customary and formal justice systems.

7.5 Legal Pluralism: A Brief Overview
Legal pluralism is often defined as a “situation in which two or more legal systems co-exist
in the same social field.”38 Legal pluralism exists in many states in varied forms ranging
from the interaction between customary justice, national-level legal system, and the
international systems where legal norms migrate across territorial boundaries.39 In postconflict Uganda, where the customary justice system operates side by side with the formal
justice system, the notion of legal pluralism has vast theoretical and practical implications
in thinking about a framework of how customary justice and formal justice could interact.
Depending on the nature of the relationship, state and non-state legal systems of justice and
dispute resolution could work together in tandem or find themselves in a clash.40 To help
understand the relationship between formal and customary justice mechanisms, Swenson
McGregor, “International Law as a ‘Tiered Process’: Transitional Justice at the Local, National and
International Level,” 52.
38
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proposes four archetypes of legal pluralism in a wide range of settings. These are
combative, competitive, cooperative, and complementary legal pluralist environments.41
In a combative legal pluralist environment, the state and non-state justice systems
“seek explicitly to undermine, discredit, supplant, and—ideally—destroy the other.”42 In
such a context, customary institutions overtly reject the legitimacy of states’ authority and
power, while the state uses its institutions to repress and outlaw non-state adjudicatory
authority.43 Combative legal systems tend to be characteristics of “countries facing an
active insurgency… [or where] post-conflict state-building has failed or is clearly trending
in a negative direction.”44
A competitive legal pluralist environment is where there are parallel systems of the
administration of justice where the state’s legal authority is not actively undermined or
challenged by non-state actors.45 Although the state’s legal authority is not overtly
challenged, there could often be deep tensions between the state and customary justice
systems because the values of the state legal systems tend to diverge from the norms,
values, and “the common vernacular of groups within society.”46 In a competitive legal
pluralist environment, the state continuously seeks ways to assert itself in places previously
beyond its control. Competitive legal pluralist environments are characteristics of many
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states during colonialism where customary traditional institutions are given an amount of
authority to “make rules or by-laws for the communities [they] govern.”47
In a cooperative legal pluralist context, both the state and customary justice actors
are often willing to work together towards achieving common goals.48 To a large extent,
customary justice maintains some autonomy and authority in dispute resolution at the local
level. Unlike competitive legal pluralism, tensions and clashes are less frequent in a
cooperative pluralist legal system. Often clashes occur, not due to the competition of
judicial power or questions of jurisdiction, but sometimes due to excesses of customary
justice such as discriminatory practices against women and issues of individual rights
violations. Cooperative legal pluralism is characteristic of states where there have been
substantial and “meaningful advances toward the consolidation of democratic governance
bound by the rule of law.”49
In complementary legal pluralism, the state enjoys legitimate, effective legal
authority and has the capacity to enforce its mandate.50 In this context, customary justice
is subordinated and controlled by the state and is only called upon as a complementary
adjudicative mechanism. The state may mandate local justice institutions to mediate some
kinds of disputes. However, formal state law retains the final authority in the outcome of
dispute resolutions. Complementary legal pluralism often exists in advanced democracies
where the legal systems choose to “allow private arbitration, mediation, and other forms of
alternative dispute resolution” as complementary dispute resolution fora.51
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Although the above analysis illustrates four models of legal pluralism, they should
not be viewed as mutually exclusive. Instead, they are best viewed as a spectrum of
increasing acceptance of the validity and legitimacy of the adjudicative power and
authority of both the state legal system and customary justice.52 Thus, one type of legal
pluralist environment could fuse into another. They help conceptualize the fundamental
characteristics of the relationships between state and non-state justice mechanisms, which
could inform transitional justice efforts in a fluid post-conflict environment.
I use Swenson’s archetypes of legal pluralism as a lens to identify and analyze the
spectrum of change to the legal environment that Uganda has experienced. Swenson’s
archetypes are relevant to explaining Uganda’s legal order before, during, and after
independence. In particular, they help to understand how customary justice has been
shaped by the complex interaction with colonial administrators, resulting in conflicting
justice processes in Uganda. Understanding these complex arrays of legal orders in Uganda
will aid in the attempt to find a suitable middle ground in which international, national, and
customary justice could constructively interact to prevent the reoccurring of armed
violence and ensure long-term peace.

7.5.1.1 Legal Pluralism in Uganda: Pre-colonial, Colonial, and Post-Independence
Before the advent of colonialism in Uganda, customary law and traditional practices have
been the primary legal system of many ethnic groups in Uganda.53 Customary and
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traditional justice enjoyed significant autonomy, and these carried out several conflict
resolution functions, including mediation, arbitration, adjudication, restitution, and were
the primary mode of dealing with disputes and conflict resolution.54
However, with the arrival of the British colonists, Western practices of dispute
resolution were introduced, effectively creating a distinct polarized system of justice.55 The
landscape of the justice system that evolved in Uganda during this time was along the
spectrum of competitive legal pluralism where two parallels systems operate. “At one end
[of the spectrum] were the courts of chiefs and headmen… courts that dispensed justice
according to customary law. At the other end was a hierarchy of courts cast in the
metropolitan mold, courts designed to solve disputes involving nonnatives.”56 In this
context, adjudicative authority was allocated between state and customary justice based on
state law and the subject matter’s appropriateness. For instance, on the one hand, modern
state law was based on the “language of rights for citizens guaranteed by civil law.”57 On
the other hand, customary justice was under native authority, based on a “patchwork of
customs and practices considered customary.”58
After independence, in 1967, during Milton Obote’s regime, customary and
traditional institutions were abolished throughout the country.59 The legal order during this
time was one of a combative pluralist environment. The state engages in repressive
strategies and actively seeks to undermine and outlaw customary systems of justice.
Traditional institutions were outlawed under article 118 of the 1967 Ugandan
Quinn, “Tradition⁈" 34.
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constitution.60 In such a combative legal pluralist environment, state repression often
becomes an important tool for the state to exert a monopoly on legal authority.61
Uganda’s customary justice system was subsequently revived and given explicit
recognition in the 1995 Constitution. Article 246(1) of the 1995 constitution explicitly
states that “subject to the provisions of this constitution, the institution of traditional leader
or cultural leader may exist in any area of Uganda in accordance with the culture, customs
and traditions or wishes and aspirations of the people to whom it applies.”62 In furtherance
of the provisions in Article 246, customary justice has been discussed and prominently
featured in various national-level policies, including the Juba Peace Agreement. Clause 3.1
of the 2007 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation emphasizes that “traditional
justice mechanisms, such as Culo Kwor, Mato Oput, Kayo Cuk, Ailuc and Tonu ci Koka
and others as practiced in the communities affected by the conflict, shall be promoted, with
necessary modifications, as a central part of the framework for accountability and
reconciliation.”63
Local Council Courts (LCCs) were also established under the Local Council Court
Act, 2006, for the administration of justice at “every village, parish, town, division and
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sub-county level.”64 The LCCs are mandated to handle civil disputes governed by
Customary Law, regarding “(a) disputes in respect of land held under customary tenure;
(b) disputes concerning marriage, marital status, separation, divorce or the parentage of
children; (c) disputes relating to the identity of a customary heir; (d) Customary
bailment.”65
In addition, Uganda’s recent national transitional justice policy acknowledges that
the
[t]raditional justice system plays an invaluable function in conflict and dispute
resolution especially among disadvantaged populations in conflict and post conflict
environments… In Uganda, traditional justice has been used as more formal
authority than formal law in most communities… They have been credited for
facilitating peace processes between the Government [of Uganda] and the rebel
factions, as well as tribal groups caught in conflict propaganda. They [traditional
justice] sustained peace and tranquility in Ugandan communities, a virtue that needs
to be strengthened.”66

7.5.2

A Pseudo Cooperative Pluralist Legal Order?

Despite the formal recognition of customary justice in several national policy documents
and transitional justice mechanisms happening at different levels, the current condition in
Uganda falls short of full cooperation between formal and customary justice. The context
in Uganda could best be described as a pseudo cooperative legal pluralist environment
because there is no real cooperation, and tensions still exist between formal and customary
justice about judicative power and jurisdictional authority.

For example, the ICC’s

indictment of Joseph Kony ignited fierce friction between local Acholi customary justice
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leaders and the ICC.67 Also, although the Acholi highly utilized customary justice to
facilitate the re-integration of ex-combatants, the relationship between customary justice
and the other state-led components such as the disarmament and demobilization of armed
groups was uncoordinated and ad hoc, rather than a planned and holistic approach.68 There
is no clear framework for how to balance these different justice mechanisms. The
modalities of interaction between customary justice and formal justice represent one of the
critical policy challenges of transitional justice practice.

7.5.2.1.1 From Pseudo to Full Cooperation: Towards Integration and
Harmonization
To effectively prevent post-conflict societies from reverting to armed violence, I envision
a legal order in Uganda characterized by a shift from pseudo to full cooperation between
formal and customary justice in which customary justice retains significant autonomy,
authority and not subordinated or viewed as a second-best alternative to formal justice.
Integration and harmonization seem to be the ideal approach that could lead to a complete
cooperative pluralist legal environment and comprehensive outcomes. I view the
integration of different systems as a “mutually agreeable contact leading to
interdependencies that cause little or no change in contact partners.”69 In an integrative
approach, the core and essential constitutive elements of customary justice remain intact
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and “sovereign.”70 In this context, the original quality and resonance of customary justice
is maintained, which is important for performing its intended functions.
Harmonization, too, is viewed as the other “best” approach to achieve a complete
cooperative legal pluralism, especially in post-conflict environments where customary
justice is officially recognized by the state, and efforts are made to consolidate democratic
governance.71 In this approach, national and international actors are willing “to tolerate
some normative differences in adjudication standards, as opposed to trying to get non-state
venues to act like state courts.”72 Thus, the state and international actors often support and
actively encourage customary justice practitioners “to act in a manner consistent with state
law” and core values, such as respecting women and children’s rights.73 Integration and
harmonization could work together in a way that allows for a certain level of support for
customary justice to function better in terms of enhancing fairness and minimizing
potential abuses. This support could come from various international and national level
actors. At the same time, international and national level actors must not consider their
support as an avenue to interfere with the autonomy and independent legitimacy of
customary justice. Figure 2 illustrates the “ideal” model of interaction between formal and
customary justice.
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Cooperative Pluralist Legal Environment:
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system without full incorporation
Customary and traditional institutions
retain great autonomy and independence
Jurisdictions are clearly defined
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Spectrum of Interaction Between Formal and Customary Justice Systems

Figure 2. A Model for the Interaction Between Formal and Customary Justice.74

As figure 1 illustrates, the proposed model allows informal customary justice to
exist independently of the formal state structures with considerable autonomy. Rather than
a full top-down incorporation of customary justice into the state legal apparatus, the
proposed model envisages a mutual positive interaction and a “process of negotiation as
multiple sources of power in a society compete, coalesce, [and] seep into each other.”75
Thus, it is an approach that does not focus on blueprints but, instead, is based on a
fundamental epistemological change, resulting in a situation where formal national and
international level transitional justice could reach an uneasy and perhaps uncomfortable
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accommodation with customary justice approaches. This model also allows for minimal
accountability mechanisms to safeguard and protect the rights of vulnerable groups and
other excesses of customary justice. International actors may collaborate with state
institutions to develop the technical and operational capacities of traditional institutions to
minimize abuses and other discriminatory practices of customary justice.

7.5.2.2

Integration and Harmonization in Practice

There are several opportunities for integration and harmonization between formal and
customary justice systems that could lead to effective cooperative pluralist legal order.
Integration and harmonization could result when actors develop transitional justice
interventions and policies in ways that are appropriate and consistent with the traditional
system of norms, values, and beliefs of local communities. For example, the structure of
Sierra Leone’s truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) came close to such an integrated
and harmonized approach. Sierra Leone’s TRC made explicit provisions and integrated
customary ritual practices in the working of the TRC. 76 In Kelsall’s view, although the
“truth” that was satisfactory to the local communities was not forthcoming, the addition of
traditional ritual and reconciliation ceremony to the TRC’s proceedings “created an
emotionally charged atmosphere that succeeded in moving many of the participants and
spectators… which arguably opened an avenue for reconciliation and lasting peace.”77
Kelsall argued that the TRC faced many challenges, including its relationship with the
Special Court, however, the traditional “ceremony of repentance and forgiveness… struck
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deeply resonant chords with the participants and forged a reconciliatory moment,” which
was significant and necessary for the state to regain credibility among local constituency.78
Another example where customary and formal transitional justice mechanisms
could be integrated and harmonized explicitly is the process of disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). As I discussed above, customary justice
contributed significantly to the reintegration process of many ex-fighters into their
communities. However, the relationship and the modalities of interacting with other formal
state-led aspects of the DRR were somewhat spontaneous and uncoordinated. Hence,
instead of ad hoc interactions, there could be a deliberate, planned, and coordinated
strategy where customary justice is integral to the entire DDR process from the
international, national, and local levels. Beyond the official recognition of customary
justice in national policy documents, there could be a comprehensive strategy that
explicitly details the specific tasks that the state, international actors, and the customary
and traditional institutions will each play in the overall DDR process. For the system to be
effective, customary and traditional institutions must maintain their independence and
authority to perform their tasks without undue interference or control by the state.
An approach that consciously and explicitly integrates and harmonizes customary
justice with formal justice measures could also serve as a vital foundation for reclaiming
trust and enhancing the state’s legitimacy. In Uganda, the state’s complicity in perpetuating
violence makes it lose trust, and its legitimacy is often challenged by those who feel
marginalized and violated during the conflict.79 As a result, concerns often arise whether
the state institutions and structures of governance could claim some legitimacy in
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administering interventions that seek to bring repair and reconciliation. However,
integrating and harmonizing customary justice into national and international level
transitional justice processes could be a governance strategy that could maintain peace and
stability and prevent conflict from reoccurring. The way the state engages, interacts,
accommodates, and negotiates with customary justice in which different sources of
knowledge and power coalesce could enable the state to regain and (re)build trust and be
seen as a credible actor in the eyes of the people who suffered several years of brutality.
The state could be seen as a credible actor in providing repair and redress when its actions
are deemed worthy, meaningful, and appropriate within some socially constructed system
of norms, values, and beliefs.80 Mutual interaction and cooperation between formal and
customary justice could also enhance “learning between informal and state systems,
[which] can improve the effectiveness of both sets of institutions.”81
If customary justice should be effectively integrated and harmonized with formal
national and international level processes, then there will have to be some type of “criteria
for what counts as an acceptable procedure,” and many modalities about the relationship
must be worked out, too.82 This raises a vital question regarding whether and how
customary justice mechanisms should be codified and what that might mean regarding their
originality and authenticity.
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7.6 Furthering the Interaction Between Customary and Formal Justice: A
Necessary Tension
This chapter argues that to have a more fulsome and transformative change that could cease
hostilities and prevent societies from reverting to armed conflict, there is the need for
formal state and customary justice mechanisms to work synergistically. However, the
interaction and co-existence of customary and state formal justice systems have often
generated tensions. In Uganda, this tension has existed since colonial times, especially as
seen in the dual judicial system created by the colonial administration – the native courts
on the one hand and the state courts based on the English Penal Code on the other hand.83
Following independence, customary law and the state judicial systems have co-existed,
albeit in a fractious relationship. The fundamental challenges that created the tension
between the formal state judicial system and customary justice are twofold. First, the issue
of scope/jurisdictional authority, and second, the issue of codification.
First, tensions around the scope/jurisdictional authority center around deciding on
the circumstances or crimes that would warrant the use of customary justice and those
crimes that would warrant the use of the state’s judicial retributive justice system. The
decision on the appropriate forum to address disputes has also blurred the lines between
political and judicial considerations.84 For instance, Uganda’s local council courts have
faced interference from political elites who often use their authority to bypass the local
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courts and seek redress in the state’s formal judicial system.85 Additionally, decisions about
when to apply customary justice versus when to use the state’s retributive justice system
inevitably touch on the ubiquitous issue of the justice-peace discourse, which provoked
fierce debate in Uganda when the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Joseph Kony and some
of his rebel commanders.86
The second tension is centered on the question of codification of customary justice.
Several scholars have raised concerns about codifying customary justice.87 Robins, for
instance, observed that “it is the nature of customary law that it is dynamic and so resists
being written down”88 Nagy also worries that codifying customary justice could pervert
the process, resulting in customary practices losing their flexibility and risk “‘one-sizing’
traditional justice.”89 Examples abound in Africa, where codification has changed the form
and structure of customary justice. For example, scholars and practitioners have raised
concerns about how the gacaca courts in Rwanda have been captured and controlled by
the state to foster and achieve the political objectives of the Rwandan government.90 The
codification and national-level legislation have transformed the original gacaca into
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something relatively different than before.91 For instance, the main goal of the “original”
gacaca was the restoration of social harmony. However, scholars considered its recent use
in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide as a highly formalized approach oriented towards
retributive justice to the extent where the gacaca courts could even impose prison
sentences.92
The other problem, of course, is that one cannot simply take a set of practices and
instrumentalize them. As explained above, customary practices are deeply embedded in
socio-cultural and religious beliefs and carried out through rituals and patterns of behaviour
that have been built over time and have taken on a distinct meaning. It is precisely because
of the meaning ascribed to such practices that they matter so much. Attempts to codify
them could alter the practices and the meaning to such an extent that they no longer
resemble their former form, and no longer hold that meaning.
Depending on how the above tensions and frictions are managed, three outcomes
could emerge.93 The first outcome is the desirable situation where customary and state
formal justice systems could strengthen each other and function synergistically to promote
post-conflict reconciliation and secure long-term peace. The second potential outcome—
an undesirable outcome—could emerge in which the state could weaken customary justice.
This could be a likely outcome in transitioning states, where the rule of law and democratic
institutions are still developing, and despotic leaders are still in power. In such a context,
in the desire to consolidate and centralize its power, the state could view customary justice
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and traditional institutions as a threat and take steps to outlaw it. The state could also use
legislation to gained control of customary justice and capture it to serve political interests.
The third—another undesirable outcome—is that, in post-conflict settings such as Uganda,
where public trust in state institutions has been undermined by years of conflict, the tension
between customary and formal state justice systems could escalate where traditional
institutions could choose not to engage the state in peace processes in an adversarial
manner. The failure of traditional institutions to engage the state could further erode the
trust between the local communities and the state, which could potentially weaken the state
and its institutions.
While a complete resolution of these tensions is beyond the scope of this chapter,
it is reasonable to raise and bring them to the fore, which is vital to enriching the debate
regarding the interaction of customary and formal state justice systems.94 Nevertheless, one
way to move towards a useful framework of interaction between customary justice and the
state would be through minimal codification in which local communities’ control how
codification occurs.
In a post-conflict environment like Uganda, where democratic governance is yet to
be consolidated and episodes of state repression still exist, I am hesitant to propose a “high”
degree of codification that will involve modalities of state oversight and regulation of
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customary justice by the state. In post-conflict contexts where the rule of law could easily
be shoved aside, state oversight and regulation risk an intrusion and co-optation of
customary justice by state institutions and political elites, which may result in customary
justice losing its independence, authority, and flexibility. For instance, the local council
courts (LCC) in Uganda are currently under the control of the state, and decisions can be
appealed up to the High Court.95 This has undermined the LCCs’ autonomy, and as Nakayi
reported, “in some cases politicians use their influence to emasculate the authority of [the
LCC] officers by encouraging some people to defy [the local] court orders.”96 Therefore, a
minimal codification would be appropriate to guide the relationship and interaction
between formal and customary justice while maintaining the autonomy and independence
of customary justice. My vision of minimal codification would also be appropriate to
address some of the weaknesses of customary justice.
As I argued in chapter 4, one of the criticisms of customary justice, especially in
the African context, is gender exclusion and the paternalism embedded in the decisionmaking structures in indigenous societies. As such, most customary justice and traditional
conflict resolution processes tend to be patriarchal and not gender-sensitive. Yet, social
relations within communities and how they are negotiated are entangled in various levels
of armed conflict in society. These social relations and exclusionary processes are reflected
in the disproportionate impact of conflict on women’s lives. For instance, studies revealed
customary justice in Uganda has often failed to uphold women’s property rights, which
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reinforces unequal power relations in local communities.97 Globally, there have been
efforts at improving women’s participation in peace processes. For instance, the United
Nations Resolution 1325, on women, peace, and security, adopted in 2000, stresses the
importance of women’s equal participation in all efforts to maintain and promote peace
and security.98 Customary justice processes could learn from some of these global
initiatives and adapt customary dispute and armed conflict resolution processes to take on
some of the global progress in promoting gender equality in post-conflict reconstruction.
Minimal codification could include the following: First, a good-enough rule of
engagement could be established that is sensitive to the specific social, cultural, and
historical contexts of local communities. Rules of engagement are necessary to ensure that
the state and international actors have predictable mutual cooperation with traditional
institutions, which does not undermine the autonomy and independence of customary
justice. Second, related to the above is recognizing and giving customary justice a place in
the large scheme of transitional justice and post-conflict reconstruction. In this context,
state and international actors should not view customary justice as a second-best
alternative, which often is the case. Third, customary justice should be allowed to work
while ensuring a degree of accountability of traditional institutions and the broader
community. Such an accountability mechanism would enhance compliance and promote
procedural fairness of customary justice. Compliance and accountability could include
mechanisms to protect women’s rights and increase women’s role in all conflict prevention

Lynn Khadiagala, “The Failure of Popular Justice in Uganda: Local Councils and Women’s Property
Rights,” Development and Change 32, no. 1 (2001): 60, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7660.00196.
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and resolution decision-making processes. In this respect, the state could facilitate and
guide how traditional institutions could implement customary justice in a less exclusionary
way while allowing traditional authorities to interpret customary justice according to their
worldviews of justice and peace.

Conclusion
As I discussed throughout this chapter, for customary justice to make a significant impact
in reckoning with the past and prevent the reoccurrence of violent conflict, customary
mechanisms need to be appropriately supported and linked to national-level broader
processes. The debate about the relationship between customary justice and formal justice
should not be a stand-off in terms of which mechanism is superior. Rather, it should be
about how each could leverage their unique strengths to redress and repair a complex and
often fraught post-conflict environment. Hence, transitional justice and post-conflict
reconstruction measures should not be viewed as mutually exclusive choices between
customary practices and formal justice.99
International actors have a significant influence in shaping transitional justice. They
will continue to play vital roles in the development of transitional justice norms, especially
those that ensure that states apparatus respect the rights of marginalized groups. Regardless
of the relative weakness of formal national-level approaches, the state also has an equally
important role in ensuring that post-conflict communities do not revert to violence. A
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reformed state legal apparatus, for instance, is vital to providing fair and accountable
administration of justice and promoting the rule of law.
While it is vital for formal justice to engage with local processes, we must
acknowledge the risk of co-optation, control, and the manipulation of customary justice.
Therefore, it is important to identify ways formal justice mechanisms could integrate with
customary justice that do not compromise local communities’ cultural, social, and
normative belief systems. The model suggested above does not aim for universal
applicability in every post-conflict context. It should be viewed within the unique situation
of each post-conflict environment’s historical, pragmatic, socio-cultural, and political
factors. It serves as a guide that might be useful as scholars and practitioners think through
the ways to prevent the reoccurrence of violent conflict, whether one approaches their work
from a bottom-up or top-down perspective.
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Chapter 8

8

Conclusions
This thesis sought to discuss a new perspective and build our conceptual

understanding of how the local could be a site for strong and better-enforced measures of
non-recurrence that account for the role of traditional institutions, local leaders, and nonstate armed actors in armed conflict. I presented a revised notion of measures of nonrecurrence beyond its restrictive state-centric usage that is more adaptable and contextually
sensitive to the complexities of post-conflict states. The findings pointed to the potential
of customary justice to terminate violence and prevent its reoccurrence within post-conflict
settings, especially at the local level.
This conclusion has three main sections. In the first section, I highlight the original
contribution of this thesis and discuss four fundamental ways customary justice to nonrepetition add value to the broader discourse of transitional justice and post-conflict
reconstruction. In the second section, I summarize the main arguments in the thesis. In the
third section, I raised some limitations of this research, and in the final section, I suggest
some areas of future research.

8.1 The Added Value and Contribution to Knowledge
This thesis makes a novel contribution in the sense that it expands and gives more depth to
discussions of measures of non-recurrence that lead to new and important directions of how
customary justice could be adapted to terminate civil wars and prevent societies from
reverting to armed conflict. By linking customary justice and measures of non211

recurrence—which is new—the analytical focal point of this thesis sheds new light on, and
is explicit about, the role of customary justice beyond reconciliation, acknowledgment,
truth-seeking, and social repair.
The first value of measures of non-recurrence is that, more than anything else, they
aim to prevent further armed conflict. This benefit might seem obvious, but it is worth
pointing out because, as many scholars have noted, measures of non-recurrence are the
least developed aspect of transitional justice, and the position it occupies in the spectrum
of transitional justice measures can be fuzzy.1 Second, customary justice of non-recurrence
could deal with ex-combatants who are often viewed as obstacles to transitional justice
from achieving its broader goals. Third, the cessation of localized violence is central to end
violence, alleviate the abuse against the civilian population, which sets the foundation for
other transitional justice and post-conflict reconstruction measures to emerge. The fourth
point highlights the importance of customary justice in policy and practices among
international development actors.

8.1.1 The Core Focus is on Conflict Prevention
Truth-telling may seek to acknowledge violations, reparations may address the material
and symbolic forms of repair, and prosecution may hold individuals criminally
accountable. But the complexity and viciousness of recent armed conflicts meant that
additional measures are needed to address post-conflict legacies and ensure long-term
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peace. Measures of non-recurrence is one of the additional measures that is needed to
redress the legacies of armed violence and prevent the future reversion to armed conflict.2
In other words, dealing with the legacy of armed conflict and serious human rights
violations cannot be achieved only through prosecution, truth-telling, and reparation, but
must, at the same time, include other measures that aim to prevent armed groups from
reverting to armed violence and prevent conflict from happening again in the future. At its
core, measures of non-recurrence more broadly seek to establish the conditions in which
societies emerging from violent conflict are less likely to revert to violence. Therefore,
measures of non-recurrence play important functions, particularly in contexts where the
risk of the continuation of violence exists, or where violence is still ongoing. In most postconflict settings, such as in northern Uganda, often people who engage in violence must
live together again, increasing the risk of tensions and renewed violence. In such contexts,
customary justice to non-recurrence serves vital roles to identify culturally appropriate
entry points to prevent renewed violence, which serves as part of the larger solutions to
achieving long-term peace and reconciliation.

8.1.2 Dealing with Potential Peace “Spoilers” to Advance Broader Transitional
Justice Goals
The long-term broader goal of transitional justice is an “attempt to come to terms with a
legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and
achieve reconciliation.”3 One of the things that might get in the way of post-conflict
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societies from achieving justice, accountability, and reconciliations is when there is still
the risk of ex-combatants’ return to violence. This is because ex-combatants are often
considered “potential ‘spoilers’ of a peace process,” and therefore, their successful
reintegration is very vital to ensuring post-conflict societies achieve the goals of
reconciliation.4 The findings from this thesis demonstrate that customary justice is a
valuable tool for reintegrating ex-combatants on individual, interpersonal, and community
levels, which could prevent renewed violence and open the way for post-conflict societies
towards achieving the broader goal of reconciliation. Unlike mainstream reintegration that
often focuses on the economic and political aspects, customary justice of reintegration
focuses on the social and relational dimensions. Reintegration rituals deal with the
individual ex-combatant and pay particular attention to victims’ perspectives, their
families, traditional leaders, and, more importantly, the general community.
The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping underscored the central role of
communities in reintegration when it observed that “ultimately it is communities who will,
or will not, reintegrate ex-combatants and it is communities who will, or will not, benefit
from a successful DDR program.”5 In chapter 6, I illustrated how ex-combatants who have
participated in communal reintegration ceremonies felt relief from cen (vengeful spirit),
felt more accepted, better able to communicate, and socialize with community members.”6
Hence, customary justice measures such as reintegration rituals play vital roles to

Lars Waldorf, “Introduction: Linking DDR and Transitional Justice,” in Disarming the Past: Transitional
Justice and Ex-Combatants, ed. Ana Cutter Patel, Pablo de Greiff, and Lars Waldorf, Advancing
Transitional Justice Series 4 (Social Science Research Council, 2009), 16.
5
United Nations, “Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS)”
(United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2006), 12–13,
https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/node/10983/pdf/UN-2006-IDDRS.pdf.
6
Baines, “Roco Wat I Acoli Restoring Relationships in Acholi‐land,” 45.
4

214

“neutralize” potential peace spoilers at the community level, which advances the broader
goals of transitional justice to achieve long-term reconciliation.

8.1.3 Cessation of Localized Armed Violence Supports Larger Transitional
Justice Goals
In many contemporary armed conflicts and civil wars, getting to the negotiating table and
arriving at a negotiated political peace agreement at the national level is often a major
challenge. National level political negotiation often takes so long to reach a peace
agreement partly due to the multiple parties involved who often have distinct preferences. 7
While national-level political peace agreements become elusive, the humanitarian cost of
armed conflict and civil wars continues to increase. As chapter 5 illustrates, customary
justice could terminate pockets of violence at the local level, offer a glimmer of hope to
alleviate civilians’ suffering and stem the cycles of violence within specific conflict
localities. The termination of localized violence and abuses could, in turn, provide stability,
lay the foundation, and open opportunities for other transitional justice measures to emerge.
Local peace agreements, if adequately supported, could deliver tangible long-term peace
at the local level. For instance, although the gomo tong is a relatively rare customary
practice, reports show it successfully kept some West Nile Bank Front members away from
joining the Museveni’s army to fight the LRA. Similarly, the local peace deal between the
Pokot and Samburu communities solidified peace between the two groups for almost a
century.8 These findings demonstrate the need to develop strategies to take advantage of
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the benefits of local peace deals. Local peace deals contribute to the larger solutions to
conflict by preventing armed violence and keeping armed groups away from engaging in
future violence.

8.1.4 Advancing Policy and Practice
This study contributes to enhancing awareness and drawing more attention of international
actors to customary justice. Although there is increasing attention to the positive
contribution of customary justice to address the legacy of violent conflict, support to the
customary justice systems remains low by international development actors and donors.
For instance, despite the World Bank’s efforts in promoting justice sector reforms, it does
not have many projects that “deal explicitly with traditional legal systems, despite their
predominance in many of the countries involved.”9 To increase the support to the
customary justice sector, there is the need to enhance awareness and understanding of the
positive contribution of customary justice among international development agencies. I
tackle this head-on in this thesis. By moving the analysis of measures of non-repetition to
the local level, I broadened practitioners’ and international development agencies’
understanding of how customary justice could contribute to preventing conflict
reoccurrence. This broadened notion of non-recurrence provides policymakers, particularly
international actors, who envision measures of non-recurrence as a path to long-term peace,
new possibilities, and alternative ways to respond to the specific needs of post-conflict
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societies. The arguments I advance in chapters 5 and 6 regarding how customary justice
could be adopted to satisfy the goals of non-recurrence increase the set of tools available
to international agencies who want to adapt and adopt customary justice practices to deal
with the legacy of civil wars and armed conflict.

8.2 A Summary of Key Arguments
Chapter 3 charted the path of this study, in which I look at the trajectory and origins of the
concept of measures of non-recurrence. The practice of measures on non-recurrence
originates in international diplomatic relations in which a state that violates a tenet of
international law is notified to take “a specific action that would actively reduce the
likelihood of another violation.”10 Measures of non-recurrence were further developed and
adopted by the United Nations in its Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights
Law. Over time, the context in which measures of non-recurrence might apply shifted from
the domain of the law of state responsibility to national level-transitional justice practices.
I took stock and examine the academic debates on the subject of the local turn in
chapter 4. I argued that two central strands mark the local turn debate. The first strand
argues for an increased engagement of local actors through outreach, sensitization, and
local empowerment while maintaining the international and liberal peacebuilding and
transitional justice approaches. Paris, for instance, is one of the most outspoken upholders
of this position.11 The second strand argues for a move beyond the technocratic liner
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blueprints of the liberal framework of transitional justice and post-conflict reconstruction.
Proponents of this strand argue for critical scholarship and a fundamental epistemological
change by recognizing different ways of knowing.12 This thesis is inspired by the second
strand of the local turn. I argued that for customary justice to effectively address the legacy
of armed violence and prevent societies from reverting to armed conflict, we must rethink
and reformulate our understanding of conflict and peace beyond the linear assumptions.
Such reframing views armed conflict as complex and often embedded in historical,
cultural, and socio-political constructs.13
Chapter 5 fills an important gap in the scholarly literature regarding how customary
justice might contribute to measures of non-recurrence. Although a lot has been written
about the potentially positive role of customary justice in dealing with the legacy of armed
violence, their forward-looking potential, particularly regarding the notion of measures of
non-recurrence, has not been sufficiently explored. Several scholars, such as Boege,
Buckley-Zistel, Faure, Osaghae, and Zartman, have written about how customary justice
is fundamentally oriented toward restoring and re-enforcing the continuing future
relationship between warring groups.14 Despite the future-looking functions of customary
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justice, they have not been thought of or not yet been recognized as being able to perform
the function of non-reoccurrence.
This thesis fills this theoretical gap in chapter 5 by advancing three theoretical
arguments, which illuminate the link between customary justice and non-recurrence. First,
I argued that customary justice such as reintegration rituals could provide practical ways
for ex-combatants to reconstruct their lives after years of combat life. The involvement of
the general community in performing reintegration rituals helps create a social control and
accountability mechanism which could serve as a dissuasive mechanism to prevent excombatants from remobilizing and engaging in future violence. Second, local peace deals
negotiated by traditional authorities could terminate ongoing violence to provide the
needed stability for national-level peace discussions to emerge. In some cases, local peace
deals could be ends in themselves and deliver “tangible improvements on the ground that
the top-level talks singularly failed to do.”15 Third, the communal orientation of customary
justice tends to reinforce interdependencies among community members. In such a
situation, communities evoke their shared social order to keep peace and ensure that society
does not revert to armed violence. “Building interdependencies make it impossible for
parties to walk away from each other or to renew conflict.”16
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In chapter 6, I analyzed the historical development of the conflict in northern
Uganda and how colonialism’s social and cultural dynamics influence the Acholi ethnic
identity. I traced the history of the LRA insurgency and how the Acholi became the main
targets of the LRA’s ferocity, although the LRA has its roots from the Acholi sub-region.
I drew on what other scholars have reported to provide concrete examples to support my
theoretical arguments. For instance, I established how customary justice and reintegration
rituals cleanse ex-combatants from cen, paving the way for them to reconnect with their
families and communities.
To become efficient in addressing the legacy of armed violence and break the cycle
of violence, it is better to envision a transitional justice approach by which various
interrelated interventions are implemented at various levels. As such, in chapter 7, I looked
at how customary justice could more broadly interact with formal national and
international-level interventions “synergistically, rather than work against each other.”17 I
argued that a post-conflict environment is complex and is often an arena of competing
power. Therefore, although I approach my work from a bottom-up perspective, I believe
that integrated efforts between the state and the local are necessary to effectively ensure
that societies emerging from violence do not revert to armed conflict. Utilizing legal
pluralism as an analytical lens, I argued that rather than a mere recognition or mention of
customary justice in national policy documents, there must be a clear roadmap of how
customary justice could be integrated into national-level transitional justice policies. The
roles of local and national level actors should be clarified, so that customary practices retain
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their autonomy and authority rather than be brought under the control of state authority. In
cases where national-level actors would interfere in customary justice practices, it should
be within the context of ensuring procedural fairness and checking excesses, such as
customary justice’s discriminatory practices.

8.3 Potential Limitations
This thesis is principally a theory-building exercise in which I sought to develop an
understanding of how measures of non-recurrence could be usefully built through the use
of local mechanisms. As an analytical tool, I also used the case of northern Uganda as a
lens through which to explore the conceptual claims I made. This approach could be seen
to have the following limitations.
Although I drew data from several snippets of examples, the preponderance of my
argument is based on scholars and practitioners’ work in northern Uganda and about a
specific area, the Acholi sub-region. As a result, some may argue that this research is
particularistic to the Acholi culture and the northern Ugandan conflict. Hence, my findings
cannot wholly be applied to other contexts. This is a legitimate limitation. Nevertheless,
the context of the northern Ugandan conflict and its manifestations mirrors most civil wars
in Africa. Also, “the broad principles and inclinations” of customary justice have been
similar in Africa.18 The fundamental difference in customary justice is the institutional
practices and political organizations based on clan, ethnic group, or social organization.19
Hence, notwithstanding the specificity of this research, the theoretical arguments I advance
offer broader theoretical insights and provide a valuable framework to conceptualize
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measures of non-recurrence in other post-conflict contexts, particularly in Africa. Besides,
the effective implementation of customary justice in any post-conflict context requires
flexibility and imagination. Therefore, transitional justice practitioners could use the ideas
raised in this thesis as a guide to engage in a deeper analysis of each conflict context and
adopt the appropriate customary justice measures that could be useful to prevent the nonrecurrence of armed conflict.

8.4 Unanswered Questions and Areas of Future Research
This thesis opened two new lines of inquiry that could help advance our understanding of
how customary justice could prevent societies from renewed armed conflict. First, a
potential area of further research concerns local peace agreements. In chapters 5 and 6, I
argued that local peace agreements could terminate ongoing intertribal violence and, in
some cases, have held peace for many years. However, the mechanisms and contextual
conditions under which local peace processes are constructed to prevent the reoccurrence
of interethnic violence is an under-explored question. The fundamental question to be
explored is: How can peace agreements negotiated at the local level have broader effects
and influence? In other words, how could the benefits of local peace agreements move
from their grassroots origins to have wider effects? Answers to this question will contribute
directly to the literature and advance our understanding of what local peace deals could
achieve at the micro (community) and macro—national, regional, and international levels.
Such analysis would be critical to furthering our ability to better support locally grounded
peace deals to end civil wars and ensure long-term social and political stability.
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Second, how do we know if customary justice to non-recurrence contributes to
preventing renewed violence and armed conflict? This question is about measuring the
effectiveness of customary justice to non-recurrence. “The effectiveness of guarantees of
non-recurrence will be measured by the extent to which they ensure that violations do not
happen again.”20 In this line of inquiry, conflict non-recurrence could be treated as the
outcome variable, and customary justice, the independent variable. One would be
interested in examining the duration in which peace is sustained following interventions in
the realm of customary justice. This study will allow practitioners and scholars to
empirically access the mechanisms that enable customary justice to prevent episodes of
violence in the future.

8.5 Final Thoughts: A Cause for Cautious Optimism
The conceptual framework presented in this thesis has contributed to the ongoing
discussion on the role of customary justice practices in post-conflict societies, broadly, and
specifically on how customary justice might work to prevent future renewed violence.
Customary justice, however, has its strengths and weakness (see chapter 4). This calls for
a reason for us to be cautiously optimistic about what customary justice can and cannot
achieve. Post-conflict contexts and customary justice vary, and there is no one silver bullet.
“Effective prevention of recurrence cannot be provided by a single measure or even by a
few measures.”21 The way to think about making progress is to see customary justice
as a way to recognize the autonomy and creativity of local agents and provide
opportunities for the plurality of knowledge that account for the diverse lived experience
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of post-conflict societies. We must, however, be cautious not to romanticize the local. The
local is not a homogenized construction or inherently considered to be inclusive and
egalitarian.22 The observations of Latigo provide a convincing summary of how we should
view the potential of customary justice in dealing with the legacy of armed conflict.
Neither glorifying traditional approaches as the only cure nor relegating them to the
realm of the devilish is helpful to people seeking assistance in their suffering. It is
only prudent to acknowledge the positive potential of traditional rituals and beliefs,
not as contradictory to or competing with other approaches but as complementary
to them. To ignore or discard traditional ways that have been seen to work in the
past makes no sense. On the other hand, they cannot provide the cure for all ills.

Birgit Bräuchler and Philipp Naucke, “Peacebuilding and Conceptualisations of the Local,” Social
Anthropology 25, no. 4 (2017): 432, https://doi.org/10.1111/1469-8676.12454.
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